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The climate change timeline is at critical juncture as policymakers, academics and other climate-
related stakeholders are contemplating the transition from the Kyoto era to the advent of the 
landmark 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change (the Paris Agreement). The study focuses in 
particular on tracing the development of and learning from past experience with the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) - one of the flexible mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto 
Protocol and tailored specifically for reducing emissions in developing countries. This is undertaken 
with a view to drawing lessons for its apparent successor, the Sustainable Development Mechanism 
(SDM) provided for in the Paris Agreement. The study is undertaken against the backdrop of the 
theoretical framework of market-based instruments supplementing the traditional command-and-
control approach to reducing carbon emissions, specifically in the area of environmental taxes and 
carbon offsets. While it is acknowledged that the major difference between the proposed SDM and 
the existing CDM is that carbon markets will no longer be limited to developed country parties in 
that developing countries will also be able to participate, many uncertainties remain. Moreover, 
while it is uncertain at the time of writing (mid-2017) whether the CDM will continue to exist 
alongside the SDM or will be replaced by it, the study investigates, among other things, questions 
around if and how the SDM refines and streamlines the CDM.  It considers these questions in the 
context of not only the relevant international instruments, but more specifically against the 
backdrop of South Africa's climate-related laws and policy frameworks. It is posited that the CDM 
– and by extension the SDM – will come increasingly under the spotlight in South Africa, as it will 
serve as a useful mechanism for reducing (or offsetting) the impending carbon tax liability. The 
thesis finds that many of the principles listed for the SDM mirror those of the CDM. Yet, some sort 
of transition from Kyoto to Paris will be required to ensure that the SDM will realise its potential to 
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1.1  BACKGROUND 
This study was carried out during a critical juncture in the climate change timeline, when 
policymakers, academics and other climate-related stakeholders are contemplating the transition 
from the Kyoto era to the advent of the landmark Paris Agreement.
1
 The study focuses in particular 
on tracing the development of, and learning from, past experience with the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) - one of the flexible mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Protocol and 
tailored specifically for reducing emissions in developing countries. This is done with a view to 
drawing lessons for its apparent successor, the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) 
provided for in the Paris Agreement.
2
 
The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, 30 days after the date on which at 
least 55 parties to the Convention (accounting, in total, for at least an estimated 55 per cent of the 
total GHG emissions) had deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the UN Depository. As at 30 September 2017, 168 out of 197 Parties had ratified the 
Paris Agreement.
3
 The Paris Agreement is founded on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) 
by countries themselves, in keeping with their specific situation.  
The study is undertaken against the backdrop of the theoretical framework of market-based 
instruments supplementing the traditional command-and-control (CAC) approach to reducing 
carbon emissions, specifically in the area of environmental taxes and carbon offsets. As such, this 
chapter provides an overview of the global response to climate change, followed by a brief account 
of South Africa's energy context and climate change response strategy. 
 
                                                 
1
 See United Nations Paris Agreement (2015) available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf, accessed on  
17 March 2016. 
2
 Paris Agreement, Art 6(4). 
3
 United Nations (UN) Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification (2017), available at 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php, accessed on 20 October 2017. 
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1.1.1 Climate change: the global response 
The challenge of climate change must be seen in the wider context of environmental challenges, as 
generally exemplified by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
4
 The MDGs came to a 
conclusion in 2015 and were replaced by the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
comprising 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
5
 The interrelatedness of climate change and 
development goals has been recognised by including climate change as an SDG.
6
 Moreover, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns that the continued emission of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) 'will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of 
the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for 
people and ecosystems'.
7
 Thus, climate change is no longer solely and environmental problem, but 
has also become 'an economic, trade and security issue that will increasingly dominate global and 
national policies as its impacts become more apparent'.
8
  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
9
 took effect in 1994 
and attempts to embrace the interests and needs of all countries. The Kyoto Protocol elaborates on 
the UNFCCC by placing more specific obligations on developed countries and Countries with 
                                                 
4
 UN The Millennium Development Goals Report (2015) at 3. In 2000, world leaders entered into a landmark 
commitment in collaboration with the UN, which thereafter became the 'most successful anti-poverty movement in 
history' – this was known as the MDGs. 
5
 UN Sustainable Development Goals available at http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-
goals/, accessed 15 July 2016. 
6
 Climate change is addressed by 'SDG No. 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change'. 
7
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of 
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core 
Writing Team, RK Pachauri & LA Meyer (eds)] (2014) at 8, available at 
http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf, accessed on 19 December 2016. Recently, the IPCC has 
decided the strategy and timeline for its next series of reports, the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), and the special 
reports that will be prepared in the next few years. The special reports will be on the impacts of global warming of  
1.5 ºC above pre-industrial levels and related global GHG emission pathways. Preparations are underway for the main 
AR6 report, which is expected to be released in three working group contributions in 2020/2021 and a Synthesis 
Report in 2022. See in this regard Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 'IPCC agrees special reports, 
AR6 workplan' (2016),  available at https://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/pdf/press/160414_pr_p43.pdf, accessed 
on 15 July 2016. 
8
 Foreword to the UN Climate Change Secretariat Uniting on climate: a guide to the Climate Change Convention and 
the Kyoto Protocol in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2002). 
9
 The UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty that was produced at the UN Conference on Environment and 





 Essentially, the Kyoto Protocol translated the UNFCCC into a specific 
action plan. Annex I countries were obliged to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by at 
least five per cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 (the first commitment period).
11
 Non-
Annex I countries were not required to make any comparable cuts unless they chose to do so.
12
 
In order for the Annex I countries to accomplish their pledge, the parties have to rely primarily on 
domestic action.
13
 However, in acknowledgement of the importance of institutional flexibility and 
private sector involvement, the Kyoto Protocol introduced three flexible mechanisms that may be 
used to supplement domestic action
14
, viz. the International Emissions Trading, Joint 
Implementation (JI) and the CDM. The focus of this thesis is on the latter, namely the CDM, and its 
apparent successor, the SDM.
15
  
The underlying concern of the UNFCCC is that the earth's climate system is threatened by a rise in 
atmospheric GHG concentrations resulting from increased anthropogenic GHG emissions,
16
 as 
reflected in its ultimate objective to 'achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic [originating in human activity] interference with the climate 
system'.
17
 This objective is qualified in that food production should not be threatened and that 
economic development should be able to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
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 J Glazewski & L du Toit 'Chapter 3: International climate change law' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) 




 Ibid. Although South Africa is a non-Annex I country in the Kyoto Protocol, it is a signatory. It has ratified the Kyoto 
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 In the preamble to the Marrakech Accords, the parties to the UNFCCC confirmed that  
'the use of the [flexible] mechanism shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall 
thus constitute a significant element in the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments included under Article 3, paragraph 1'. 
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Journal of Environment & Development 295-322 at 296. 
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 The SDM, as proposed in Art 6(4) of the Paris Agreement, will be introduced in paragraph 1.1.5 below and 
elaborated on in subsequent chapters. 
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 D Blodel, N Meyer-Ohlendorf, C Schlosser-Allera & P Steel United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Handbook (2006) at 21. 
17
 UNFCCC, Art 2. 
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The UNFCCC acknowledges that, on a per person basis, developing countries contribute 'only a 
small portion' of GHG emissions.
18
 Furthermore, it is recognised that the particular needs of 
developing countries in adapting to climate change is of critical importance, as the problem of 
climate change is interlinked with development, ie economic growth is essential for developing 
countries to improve the health, economic livelihood and quality of life of their citizens.
19
 The 
challenge, therefore, is to sever the link between economic development and GHG emissions. 
Comprising mainly developing countries, Africa is one of the continents most vulnerable to climate 
change, a situation exacerbated by multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity.
20
 Agricultural 
production and food security are likely to be severely compromised; warming could extend the 
range of mosquitoes with a resultant rise in malaria, among other things; changes in the variety of 
ecosystems could negatively impact on fisheries, tourism and safety at coastal levels; and climate 
change could aggravate pressures on water availability and accessibility.
21
 Yet, Africa's role in the 
Paris Agreement negotiations should not be underestimated. For example, the African Union has 
coordinated African support for the Paris Agreement, thereby unifying the continent's response to 
climate change.
22
 Another example is the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment 
(AMCEN), which has also contributed to strengthening Africa’s participation and active 
involvement both in global negotiations and in international agreements on the environment.
23
 
Following years of protracted negotiations, the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement set 
'new records for the speed of international diplomacy'.
24
 The Paris Agreement marks the end of the 
strict differentiation between developed and developing countries. Instead, a common framework is 
used that commits all countries to put forward their best efforts and to improve on these in years to 
come. Broadly, the Paris Agreement reflects a hybrid approach, blending bottom-up flexibility (to 
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 M Boko, I Niang, A Nyong, C Vogel, A Githeko, M Medany, B Osman-Elasha, R Tabo & P Yanda 'Chapter 9. 
Africa' in ML Parry, OF Canziani, JP Palutikof, PJ Van der Linden & CE Hanson (eds) Climate change 2007: 
Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 




 C Golubski 'Even before the U.S. left the Paris Agreement, Africa stepped up to the plate on climate change' (2017), 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/06/02/even-before-the-u-s-left-the-paris-agreement-
africa-stepped-up-to-the-plate-on-climate-change/, accessed on 15 October 2017. 
23
 United Nations (UN) 'AMCEN' (2017), available at http://www.unep.org/africa/amcen, accessed on 15 October 2017. 
24
 D Hone 'Five steps for the Paris Agreement' (2016), available at https://blogs.shell.com/2016/11/11/five-steps-for-
the-paris-agreement/, accessed on 1 August 2017. 
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achieve broad participation) with top-down rules (to promote accountability and ambition).
25
 This 
hybrid model recognises that climate change is a global challenge, but it requires political will to 
address it, which primarily occurs within the domestic realm.
26
 
The main achievement of the Paris Agreement is that consensus was reached to confine global 
greenhouse gas (   ) e issions to a li it that will ensure that the planet’s global te perature will 
not increase b   ore than    Celsius above pre-industrial levels,
27
 although many argue that a 2°C 
target is inadequate.
28
 To meet the latter criticism, a more aspirational 1.5°C target has been built 
into the COP21 agreement which sets in motion a ratcheting mechanism that combines transparency 
and regular disclosure. As a primary step towards meeting this target the Paris Agreement obliges 
parties to prepare, communicate, and maintain successive Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) with the aim of achieving the objectives of the UNFCCC.
29
 Each INDC 
represents a nation's voluntary commitment to pursue actions, policies and regulations deemed 
necessary to achieve a self-determined goal to mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to a changing 
climate.
30
 Once ratified, the INDC is converted into the NDC. 
Bodansky et al remark that the causes and effects of climate change are global and require 'complex 
collective action'.
31
 The conundrum lies in getting countries to operate not only in their own best 
interest, but also for the good of all.
32
 Thus, the problem of climate change can only be dealt with if 
all states – or at least the major GHG emitting countries – overhaul their energy production and 
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 Paris Agreement, Art 4(2).  
30
 Crowell Moring The Paris Agreement on climate change: a practical guide (2015), available at 
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/The-Paris-Agreement-on-Climate-Change-A-Practical-
Guide, accessed on 2 June 2016. 
31
 D Bodansky, J Brunnée & L Rajamani International Climate Change Law (2017)  at 2. 
32
 Id at 3. The authors explain that significant investments to reduce GHG emissions will only be in a country's 





 The next paragraph explores how South Africa – as the leading emitter on the 
African continent – has attempted to address climate change. 
 
1.1.2 Climate Change: the South African response 
South Africa is among the top 25 GHG emitting countries globally.
34
 This is hardly surprising, 
given that South Africa’s energ  and electricit  supplies are  ade up of nearl  70 per cent fro  
coal.35 This has resulted in South Africa contributing more than one-third of the total energy-related 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on the African continent.
36
 Figure 1.1 below illustrates the relative 
contribution of the top 20 fossil fuel emitters (including South Africa), expressed in MtCO2.
37  
 
Figure 1.1 Top 20 territories for fossil fuel emissions 
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Chapter 5 will provide more detail concerning South Africa's energy profile, comparing it with the 
other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries.
38
 It will be seen that, despite 
having a much smaller population and economy compared to the other BRICS countries, South 
Africa is by far the largest CO2 emitter on a per capita basis (coming in at 8.10 tCO2 per person), 
followed by China (6.66), Brazil (2.31) and India (1.56).
39
  
South Africa has adopted both the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement in response to 
climate change. As part of its commitments under these agreements, the South African government 
through its lead agent for South Africa's climate change response - the Department of 
Environmental Affairs - has recognised its responsibility to curb GHG emissions and has 
accordingly put a number of policy and legal measures in place,
40
 as elaborated on in Chapter 4 of 
the thesis. These include the National Climate Change Response Strategy for South Africa to 
Address Climate Change (NCCRS),
41
 the National Climate Change Response White Paper (the 
'White Paper')
42
 and the relevant chapter of the National Development Plan (NDP).  
The NCCRS outlines the steps that should be taken by government and other role players at a 
national level to respond to climate change. A number of principles and factors guided the 
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 Department of Environmental Affairs (2004) National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS), available at 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/seminar/application/pdf/sem_sup3_south_africa.pdf, accessed on 23 January 2017. 
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 The White Paper was approved by Cabinet in October 2011, GG 34695 (19 October 2011). The White Paper is 
available at  
    https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf, 
accessed on 29 January 2017. 
25 
formulation of the NCCRS, including poverty alleviation, access to basic amenities, as well as 
infrastructure development, job creation, rural development, foreign investment, human resource 
development and improved health.
43
 These ambitious principles aim to result in sustainable
economic growth.
44
 South Africa's responsibilities, as contained in the NCCRS, include the
establishment of a national inventory of GHGs, the Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) and 
the Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) Report.  
The LTMS study
45
 was commissioned in order to inform the country's long-term climate policy as
well as contributing to South Africa's negotiating position in terms of the UNFCCC.
46
 The LTMS
was the first interpretation of international climate mitigation policy in a domestic developing 
country context. Chapter 4 elaborates on the mitigation scenarios that the LTMS undertook to build. 
The TNA report
47
 is used by developed country parties as a means to cooperate with developing
countries in order to meet their obligations in terms of technology transfer with respect to climate 
change. Importantly in this context the South African TNA report emphasises that 'South Africa 
could harness financial benefits through global funding mechanisms, including the Clean 
Development Mechanism'.
48
 In other words, developed country parties can use the TNA report to
identify the specific needs where investment in South Africa will be most beneficial, and use the 
CDM as a means to achieve this.
49
The NCCRS was followed seven years later by the White Paper, in anticipation of South Africa 
hosting COP17 in Durban. The White Paper builds on the NCCRS report by conveying the South 
African government's vision for an effective climate change response via two overarching 
objectives, namely to effectively manage climate change impacts and to stabilise GHG 
concentrations. Although the White Paper indicates South Africa's commitment to making a fair 
43




 The LTMS Research Project took place in South Africa between 2005 and 2008. The detailed technical report 
comprising the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios is available at 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33713/1/07-Winkler-LTMS-Technical%20Report.pdf?1, 
accessed on 15 February 2017.  
46
 Glazewski Glazewski & Du Toit (n10) at para 3.4.3.3. 
47
 Department of Science and Technology South Africa's Climate Change Technology Needs Assessment Synthesis 
Report (2007), available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/DST_SA-climate-change-technology-needs-
assessment_25102007_0.pdf, accessed on 24 January 2017. 
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49
 Per DF Humphris South Africa's law and policy framework for the regulation of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (unpublished LLM dissertation, North-West University, 2011) at 33. 
26 
contribution to the global effort in reducing GHG emissions, it does so against the 'overriding 
national priorities' of, amongst others, sustainable development, job creation and poverty 
eradication.
50
 In other words, the White Paper promotes mitigation measures to effect sustainable
development in socio-economic, as well as environmental terms. It will be demonstrated in Chapter 
4 that both elements can be addressed through the utilisation of the CDM.
51
A further document which has to be considered in conjunction with South Africa's climate change 
response, is the NDP.
52
  enerall  speaking, the NDP sets out a vision until  030 for South Africa’s
energ  sector, including a reference to ‘environ ental sustainabilit ’ through efforts to reduce 
pollution and mitigate the effects of climate change. The NDP supports procurement of at least 20 
GigaWatt (GW) of renewable energy by 2030 in its outline of the country's development path.
53
As mentioned earlier, the Paris Agreement came into effect on 4 November 2016. South Africa 
managed to fast-track its domestic approvals process to ratify the Paris Agreement on 1 November 
2016
54
 - just in time for the COP22 meeting in Marrakech.
55
 As South Africa is now a formal Party
to the Paris Agreement, the country has an 'even higher responsibility to fight climate change and 
build a low carbon future'.
56
 Consequently, in fulfilment of its role as a party to the Paris
Agreement, South Africa submitted its INDC on 25 September 2015.  
50
 L Kotzé, T Humby, O Rumble, A Gilder & K Lehmann 'Chapter 1: Setting the scene' in T Humby, L Kotzé, O 
Rumble & A Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 1-6. 
51
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%20make%20it%20work.pdf, accessed on 17 December 2016. 
53
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South Africa had signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016. Thereafter, on 
20 October 2016, Cabinet announced its approval for the treaty to be submitted to Parliament for ratification. The 
ratification of the treaty was assented to by the National Council of Provinces on 27 October 2016, and the National 
Assembly on 1 November 2016. 
55
 COP22 was held from 7 to 18 November 2016 in Marrakech, Morocco. 
56
 WWF 'South Africa ratifies climate agreement in time for Marrakech COP22' (2016), available at 
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The INDC targets a reduction in GHG emissions of between 398 and 615 MtCO2e, over the period 
2025 to 2030.
57
 When South Africa ratified the Paris Agreement, the INDC was transformed into an
NDC. The country's NDC is consistent with its pledge under the Copenhagen Accord, which 
proposes emissions reductions below business-as-usual (BAU) levels by 34 per cent in 2020 and 42 
per cent in 2025. The South African NDC also highlights the fact that economic and social 
development as well as poverty eradication are South Africa's top priorities.
58
Notwithstanding that South Africa is a developing country beset with some of the highest levels of 
social and economic inequality in the world, it has played a leading role in global climate change 
negotiations from (at least) COP13 hosted in Bali.
59
 The country headed the vanguard in
negotiations when it hosted COP17 in Durban, South Africa, in 2011. More recently, South Africa 
chaired the G77
60
 at COP21, with some individuals playing a central role in the negotiations.
61
Other policies emanating from the White Paper are, for example, the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP),
62
 and the White Paper on the
Renewable Energy Policy.
63
 In the latter document, the South African government recognises that
the development of fiscal, financial and legislative instruments will be required to stimulate the 
increased use of renewable energy technologies.
64
 One such fiscal instrument is South Africa's
proposed carbon tax, which is likely to come into effect within the next few years.
65
 This is the
subject matter of the next paragraph. 
57
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 The development of the proposed carbon tax in South Africa is set out in Chapter 2. 
28 
1.1.3 Carbon tax and carbon offsets 
The above must be seen against the backdrop of the interaction between two types of market-based 
instruments (MBIs), namely that of a carbon tax and a carbon offset, which are discussed in Chapter 
2. One such carbon offset is the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol. Internationally recognised as a full-
fledged carbon offset standard,
66
 it is also domestically approved as a carbon offset methodology.
Because South Africa will likely implement a new carbon tax in the foreseeable future, carbon 
offsets will probably come under greater scrutiny as a means of reducing the carbon tax liability. It 
is against this background that the theoretical foundation of this thesis is now addressed. 
Governments have an array of environmental policies at their disposal, including regulations, 
information programmes, innovation policies, environmental subsidies and environmental taxes.
67
In general, policies to restrict GHG emissions (or, conversely, to promote reductions) may be 
classified into two categories, namely CAC and MBIs. The latter comprise regulations that 
encourage behaviours through market signals, rather than through explicit control directives.
68
 On
the other hand, conventional approaches to regulating the environment are referred to as CACs, as 
they allow little flexibility in the means of achieving goals.
69
 Chapter 2 will delve into greater detail
regarding these classifications, and will set out the characteristics inherent to MBIs.  
Of relevance here, is that a range of MBIs exist to address environmentally-related market failures 
by way of a price mechanism. One such MBI is the use of environmental taxes.
70
 The basic
rationale for an environmental tax is clear: it applies the polluter-pays principle and intends to 
change the behaviour of taxpayers. On this basis, the rationale is to reduce pollution to a level that 
66
 A Kollmuss, H Zink & C Pol carp ‘Making sense of the voluntar  carbon  arket: A co parison of carbon offset 
standards’ (2008) at 14, available at http://cetesb.sp.gov.br/wp-
content/uploads/sites/28/2008/03/acomparisonofcarbonoffsetstandardsmakingsenseofthevoluntarycarbonmarket.pdf, 
accessed on 20 April 2017 state that a full-fledged carbon offset standard includes the following three components: 
accounting standards; monitoring, verification and certification standards; and registration and enforcement systems. 
Also, in adhering to all these accompanying requirements, the carbon offset standard is seen to be rigorous and enjoys 
wide support from carbon project developers. 
67
 OECD Environmental taxation – a guide for policy makers (2011) at 1, available at https://www.oecd.org/env/tools-
evaluation/48164926.pdf, accessed on 14 June 2017. 
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 MG Faure & SE Weishaar 'Chapter 22: The Role of Environmental Taxation: Economics and the Law' Handbook of 
Research on Environmental Taxation (2012) provide an overview of taxation and other incentive-based regulations 
from an environmental law and economics perspective by addressing their strengths and weaknesses. 
29 
takes full account of both the costs of the pollution and the benefits of the polluting activity.
71
 Taxes
are often more effective than regulation as a way to achieve this.
72
 An example of an environmental
tax is the carbon tax. 
A carbon tax is designed to encourage emission-reduction activities in certain sectors, through 
placing a price on carbon.
73
 It therefore strives to internalise the cost of external GHG damages,
thereby providing consumers and businesses with greater flexibility to decide how to change their 
behaviour and reduce harmful activity.
74
 South Africa already makes use of two specific carbon
taxes,
75
 namely an electricity levy
76
 and a CO2 emissions levy  on new motor vehicles imported into
or manufactured in South Africa.
77
 Following recommendations from energy scholars, the South
African government has proposed the introduction of a comprehensive carbon tax.
78
 The
development and workings of the carbon tax are explored in Chapter 2. 
It is anticipated that South Africa's carbon tax will come into effect in a phased manner at a 
marginal rate of R120 per tCO2e.
79
 Parties that conduct various activities in the manufacturing,
construction, mining and transport sectors will be affected. The carbon tax liability is calculated as 
the tax base multiplied by the rate of carbon tax. The tax base refers to the total quantity of GHG 
emissions from combustion, fugitive and industrial processes, proportionately reduced by the tax-
free allowances.  
71
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 National Treasury Carbon Offsets Paper (2014) at 18, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/CarbonOffsets/2014042901%20-
%20Carbon%20Offsets%20Paper.pdf, accessed on 20 December 2016. The Carbon Offsets Paper complements 
National Treasury's Carbon Tax Policy Paper. It provides further details about the proposed carbon offset mechanism 
to accompany the carbon tax. 
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The carbon tax will likely be implemented with complementary measures, for example, a reduction 
in the electricity levy, as well as other measures, such as carbon offsets which firms can use to 
reduce their carbon tax liability. The Davis Tax Committee
80
 considers it likely that investment in
offsets could significantly promote sustainable development
81
 in South Africa.
In some industries, GHG producers are unable to implement programmes to reduce GHG 
emissions, mostly due to technology and financing constraints. A carbon offset is an external 
investment that allows a company to access least cost mitigation options in a manner that is cheaper 
than investment in its own operations. In other words, carbon offsetting is the funding of an activity 
outside of one's own organisation that reduces emissions elsewhere, by the same amount as the 
emissions that need to be offset.
82
Carbon offsetting is an increasingly popular means of taking action against climate change. By 
paying someone else to reduce GHG emissions elsewhere, the purchaser of a carbon offset aims to 
compensate for – or offset – their own emissions. Carbon offset markets exist both under 
compliance schemes as well as under voluntary programs. In order to be useful, carbon offset 
projects have to be evaluated and validated. A number of different carbon offset standards have 
been developed to achieve this. The CDM standard is often a mandatory one, given its wide 
international acceptance in the global regulated carbon markets. These standards will be elaborated 
on in Chapter 2.  
It is anticipated that carbon offset mechanisms will increasingly come under the spotlight in South 
Africa as the carbon tax nears its implementation date. Consequently, the next paragraph provides a 
brief prologue to the CDM, followed by an introduction of the SDM. 
80
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1.1.4 Carbon offsets under the Kyoto Protocol: the CDM 
The CDM was established as part of the Kyoto Protocol and provides developed countries with a 
mechanism to reduce their own GHG emissions obligations by purchasing credits from CDM 
projects that avoid GHG emissions in developing countries.
83
CDM projects facilitate financing and technology transfer for GHG reduction in developing 
countries. This mechanism includes projects in renewable energy, energy efficiency and other 
related fields designed to achieve emission reductions.  Chapter 3 will provide an historical account 
of the CDM's development. 
The carbon emission reduction credits from the CDM projects are known as Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) and are saleable to and usable only by developed countries for the purpose of 
meeting their legally binding emission reduction obligations.
84
 To motivate non-Annex I countries
(such as South Africa) to participate in the CDM they benefit from technology transfer for the 
projects, foreign funding for the projects and the possibility of trading the carbon credits gained 
from the projects with Annex I countries.
85
The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and is intended to meet two objectives: 
1. To assist non-Annex I countries in achieving sustainable development and, in so doing, to
contribute prevent dangerous climate changes; and
2. To assist Annex I countries in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments.
The CDM addresses the second objective by allowing the Annex I countries to meet part of their 
emission reduction commitments buying CER from CDM emission reduction projects in 
83
 The CDM was first mooted during July 2001, when the COP6 reached an outline agreement (the so-called Bonn 
Agreement) on an emissions trading system. The Bonn Agreement introduced rules for accounting for emissions 
reductions from carbon 'sinks' as well as a compliance regime. It also outlined a package of financial and 
technological support to help developing countries contribute to global action on climate change and address its 
adverse effects (Blodel et al Handbook n16 at 19). In late 2001, the COP7 adopted the detailed legal texts based on 
negotiations held in Marrakesh – these decisions became known as the Marrakesh Accords (Blodel et al Handbook 
n16 at 20). COP9, during December 2003, adopted decisions on afforestation and reforestation activities under the 
CDM (Blodel et al Handbook n16 at 20). The rules for the CDM came into effect on 16 February 2005 when the 
Kyoto Protocol was ratified by the requisite number of signatories. 
84
 This explanation of the workings of the CDM and CERs were obtained from National Treasury Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (2013) at para 4.3. 
85
 GS Little, T Maxwell & M Sutherland 'Accelerating the implementation of the clean development mechanism in 
South Africa' (2007) 10(4) SAJEMS 395-411 at 395. 
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developing countries. The projects and the issue of CERs are subject to approval to ensure that 
these emission reductions are real and 'additional'. The issue of additionality is complex and will be 
examined in Chapter 7 'Barriers' of this thesis. 
During the COP18 meetings held in December 2012 in Doha, Qatar, the CDM was extended as a 
flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, enabling developing countries to continue their 
participation in the global carbon market. In order to enhance the uptake of CDM projects in South 
Africa, National Treasury introduced the section 12K tax incentive to the South African Income 
Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, as amended (the 'Income Tax Act') in 2009.
86
 South Africa's fiscal policy
(including tax incentives relating to the CDM and renewable energy) is addressed in Chapter 4 'Law 
and Policy' of this thesis. 
Chapter 6 will provide more in-depth analytics regarding South Africa's CDM profile. At this stage, 
it is worth mentioning that South Africa currently has 56 registered CDM projects, with no new 
projects having been registered after 2014. This can likely be ascribed to the fact that the window of 
opportunity for CDM project implementation was drawing to a close when the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol came to an end.
87
 Although it is not as yet clear whether the CDM will
be replaced in its entirety or continue in 'a similar shape and form', the SDM of the Paris Agreement 
has 'strong echoes of the CDM'.
88
 As such, the focus now shifts to the SDM.
1.1.5 Carbon offsets under the Paris Agreement: the SDM 
As mentioned earlier, the Paris Agreement aspires to an ambitious, but nonbinding, goal to curb the 
increase in global average temperature caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions to 'well below' 
2°C. One view of the Paris Agreement is that it 'seeks a Goldilocks solution that is neither too 




 Essentially, section 12K exempts amounts received or accrued upon disposal of CERs for purposes of normal tax and 
capital gains tax.  The capital gain or capital loss from the disposal of a section 12K asset that is used to produce 
amounts that are exempt from normal tax, must be disregarded in terms of para 64(b) of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Act. Section 12K was amended on 1 January 2013 so as to extend the exemption to 31 December 2020.  
87
 It was expected that the Kyoto Protocol would have terminated by 2012 and been replaced by a new protocol. 
88
 O Rumble, A Gilder & M Parker 'Chapter 20: Carbon Pricing in South Africa' in T Humby, L Kotzé, O Rumble & A 
Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 20-19. 
89
 D Bodansky 'The Paris climate change agreement: a new hope?' (2016) 110(2) American Journal of International 
Law 288-319 at 289. The author explains that the Paris Agreement comprises both a bottom-up approach which 
reflects (rather than drives) national policy and a top-down approach whereby countries' NDCs are complemented by 
international norms. 
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architecture of the Paris Agreement is outlined in Chapter 3 where the historical development of the 
CDM and SDM is emphasised. 
Of particular relevance to this thesis, is the proposed establishment of the SDM, titled 'mechanism 
to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development'.
90
The SDM is a successor-in-interest to the regulatory infrastructure established under the Kyoto 
Protocol's CDM and, according to some commentators, is set to replace the CDM from 2020 
onwards.
91
 It will be created and managed under the authority and rules of the UNFCCC
Secretariat.
92
 This thesis will compare and contrast the CDM and SDM in Chapter 3.
The SDM's essence is to deliver an emissions reduction against some reference which is contained 
within the NDC, but also to ensure an overall reduction in global emissions while delivering 
sustainable development benefits.
93
 Thus, the SDM promotes GHG mitigation efforts above and
beyond what a nation commits to under its NDC.
94
90
 Chapter 3.5.1 deals with the SDM in more detail. Article 6(4) of the Paris Agreement, available at: 
 http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf, accessed on 
2 June 2016, establishes the SDM 'under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body 
designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, and shall aim: 
a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;
b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private
entities authorized by a Party;
c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities
resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined
contribution; and
d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions'.
91
 See, for example, J Voigt 'NGO Newsletter #14: Lessons from the CDM for the SDM and climate finance' (2016), 
available at http://carbonmarketwatch.org/watch-this-ngo-newsletter-14-lessons-from-the-cdm-for-the-sdm-and-
climate-finance/, accessed on 15 July 2016.  
92
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 'Adoption of the Paris Agreement - Proposal 
by the President' (Draft decision 1/CP.21) at para 38, available at  
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1&Lang=E, accessed on 10 June 2016. 
93
 For this reason, the mechanism is also referred to by some as the Emissions Mitigation mechanism (EMM). See, for 
example, International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) A vision for the market provisions of the Paris 
Agreement (2016) at 3, available at 
http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Position_Papers/2016/IETA_Article_6_Implementation_Paper_May2016.pd
f, accessed on 21 March 2016. 
94
 In other words, all GHG emission reductions achieved under the SDM will therefore have to be in addition to those 
that would have otherwise occurred in the host party's jurisdiction. 
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The CDM became an important source of climate finance for developing countries, where the only 
real obligation on the part of the host country for a given project was to provide the necessary 
governance structure to ensure eventual issuance of the CERs.
95
 However, this is no longer the case,
as the provisions of the Paris Agreement, in particular Art 6, are now effectively the same for all 
countries.
96
 Therefore, all countries will be able to generate and/or use offset credits, ie developed
countries will compete with developing countries for the investment in mitigation activities.
97
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The CDM was the first global, environmental investment and credit scheme of its kind, providing a 
standardised emission offset instrument. Although the CDM could in many ways be regarded by 
some as a 'trailblazer',
98
 others are of the opinion that the CDM is 'cumbersome and unrewarding'
and 'tangled in red tape'.
99
 The CDM faces significant barriers; these include, amongst others, the
dilemma of additionality, lower proportional CER credit revenues on the investment, and the lack of 
incentive for technology transfer.
100
 Scholars appear to be divided as to the success of the CDM,
especially in Africa.
101
 The SDM, as proposed in the Paris Agreement,
102
 will arguably face similar
opportunities and challenges. 
95
 According to D Hone 'A new reality to come to terms with' (2016) available at: 




 Carbon Market Watch 'News: Paris treaty establishes new carbon trading mechanisms' (2016), available at 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/news-paris-treaty-establishes-new-carbon-trading-mechanisms/, accessed on 8 June 
2016. 
98
 See Q Wang & Y Chen 'Barriers and opportunities of using the clean development mechanism to advance renewable 
energy development in China' (2010) 14(7) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1989-1998. 
99
 B Pearson 'Market failure: why the Clean Development Mechanism won't promote clean development' (2007) 15(2) 




For an analysis of the CDM's success and failure on the African continent, see N Kreibich, L Hermwille, C 
Warnecke & C Arens 'An update on the Clean Development Mechanism in Africa in times of market crisis' (2016) 
9(2) Climate and Development 178-190; for a global perspective of the CDM's performance, see D Watts, C 
Albornoz & A Watson 'Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) after the first commitment period: Assessment of the 
world's portfolio and the role of Latin America' (2015) 41 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1176-1189. As 
regards the South African context, see W Greene 'Carbon Finance for South Africa – an Investor’s guide' Africa 
practice (2006); M Jung 'Host country attractiveness for CDM non-sink projects' (2006) 34(15) Energy Policy  2173-
2184 and L du Toit 'Promoting Clean Development Mechanism Implementation in South Africa: Law and Policy' 
(2009) 1 SA Public Law 33-55 at 47. 
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This dichotomous view of the CDM informs the foundation upon which this thesis will be built. 
With many of the rules, modalities and procedures for the SDM yet to be defined, a unique 
opportunity exists to learn from the experience of the CDM.
103
 It is therefore the purpose of this
study to analyse the challenges and opportunities that exist for the proposed SDM, by applying 
lessons learned from its predecessor, the CDM.
104
While it is uncertain at the time of writing (mid-2017) whether the CDM will continue to exist 
alongside the SDM or will be replaced by it,
105
 the study investigates, among other things, questions
around if and how the SDM refines and streamlines the CDM.  It considers these questions in the 
context of not only the relevant international instruments, but more specifically against the 
backdrop of South Africa's climate-related laws and policy frameworks. The study will show that 
much of the ramifications and many of the details of the SDM still have to be ironed out.  
It is posited that the CDM – and by extension the SDM – will come increasingly under the spotlight 
in South Africa, as it will serve as a useful mechanism for reducing (or offsetting) the impending 
carbon tax liability. The thesis finds that many of the principles listed for the SDM mirror those of 
the CDM. Yet, some sort of transition from Kyoto to Paris will be required to ensure that the SDM 
will realise its potential to mitigate emissions and support sustainable development. 
To that end, the following research objectives have been identified: 
 To understand South Africa's energy profile and responses to climate change, with specific
reference to the CDM and SDM.
 To evaluate South Africa's law and policy framework for the regulation of the CDM, and by
extension, the SDM.
 To ascertain the various factors that influence countries, in particular South Africa, both
positively and negatively when considering implementing projects under the CDM.
102
 Paris Agreement, Art 6(4). 
103
Also see in this regard the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)  'Mitigation update: COP 21 
carbon footprint released, CDM provides lessons learned for Paris Agreement' (2016) available at http://climate-
l.iisd.org/news/mitigation-update-cop-21-carbon-footprint-released-cdm-provides-lessons-learned-for-paris-
agreement/, accessed on 10 June 2016. 
104
 Bodansky et al (n31) 193 are also of the opinion that lessons learned from the CDM are 'clearly relevant', although it 
is unclear at this stage how the SDM will build on the CDM. 
105
Although the Paris Agreement and its accompanying decision are silent on the future of the CDM, many 
commentators - including Bodansky et al (ibid), Voigt (n91), Hone A new reality (n95) and Carbon Market Watch 
(n97) - are of the opinion that the SDM is a new mechanism which merges the functionality of the CDM and JI in that 
it encompasses emissions reductions in both developed and developing countries. 
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 To examine the key elements of the SDM, especially the concepts of additionality, double
counting and the establishment of transparent governance and verifiable accounting.
 In light of the lessons learnt from the CDM, to propose recommendations for the design and
implementation of the SDM, specifically with regards to South Africa.
1.3  RESEARCH DESIGN, METHOD AND SCOPE 
An interpretive research approach was adopted for this study as it seeks to understand and 
describe.
106
 As with most legal interpretive research, this study adopts a doctrinal research
methodology, as it provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal 
category (in this case, the legal rules pertaining to the CDM and SDM), explains areas of difficulty 
and is based purely on documentary data.
107
Both a desktop study and a quantitative study were performed. The desktop study entails a literature 
review of and reference to both foreign and local statutory laws, regulations and policy documents, 
as well as authoritative studies on the UNFCCC, MBIs, the CDM and SDM. The documentary data 
was obtained from published articles, chapters in books, journal and legal databases and reputable 
websites.  
The quantitative study consists of a high-level analytical review of certain key indicators of CDM 
projects in South Africa and the other BRICS member countries. This approach comprises the 
CDM's project generation ability, its contribution to the economy, its investment capability and 
proposed emissions reduction. The study then analyses sustainable development impacts as 
described in the Project Design Documents (PDDs) of each of the 56 registered CDM projects in 
South Africa.  
The research reflects the CDM project data, law and policy developments up to and including 
30 September 2017, except in certain circumstances where more recent policy developments or 
legislative amendments appear particularly relevant. 
1.4  IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis will demonstrate that most CDM projects in South Africa are energy related and 
contribute to sustainable development in the country. It could therefore be surmised that existing 
106
 E Babbie & J Mouton The Practice of Social Research (2009). 
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MA McKerchar 'Philosophical paradigms, inquiry strategies and knowledge claims: applying the principles of 
research design and conduct to taxation'  eJournal of Tax Research (2008) 6(1) 5-22. 
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CDM (and future SDM projects) will play a pivotal role in contributing to South Africa's 
sustainable energy future.
108
 This study aspires to contribute to a climate change policy which
would help ensure the energy security in South Africa, whilst at the same time contributing to 
national endeavours to honour the Paris Agreement pledges made by South Africa. 
To that end, the researcher will undertake to disseminate the main research findings of this study 
through, for example, publication in peer-reviewed journals, presentations at conferences and 
participation in think-tanks and indabas. In particular, this study will inform the contribution the 
researcher hopes to make as part of her membership of various influential and worthy committees 








 The dependency on foreign energy imports, in combination with insufficient electricity supplies, will inevitably and 
primarily affect the poor and the employment sector. Indeed, the unreliable electricity supply in South Africa had 
already caused National Treasury to adjust its estimate in GDP growth downwards to one per cent for 2015 and 
0.9 per cent for 2016. Given the energy crisis faced by South Africa – load shedding, the recent record fall of the 
Rand, credit rating downgrades, violent service delivery protests, illegal power connections and gross 
mismanagement of the power utility Eskom – a sustainable, energy policy is a serious and relevant matter that 
requires urgent attention and in-depth research. Moreover, the design of such an appropriate policy would assist in 
decoupling power supply in South Africa from internationally linked factors (such as the price of gas, oil and coal) as 
well as exchange rate fluctuations.  
109
 The author represents her employer (the University of Stellenbosch Business School) as an academic stakeholder on 
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th
 International Conference on Clean Electrical Power (ICCEP) 
held in Italy during 27-29 June, the author was invited to join the international steering committee as the only 
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is hoped that this study will assist in improving and enhancing the usefulness of the SDM as a tool 
to incentivise climate change mitigation and contribute to sustainable development. 
1.5  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Having provided an overview in this introductory chapter this thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 contextualises the thesis by drawing the relevant theoretical framework. This chapter 
introduces the broader theoretical discourse relating to MBIs, environmental taxes and carbon 
offsets. It is against this backdrop that the most prominent carbon offset, namely the CDM, will be 
examined in subsequent chapters. 
Having laid the theoretical foundation in the previous chapter, Chapter 3 examines the Kyoto 
Protocol, in particular Art 12 which establishes the CDM. The chapter then investigates the 
theoretical and policy considerations underlying the legal aspects of the CDM with a view to 
assessing how they will be expanded upon by the SDM. The architectural components of the Paris 
Agreement are explored in order to contextualise the origin and proposed implementation of the 
SDM. In particular, the chapter compares the legal text of Art 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (ie the 
CDM) with Art 6(4) of the Paris Agreement (ie the SDM). Lastly, the chapter reflects on 
transitional arrangements for existing CDM projects.  
In light of the above, Chapter 4 focuses on the legal and policy framework governing the CDM in 
South Africa. Fiscal laws are part of this framework; as such, a brief account of the tax incentives 
for clean (or renewable) energy is provided. This chapter also considers the domestic policy 
framework, including the White Paper, which could potentially create an enabling environment for 
the SDM. Thereafter, the role of local government in implementing green reform is explored.  
The quantitative aspect of this thesis commences in Chapter 5, wherein the status of the CDM is 
analysed from an international perspective. This chapter also elaborates on the CDM network of the 
BRICS member countries, in particular China and India, as these countries are recognised as global 
leaders in the CDM environment.  
Chapter 6 continues the analytical study by examining the sustainable development impacts of all of 
the CDM projects registered in South Africa. The resulting trends in reported impacts are 
subsequently presented by province and project type. The chapter concludes by considering a case 
study from South Africa, where the country's first CDM project has received mixed reviews. 
The previous chapters considered the development of the CDM, the policy considerations 
underpinning its use, as well as the success of the CDM in the global arena and its contribution to 
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sustainable development in South Africa. In Chapter 7, the focus shifts to the South African 
experience, highlighting problems experienced by local CDM project developers. Next, the chapter 
explores three proposals which are aimed at boosting the CDM uptake during the transition period 
and beyond 2020. Finally, the chapter considers a case study from Panama, which serves as a 
cautionary tale where insurmountable barriers (in the form of socio-economic factors) caused the 
demise of a CDM project. Chapter 7 therefore seeks to identify the barriers which prevent the 
further expansion of the CDM in order to provide some lessons for the SDM. 
Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the main research findings and recommendations. 
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 Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to reviewing a country's legal framework (as will be done in Chapter 4), it is necessary to 
contextualise the relevant theoretical framework. Accordingly, this chapter introduces the broader 
theoretical discourse relating to market-based instruments (MBIs), environmental taxes and carbon 
offsets. It is against this backdrop that the most prominent carbon offset, namely the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
The context provided in this chapter serves as the theoretical foundation for the remainder of the 
study. The next chapter traces the evolution of the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol to the proposed 
Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) of the Paris Agreement. 
Employing the broadest lens first, this chapter firstly outlines the essentials of MBIs and contrasts 
these with Command-and-Control instruments (CACs). Next, environmental taxes will be outlined 
and contextualised in reference to the wider framing of MBIs. Thereafter, the formulation of a 
carbon tax, as a specific type of an environmental tax, will be examined. Finally, carbon offsets – as 
a means to reduce the carbon tax liability – will be addressed. In particular, the CDM will be 
introduced at this point.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the lens through which the theoretical framework will be presented, starting 
with MBIs and zooming in on the CDM. 
Figure 2.1 The theoretical framework of the CDM 
(source: author's own) 
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Climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies include MBIs and CAC approaches. These are 
considered in the next section. 
2.2  MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS 
2.2.1 Introduction 
To begin with, environmental challenges are increasing the pressure on governments to find ways to 
reduce environmental degradation, while minimising obstacles to economic growth.
1
 Environmental
policies usually combine the identification of an environmental goal with some means to achieve 
that goal.
2
 Governments have a range of environmental policies at their disposal, including
regulations, information programmes, innovation policies, environmental subsidies and 
environmental taxes.
3
In general, policies to restrict Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (or, conversely, to promote 
reductions) may be classified into two categories, namely CACs and MBIs. MBIs are regulations 
that encourage behaviours through market signals, rather than through explicit control directives.
4
On the other hand, conventional approaches to regulating the environment are referred to as CACs, 
as they allow little flexibility in the means of achieving goals.
5
CAC instruments are regulatory in nature and operate by imposing mandatory obligations or 
restrictions on the behaviour of firms and individuals.
6
 Two policies can be identified here, namely
emissions legislation and technologies. The first comprises regulatory measures to correct 
environmental market failures, for example, emissions standards, zoning and quota restrictions.
7
The latter refers to banning deleterious technologies and promoting beneficial practices.
8
1
 OECD Environmental taxation – a guide for policy makers (2011) at 1, available at https://www.oecd.org/env/tools-
evaluation/48164926.pdf, accessed on 14 June 2015. 
2
 RN Stavins 'Experience with market-based environmental policy instruments' Handbook of Environmental Economics 
(2003) at 231. 
3
 OECD (n1) at 1. 
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 L du Toit Promoting renewable energy in South Africa through the inclusion of market-based instruments in South 
Africa's legal and policy framework with particular reference to the feed-in tariff (Doctoral dissertation, University of 






Table 2.1 below portrays this taxonomy of policy instruments, with an additional line item 
attributable to government production.
9
The comparison of CAC with MBIs has been the subject of academic debate and literature on this 
topic is relatively extensive and well developed.
10
 However, it is not the purpose of this study to
9
 Based on S Gupta (2015) 'Harnessing the market for environmental protection (slide show)' (2015), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/ccsindia/ccs-chintan-shreekantfeb32015, accessed on 28 December 2016 and S di Falco 
'Guidance notes on tools for pollution management' (n.d.) at 2, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETENVIRONMENT/Resources/GuidanceNoteonMarketBasedInstrumen
ts.pdf , accessed on 28 December 2016. 
10
 It should be pointed out that it is impracticable to provide a general comparison, as the superiority of the one or the 
other is very dependent upon the specific context (eg the type of pollutant regulated). See, for example, MG Faure, P 
Martin, L Zhiping & Q Tianbao 'Instruments for environmental governance: what works?' Environmental 
Governance and Sustainability (2012) at 17, where it is cautioned that both approaches require effective monitoring 
and enforcement systems.  
The UNEP devised practical guidelines to assist policy makers, especially in developing countries, in choosing the 
types of MBIs that are likely to work in addressing their specific environmental problems. See in this regard B 
Bustos, N Borregaard & M Stilwell The Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy: Opportunities and 
Challenges (2004). 
    National Treasury Carbon Tax Discussion Paper (2010) at 24, available at 
   http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Discussion%20Paper%20Carbon%20Taxes%2081210.pdf, accessed 
on 19 December 2016 analyses the differences between CAC measures and MBIs. Another useful overview of MBIs 
can be found in the Davis Tax Committee's First interim report on carbon tax for the Minister of Finance (2015) at 9-
15, available at 
Table 2.1: Taxonomy of Policy Instruments 
Policies Direct instruments Indirect instruments 
Market-based 
instruments  
Effluent or emission charges; 
tradable permits; deposit-refund 
systems 
Input/output taxes and subsidies; 






Technology standards; regulation 





Regulatory agency expenditures 
for clean-up, waste disposal, 
enforcement 
Development of 'clean' 
technologies 
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contribute to this debate, nor to offer an exposition of the strengths and weaknesses of CACs and 
MBIs.
11
 Instead, this section touches on the broad classification of instruments in order to
contextualise the development of the CDM. 
CAC instruments tend to limit investment incentives, as companies are not induced to go beyond 
compliance, due to the possibility of stricter regulations in future.
12
 In contrast, MBIs are not
compulsory in nature and do not prescribe mandatory objectives or standards, but rather incentivise 
environmentally friendly behaviour or disincentivise environmentally unfriendly behaviour.
13
CAC approaches have traditionally been the dominant instruments for environmental regulation.
14
These were 'generally prescriptive and highly targeted', in that particular substances were banned or 
limited or certain industries required to use specific technologies.
15
 While CAC instruments are still
do inant, there has been a ove internationall  towards ‘environ ental fiscal refor ’.
16
Traditional CAC mechanisms are now commonly employed in conjunction with MBIs.
17
 This is
due to the emergence of MBIs as significant mechanisms to realise environmental protection goals 
and better manage natural resources.
18
 It will be seen in Chapter 3 that, under the Paris Agreement,
http://www.taxcom.org.za/docs/20151116%20DTC%20Carbon%20Tax%20First%20Interim%20Report.pdf, 
accessed on 11 April 2016, and D Blodel, N Meyer-Ohlendorf, C Schlosser-Allera & P Steel United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook (2006) at 29-37.  
For a more in-depth discussion of MBIs and CACs, including an account of MBIs that have been introduced to 
support renewable energy at the international level, see Du Toit (n6). S Whitten, M van Bueren & D Collins 'An 
overview of market-based instruments and environmental policy in Australia' (2003) AARES Symposium outline the 
role of MBIs in Australia. 
11
 See, for example, SE Weishaar 'Chapter 2 Emissions trading and alternative instruments' in Emissions trading design: 
a critical overview (2014). 
12
 Bustos et al (n10) at 27. 
13
 Du Toit (n6) at 93. 
14
 J Greene & NA Braathen (2014) 'Tax preferences for environmental goals: use, limitations and preferred practices' 




 Du Toit (n6) at 96 remarks that environmental fiscal reform has been implemented in a number of EU countries and 
essentially involves implementation of environmentally-related fiscal instruments. A number of terms have been 
used, so eti es interchangeabl , to describe environ ental fiscal refor  instru ents including ‘econo ic 
instru ents’, ‘ arket-based instru ents’ and ‘econo ic incentives’.  
17
 National Treasury Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa (2006) at 2, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Draft%20Environmental%20Fiscal%20Reform%20Policy%20Pape
r%206%20April%202006.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2016. 
18
 Whitten et al (n10) at 1. 
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countries have voluntarily submitted Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which include 
different types of targets for reducing GHG emissions. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which set 
commitment targets that have legal force, the Paris Agreement emphasises consensus building and 
therefore follows a 'bottom-up' approach. In a sense, the Paris Agreement therefore heralds a 
transition from CAC to MBI's. 
Consequently, the next paragraph provides a concise account of the features inherent to MBIs. 
2.2.2 Characteristics of MBIs 
The theory of market-based approaches to environmental policy is hardly novel, having first been 
advanced in 1920 by the British economist, Arthur Cecil Pigou.
19
 A Pigouvian tax, such as a carbon
tax, is designed to correct a market activity that generates negative external effects.
20
 In the case of
climate change, MBIs are particularly well suited to control GHGs, both because 'emissions from 
most sources can be determined simply based on fossil fuel consumption and because location of 
emissions is irrelevant'.
21
The two main MBIs for assigning a price to GHG emissions so as to achieve emission reductions 
are carbon emissions trading and carbon taxes.
22
 The former sets targets for the level of emissions
though trade in emissions allowances, while the latter sets a price for emissions directly.
23
Carbon emissions trading are addressed by the Joint Implementation (JI) and International 
Emissions Trading (IET) mechanisms - two of the Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms which are 
examined in greater detail in the next chapter. The proposed South African carbon tax is discussed 
in para 2.4 below. At this stage, it is apposite to note that carbon taxes price GHG emissions 
directly and thus provide certainty with respect to price, but none with regard to emissions 
reductions.  
MBIs attempt to address environmentally-related market failures by way of a price mechanism.
24
By endeavouring to alter the relative prices that individuals and firms face, MBIs could offer a more 
19
 AC Pigou The economics of welfare (2013). 
20
 See A Sandmo 'Pigouvian taxes' in SN Durlauf & LE Blume (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
(2008), available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000351, accessed on 26 July 2017. 
21
 K Harrison 'A tale of two taxes: The fate of environmental tax reform in Canada' (2012) 29(3) Review of Policy 
Research 383-407 at 385. 
22
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efficient way of addressing certain environmental concerns.
25
 This is why MBIs are often described
as 'harnessing market forces': if they are well designed and implemented, they encourage entities to 
undertake pollution control efforts that are in their mutual interest and so collectively meet policy 
objectives.
26
 MBIs offer two notable advantages over traditional CAC approaches, namely cost
effectiveness and dynamic incentives for technology innovation and diffusion.
27




 and government subsidy reductions.
30
 The first category, namely
pollution charges, is of relevance to this study. A pollution charge assigns a fee or tax on the 
amount of pollution that a firm or source generates.
31
 The rationale behind a pollution charge is to
provide sufficient impetus for the firm to reduce emissions to the point where its marginal 
abatement cost is equal to the tax rate. 
The efficiency of MBIs not only depends on the degree of information the policymaker can secure 
regarding optimal pollution levels, but is also reliant on other factors:
32
 Ecological effectiveness: this describes how well an instrument works to reach the
environmental goal the policy focuses on – in this case, the reduction of the amount of carbon in
the atmosphere. For example, the ecological effectiveness of a carbon tax system is dependent
25
 Ibid. However, it should be cautioned that price signals do not work in all circumstances. J Mirrlees, S Adam, T 
Besley, R Blundell, S Bond, R Chote, M Gammie, P Johnson, G Myles & JM Poterba 'Environmental Taxation' in 
Institute for Fiscal Studies & Mirrlees J (eds) Tax by Design (2011) at 238 point out that where individuals or firms 
are ‘locked in’ to particular technologies, i posing an MBI (such as a tax)  a  si pl   ake the  worse off. There 
may be other market failures that could result in incentives not feeding through to behaviour change. 
26
 RN Stavins 'Market-based environmental policies' Public Policies for Environmental Protection (2000) at 1. 
27
 Id at 2. 
28
 Id at 4 explains that under a tradable permit system, an allowable overall level of pollution is established and 
allocated among firms in the form of permits. He further states that firms that keep their emission levels below their 
allotted level may sell their surplus permits to other firms or use them to offset excess emissions in other parts of their 
facilities. 
29
 Id at 5 avers that 'substantial gains' can be made in environmental protection simply by removing existing explicit or 
implicit barriers to market activity. An example is information programs, such as energy efficiency product labelling 
requirements. 
30
 Government subsidies are the opposite of taxes. Although they theoretically provide incentives to address 
environmental problems, Stavins Policies (n26) at 5 argues that, in practice, many subsidies promote economically 
inefficient and environmentally unsound practices. 
31
 Stavins Policies (n26) at 4. 
32
 SR Goers, AF Wagner & J Wegmayr 'New and old market-based instruments for climate change policy' (2010) 12(1) 
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 1-30 at 16-23. 
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upon the tax rate, which should preferably be established with the knowledge of the marginal 
abatement costs. 
 Political feasibility: this implies the level of acceptance in the public eye. The more people
(including industry roleplayers) who are in favour of a certain policy, the easier it is for the
political authority to implement this policy.
 Financial impact: this entails how consumers are affected in monetary terms, as companies will
(at least to some extent) pass costs on to consumers.
 Dynamic incentives: the inducement for technological change and innovation are key aspects to
consider when encouraging companies to continuously improve their emission reduction
techniques.
Notwithstanding the policy debates surrounding the choice of a particular MBI, it seems clear that 
market-based approaches will enjoy increasing acceptance in the years ahead,
33
 especially in light
of the mechanisms proposed in the Paris Agreement. 
2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
MBIs have historically played a significant role in incentivising cooperation between developed and 
developing countries.
34
 One example is Brazil's participation in the negotiations for the first
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (Brazil was also the first country to sign the UNFCCC).
35
Notwithstanding that the Paris Agreement represents a momentous breakthrough to combat the 
climate change challenge, multilateral negotiations can be complex and could take several years to 
conclude. In the interim, further regional cooperation through the development and linking of MBIs 
– such as the CDM and carbon taxes – may be viewed as 'essential to increase key industrialised
countries' ambitions'.
36
Developed countries are more likely to consent to financial assistance for transition towards low-
carbon economies in developing countries where 'economic interests converge'.
37
 In South Africa,
33
 Stavins Policies (n26) at 36. 
34
 E de Lemos Pinto Aydos 'Paris: the dilemmas of international climate change negotiations and the role of linked 
Emissions Trading Schemes in the post-2020 regime' in NP Stoianoff, L Kreiser, B Butcher, JE Milne & H Ashiabor 
(eds) Market Instruments and the Protection of Natural Resources (2016) at 213. 
35
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MBIs (or incentive-based measures) have been explored in general by the National Treasury in its 
Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa.
38
 This policy paper defines an environmental tax as a
'tax on an environmentally-harmful tax base'.
39
 The notion of an environmental tax as an MBI is
accepted practice in South Africa, as there are a number of environmental taxes currently in action, 
including an electricity levy, fuel levy, and plastic shopping bags levy.
40
An environmental tax, as a particular type of MBI, is the focus of the next section. 
2.3  ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES 
The basic rationale for environmental taxes
41
 rests upon the 'polluter pays' principle. Because
pollution imposes environmental, economic and social costs on society that are not borne by the 
polluter, the imposition of a cost on the polluter ensures that the polluter internalises these wider 
costs when undertaking these polluting activities.
42
 Taxes are among the most important economic
instruments available to deal efficiently with pollution and thereby help protect the environment.
43
Greene and Braathen provide a number of reasons for the use of environmental taxes, including: 
 Internalising an externality: an environmental tax increases the price of a good (or activity) to
reflect the cost of the environmental harm that it imposes on others, thereby ensuring that
producers and consumers take these costs into account when making decisions.
 Flexibility: in contrast to regulations or subsidies, an environmental tax provides businesses and
customers with greater flexibility  to modify their behaviour and reduce harmful activities. This,
38
 National Treasury Market-Based Instruments (n17). 
39
 Id at 3. The paper further explains that the tax base is a physical unit or proxy thereof which has a proven detrimental 
impact on the environment.  
40
 See South African Revenue Service (SARS) Environmental Levy Products (2017), available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/clientsegments/customs-excise/excise/Environmental-Levy-Products/Pages/default.aspx, 
accessed on 10 July 2017. 
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in turn, allows market forces to operate and determine the least-cost way to reduce 
environmental damage. 
 Incentivising continuous improvement: environmental taxes provide an enduring drive to abate
at all levels of emissions, even after significant abatement has already occurred.
 Improving competitiveness: environmental taxes enhance the demand for low-emission
alternatives. This leads to economies of scale that assist in making such alternatives more
viable, without requiring direct subsidies.
 Encouraging innovation: due to the 'polluter pays' principle, environmental taxes provide a
strong incentive for firms to develop new innovations (and to adopt existing ones).
 Transparency: environmental taxes (if properly designed) are highly transparent in terms of
their coverage and costs, by clearly communicating what is taxed, which polluters fall within the
tax net as well as the cost per unit of pollution generated.
 Cost certainty vs. environmental certainty: environmental taxes increase the cost of particular
products and activities in a fairly direct and generally predictable way. This makes it easier to
judge the financial impact on consumers and firms; however, it is more difficult to determine
the quantum of the environmental impact.
44
Tax instruments involve the use of the tax system to adjust relative prices with a view to influencing 
producer or consumer behaviour in favour of goods or services that are considered to be 
environmentally beneficial.
45
 These instruments effectively transfer resources from the taxpayer to
the beneficiaries of the tax preference. The tax instruments can take several forms, namely tax 
expenditures, tax breaks, tax relief or tax subsidies.
46
National Treasury's policy paper on MBIs recognised the role of environmentally-related taxes to 
complement existing regulatory policy interventions and address environmental problems such as 
44
 Greene & Braathen (n14) at 2-3. 
45
 Id at 5. 
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comes to addressing negative externalities (eg situations where there is no market incentive for firms and households 
to control pollution). A comparative advantage offered by tax instruments is in providing support for positive 
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climate change. The focus now turns to the most prominent environmental tax to likely be 
implemented in South Africa, namely the carbon tax.
47
2.4  CARBON TAX 
A carbon tax can be applied in a number of ways, namely a tax applied directly to measured GHG 
emissions; on fossil fuel inputs based on their carbon content (for example, crude oil and natural 
gas); or levied on energy outputs (for example, electricity). 
The carbon tax was first proposed by Cabinet in 2007. Following a lengthy public consultation 
process and debates, National Treasury published the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper in 2010.
48
 The
national budget proposals of 2012 set out further details. The process culminated in the publication 
of the Carbon Tax Policy Paper in 2013.
49
In November 2015, National Treasury introduced the Draft Carbon Tax Bill for public comment, 
following the announcement made by the Minister of Finance in the 2015 Budget Speech.
50
 The
design elements of the carbon tax in the Bill are largely uniform with those outlined in its 
predecessors, namely the Carbon Tax Discussion Paper and the Carbon Tax Policy Paper. The 
implementation of the carbon tax has been delayed numerous times. Although it was scheduled to 
come into effect during 2017, it is likely that further delays might ensue. 
A carbon tax is designed to encourage emission-reduction activities in affected sectors, by placing a 
price on carbon.
51
 This price acts as a signal that incentivises behavioural change and makes
47
 For an exposition of the key features of the carbon tax, as well as fiscal incentives for renewable energy, see L-A 
Steenkamp 'To incentivise or penalise: an analysis of the proposed carbon tax in South Africa' in SE Weishaar et al 
(eds) Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol XIX (2017). 
    For a discourse on how carbon taxation and emissions trading fit into the broader scheme of South Africa's climate 
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   http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Carbon%20Tax%20Policy%20Paper%202013.pdf, accessed on 
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emission reduction projects more attractive.
52
 The planned carbon tax is aimed at achieving South
Africa's ambitious commitments to reduce GHG emissions by 34 per cent by 2020 and 42 per cent 
by 2025.
53
It is anticipated that the carbon tax will come into effect in a phased manner at a marginal rate of 
R120 per ton of Carbon Dioxide equivalent (CO2e).
54
 Parties that conduct various activities in the
manufacturing, construction, mining and transport sectors will be affected. The carbon tax liability 
is calculated as the tax base multiplied by the rate of carbon tax. The tax base refers to the total 
quantity of GHG emissions from combustion, fugitive and industrial processes, proportionately 
reduced by the tax-free allowances. It is likely to be implemented with complementary measures, 
for example, a reduction in the electricity levy, as well as other measures, such as carbon offsets 
which firms can use to reduce their carbon tax liability. The Davis Tax Committee
55
 considers it





National Treasury has advanced the notion that, under the South African carbon tax, only entities 
not liable for the carbon tax will be permitted to implement emission-reduction projects and sell 
carbon offset credits to entities that are liable for the carbon tax (carbon offsets are discussed in the 
next section). The argument is as follows: if a company falling in the carbon tax net receives 
 http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/CarbonOffsets/2014042901%20-




 During the 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations, South Africa voluntarily announced that it would act to 
reduce domestic GHG emissions by 34 per cent by 2020 and 42 per cent by 2025 from business as usual (BAU) 
subject to the availability of adequate financial, technological and other support. See, in this regard, National Treasury 
(n10) at 3. 
54
 Clause 5 of the Draft Carbon Tax Bill (n50). 
55
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 According to the Davis Tax Committee First interim report (n10) at 23, benefits of the proposed tax include: 
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 protection of biodiversity; and
 the encouragement of energy efficiency and low carbon growth.
51 
income from an emission-reduction project that also reduces the company's overall emissions, a 
double incentive is effectively provided. These double-counting problems would be likely to occur, 
as there are incentives for mitigation in the form of both carbon tax liability reduction and revenue 
from carbon offset credits.  
Consequently, the Davis Tax Committee has proposed that:
58
 Credits for projects based only in South Africa should be used for offsets;
 The projects should be outside the scope of activities that are subject to the carbon tax;
 An initial list of eligible projects would be used to stimulate an offsets market; and
 Projects that have already been developed in South Africa under standards such as CDM, should
be considered for use as offsets, provided they meet certain eligibility criteria.
As a result, the Committee intends that carbon offsets should also incentivise investment in least-
cost mitigation options in the country, thereby driving investment in GHG-mitigation projects that 
deliver carbon emission reduction at a lower cost per CO2e than the carbon tax.
59
 The objective,
therefore, is for a taxpayer to purchase carbon credits for cheaper than the cost of paying the carbon 
tax. 
Carbon taxes are aimed at bringing about behavioural change, but they also raise revenue for the 
government. This tax revenue could be used to reduce other taxes, such as personal income tax. 
This, in turn, could result in higher rates of employment and economic growth. In general, revenue 
recycling includes tax shifting (ie decreasing other taxes), tax incentives for programmes (eg 
energy-saving incentives) and targeted assistance to low income households. National Treasury 
envisages that revenue collected from the carbon tax will be paid into the National Revenue Fund.
60
It remains to be seen whether the carbon tax revenue will, in fact, be recycled to fund other 
programs. 
The proposed carbon tax has undergone extensive consultation and attracted many disparate views, 
including competitiveness concerns and distributional issues.
61
 Ultimately, though, it aims to meet
its main objective as an environmental tax, namely to reduce GHG emissions. In some industries, 
however, GHG producers are unable to implement programmes to reduce GHG emissions, often 






 Clause 2 of the Draft Carbon Tax Bill (n50). 
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location to compensate for excess emissions in another.
62
 The next section accordingly examines
the carbon offset policy of National Treasury. 
2.5  CARBON OFFSETS 
2.5.1 Introduction 
The Carbon Offsets Paper complements National Treasury's Carbon Tax Policy Paper and 
provides further details about the proposed carbon offset mechanism to accompany the carbon tax.
63
A carbon offset is defined as a 'measurable avoidance, reduction or sequestration of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) or other GHG emissions'.
64
 Through investment in carbon offset projects, entities will be able
to reduce their own tax liability, through funding GHG-reduction measures implemented by other 
entities.
65





 carbon offset standards
68
 and the development of a South African carbon offset
scheme.
69
In June 2016, substance was given to the Draft Carbon Tax Bill with the release of the Draft 
Regulations on the Carbon Offset.
70
 The Explanatory Note for the Draft Regulations was released at
the same time.
71
 National Treasury was expected to release a second draft of the Regulations for
62
 L Andanova & Y Sun Private governance in developing countries: what are the drivers of voluntary carbon offset 
programs? (2017) at 6, available at http://interconnections2017.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/andonova.pdf, 
accessed on 21 June 2017. 
63
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 Id at 12-13. These principles include, inter alia, additionality, measurability, monitoring and verification, and 
synchronisation. 
67
 Id at 16-22.  Factors which influence the suitability of a project include, amongst others, the geographical location, 
carbon tax coverage and project methodologies. 
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 The regulations were published in terms of clause 20(b) of the Draft Carbon Tax Bill (n50). The Draft Regulations 
are available at 
   http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/CarbonTaxBill2016/Carbon%20offset%20Regulations.pdf, accessed 
on 31 January 2017. These regulations were developed jointly by National Treasury, the Department of Energy and 
the Department of Environmental Affairs. 
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further public comment in mid-2017 (following the anticipated release of the revised Draft Carbon 
Tax Bill), but this too has been delayed.
72
As mentioned earlier in para 2.4, the carbon offset system will only apply to those sectors and 
activities that are not covered by the proposed carbon tax.
73
 The offset scheme will initially rely on
international standards for carbon offset projects, most notably the CDM.
74
 Other approved carbon
offset projects includes the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), Gold Standard (GS), or any other 
project that complies with another standard approved by the Minister of Energy or a delegated 
authority.
75
The offset of an approved project against an entity's carbon tax liability is allowed in relation to any 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) in a specific time period.
76
 Carbon offsets against the carbon
tax liability can only be used for a stipulated number of years according to the type of project.
77
Only projects that are wholly undertaken in South Africa will qualify.
78
 Moreover, projects
benefitting from other government incentives, for example, the energy efficiency savings tax 
incentive
79
 or Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme
(REIPPPP),
80
 will not be eligible for the carbon offset allowance.
81
South Africa's Designated National Authority (DNA), which was established along with the 
Department of Energy under the CDM (as will be discussed in Chapter 3), will administer the 
carbon offset scheme.
82
 The administration of the carbon offsets entails the inspection and review of
section 20(b) of the Draft Carbon Tax Bill, 2015 (20 June 2016), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/CarbonTaxBill2016/Explanatory%20Note%20Carbon%20Offset%2
0Regulation.pdf, accessed on 31 January 2017. 
72
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applications, as well as the managing of the offset registry.
83
 In order to claim the carbon offset
against the carbon tax liability,
84
 the taxpayer will have to register the carbon offset and obtain a
certificate.
85
 Projects which are currently under development and which will be registered before
the commencement of the carbon tax, as well as issues relating to credits following the introduction 
of the carbon tax, will have to be transferred from an international registry to the South African 
registry within six months of their issuance.
86
Carbon offsets are typically measured in tons of CO2e and are bought and sold through a number of 
international brokers, online retailers, and trading platforms.
87
 By converting carbon emissions to a
marketable commodity, they create flexible mechanisms for companies, organisations, and 
individuals to purchase carbon credits from offsets in a manner that is cheaper than investment in its 
own operations.
88
Box 2.1 below presents a simplified depiction of the workings of a carbon offset.
89
Carbon offset markets exist both under compliance schemes and as voluntary programs.
90
Compliance markets are created and regulated by mandatory regional, national, and international 
83
 Regulation 5, 6 and 8 of the Draft Regulations (n70). 
84
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 P Clarke An introduction to carbon offsets (2000) at 4, available at 
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 Based on an example in Clarke (n87) at 4. 
90
 A Kollmuss, H Zink & C Polycarp Making sense of the voluntary carbon market: A comparison of carbon offset 
standards (2008) at v, available at  
Box 2.1 The workings of  a carbon offset 
Say a wind energy company sells carbon offsets. The wind energy company benefits because 
the carbon offsets it sells make such projects more economically viable. The buyers of the 
offsets benefit because they can claim that their purchase resulted in new renewable energy, 
which they can use to mitigate their own GHG emissions. The buyers may also save money 
as it may be less expensive for them to purchase offsets than to eliminate their own 
emissions. 
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carbon reduction regimes, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS).
91
 Under a mandatory scheme, an overall emission cap is set by public regulatory institutions
and each emitter receives an emission target to comply with and is allowed to buy credits from 
offsets.
92
 Voluntary offset markets function outside of the compliance markets and enable
companies and individuals to purchase carbon offsets on a voluntary basis.
93
 Under a voluntary
scheme, emitters are not subject to binding emission limits, but still have incentives to purchase 
offsets.
94
Successful carbon offset standards are those that are simple yet rigorous and which enjoy wide 
support from carbon project developers, offset traders and buyers, environmental Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the financial industry.
95
 In order to be useful, carbon
offset projects have to be evaluated and validated. A number of different carbon offset standards 
have been developed to achieve this. The focus of this chapter now shifts to the leading carbon 
offset standards. 
2.5.2 Carbon standards 
As mentioned in para 2.5.1, National Treasury has approved three international carbon offset 
standards, namely the CDM, VCS and GS.
96
 These are 'full-fledged' carbon offset standards,
meaning they include the following three components: accounting standards; monitoring, 
http://cetesb.sp.gov.br/wp-
content/uploads/sites/28/2008/03/acomparisonofcarbonoffsetstandardsmakingsenseofthevoluntarycarbonmarket.pdf, 




 Andanova & Sun (n62) at 6. 
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 The possibility of broad participation: this enables those in unregulated sectors or countries that have not
ratified Kyoto, such as the US, to offset their emissions.
 Preparation for future participation: this assists companies in gaining experience with carbon inventories,
emissions reductions and carbon markets.
 Innovation and Experimentation: the voluntary market is not as rigid when it comes to the level of oversight,
management, and regulation as the compliance market. Accordingly, project developers are more flexible to
implement projects that might otherwise not be viable (eg projects that are too small or too disaggregated).
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verification and certification standards; and registration and enforcement systems.
97
 Although there
are numerous other standards, this section will focus on these three approved standards.
98
 In order
to sketch a broader backdrop, two other full-fledged standards are also alluded to, namely the 
Voluntary Emission Reduction (VER+) and Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) standards.  
2.5.2.1 CDM 
The CDM is one of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and its related accords. It is 
administered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
CDM enables industrialized countries to achieve emissions reductions by paying developing 
countries for CERs. Moreover, the CDM is the only flexible mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol open 
to participation by developing countries.  
Established under Art 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, it provides developed countries with a mechanism 
to reduce their own GHG emissions obligations by purchasing credits from CDM projects that 
avoid GHG emissions in developing countries. These projects facilitate financing and technology 
transfer for GHG reduction in developing countries. This mechanism includes projects in renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and other related fields designed to achieve emission reductions.  
The carbon emission reduction credits from the CDM projects are known as CERs and are saleable 
to and usable only by developed countries for the purpose of meeting their legally binding emission 
reduction obligations.
99
 Non-Annex I countries (such as South Africa) are motivated to participate
in the CDM by benefits such as technology transfer for the projects, foreign funding for the projects 
and the possibility of trading the carbon credits gained from the projects with Annex I countries.
100
The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and is intended to meet two objectives: 
97
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(i) To assist non-Annex I countries in achieving sustainable development and, in so doing, to
contribute to the prevention of dangerous climate changes; and
(ii) To assist Annex I countries in achieving compliance with their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments.
The CDM addresses the second objective by allowing the Annex I countries to meet part of their 
emission reduction commitments buying CERs from CDM emission reduction projects in 
developing countries. The projects and the issue of CERs are subject to approval to ensure that 
these emission reductions are real and 'additional'. The issue of additionality is complex and will be 
examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
During the COP18 meetings held in Doha in December 2012, the CDM was extended as a flexible 
mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, enabling developing countries to continue their participation 
in the global carbon market. In order to enhance the uptake of CDM projects in South Africa, 
National Treasury introduced the section 12K tax incentive to the South African Income Tax Act 
No. 58 of 196 , as a ended (‘the Inco e Tax Act') in  009. South Africa's fiscal polic  (including 
tax incentives relating to the CDM and renewable energy) is addressed in Chapter 4. 
2.5.2.3 Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)
101
The VCS is a non-profit NGO founded in 2005 by the Climate Group, International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA) and the World Economic Forum (WEF), and later joined by the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
102
 The VCS classifies projects into
categories known as sectoral scopes, which can range from energy efficiency to waste management, 
and is the world's most widely used voluntary GHG reduction programme.
103
 Unlike the GS (see
below), the VCS focuses on GHG reduction attributes only and does not require projects to have 
additional environmental or social benefits.
104
The VCS operates by accepting methodologies that serve as the protocols for developing carbon 
credit projects.
105
 Some of these methodologies are created through the VCS Association which
101
 Formerly the 'Voluntary Carbon Standard'. 
102




 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 58. 
105
 NA Munuo Towards the design of a reflexive regulatory framework to" Reduce and control emissions from land 
deforestation and degradation and enhancing carbon stocks"(REDD+): a perspective from select developing 
countries (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2016) at 117. 
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relies on expert committees from organisations such as the CDM Methodology Panel, the World 
Bank and leading non-profit and private sector organisations.
106
 In addition, the VCS Association
accepts methodologies adopted by the Executive Board of the CDM.
107
 VCS approved carbon
offsets are registered and traded as Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs) and represent emissions 
reductions of one million ton of CO2e (MtCO2e).
108
In order to obtain approval of a carbon project and the issuance of VCUs, a third-party verifier must 
validate the project design document submitted by the project developer, and verify the amount of 
GHG emissions actually reduced.
109
 The VCS Association relies on third-party registries to actually
issue the credits and maintain them on their registries.
110
It is noteworthy that VCS projects represent more than ten per cent of CDM projects, both in terms 
of the number of projects and estimated emission reductions.
111
 Thus, although it is a voluntary
carbon offset standard, it contributes a significant portion to global offset schemes. 
2.5.2.4 Gold Standard (GS) 
The GS was developed by a group of environmental and social non-profit organisations to 
strengthen the social and environmental benefits of carbon offset projects.
112
 It was nurtured under
the leadership of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in order to make sure that emission reduction 
projects are real and provide social, economic and environmental benefits.
113
 The GS can be used
for voluntary as well as CDM projects.
114
106
 VCS (n102). 
107
 Ibid. Kollmuss et al (n90) at 54 comment that the advantage of outsourcing is that the organisation can be kept lean. 
Also, by outsourcing tasks to specialists, the quality of work is greatly enhanced. Of course, as the authors rightly 
point out, the downside of this approach is that more decision making power is given to outside entities. 
108
 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 58. 
109
 Munuo (n105) 117. 
110
 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 61. The authors explain that double counting is avoided by the VCS also maintaining a 
project database on its website which assigns a serial number to each project. It should be noted that the VCS 
Association does not directly play a role in the issuance of carbon credits for individual projects. 
111
Andanova & Sun (n62) at 15. 
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 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 30. 
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 Id at 54. 
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 Id at 30. 
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The GS CDM was launched in 2003 after a two year period of consultation with stakeholders, 
governments, NGOs and the private sector from over 40 countries.
115
 The GS serves as a standard
and certification body that aims to identify and encourage well-designed activities as the sources for 
credible GHG reductions that maximise wider sustainable development outcomes.
116
 The GS
accepts renewable energy (including methane-to-energy projects) and energy efficiency projects.
117
2.5.2.5 Voluntary Emission Reduction (VER+) Standard 
The VER+ standard was developed by TÜV SÜD, a German-based Designated Operational Entity 
(DOE) for the validation and verification of CDM projects.
118
 Although it closely follows the Kyoto
Protocol’s project-based mechanisms, namely the CDM and JI, it does not focus on co-benefits.
119
Launched in mid-2007, it was designed for projects not yet implemented under the CDM, as it 
demonstrates pre-compliance with CDM principles.
120
Projects are verified by a third party auditor which must be CDM/JI accredited.
121
 All VER+ offset
credits  ust be registered in TÜV SÜD’s own BlueRegistr .
122
 There are several reasons why
project developers might choose VER+ over CDM. In comparison to CDM, VER+ provides more 
flexibility on methodologies, which speeds up validation and verification.
123
 The fees for the
incorporation of VER+ credits to the BlueRegistry are usually lower than those covered by 
115
 Id at 54 further remark that the Gold Standard Foundation is a non-profit organisation under Swiss Law, funded by 
public and private donors. Furthermore, they state that the operational activities of the GS are managed by the Gold 
Standard secretariat based in Basel, Switzerland, including capacity building, marketing and communications, 
certification, registration and issuance as well as maintenance of the GS rules and procedures. 
116
 See http://www.goldstandard.org/, accessed on 19 April 2016, which states that GS projects have contributed to 
billions of dollars in climate and development outcomes in communities across the world. 
117
 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 54 also point out that the GS excludes large hydro projects above 15 MW capacity. 
118
 See https://shapingsustainablemarkets.iied.org/ver-standard, accessed on 21 June 2017. 
119
 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 63. 
120
TÜV SÜD A robust Standard for Verified Emission Reductions (Criteria Catalogue) (n.d.), available at 
http://www.tuev-sued.de/uploads/images/1179142340972697520616/Standard_VER_e.pdf, accessed on 21 June 
2017. This means that project developers may well be able to sell credits through the CDM in the future. 
121
 Kollmuss et al (n90) at 63. 
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CDM approved methodology is not available or fully applicable. 
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UNFCCC for registration and issuance of CDM projects.
124
 Credits certified under VER+ are traded
in the voluntary market. 
TÜV SÜD is currently both the certification body and the auditor, which perhaps raises questions of 
independence.
125
 Although TÜV SÜD has a good reputation as a DOE and is a well-know auditor,
it is difficult to know if project approval will always be strictly independent.
126
2.5.2.6 Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
The CCX was a voluntary GHG emissions cap-and-trade scheme based in North America.
127
Although participation was voluntary, compliance with emission reduction objectives was legally 
binding once a member joined.
128
 CCX had as part of its cap-and-trade scheme an offset programme
with a full-fledged carbon offset standard.
129
 CCX ceased trading carbon credits at the end of 2010
due to inactivity in the US carbon market.
130
2.5.3 Carbon Tax and the CDM 
It is clear that a carbon offset standard, most notably the CDM and its likely successor (the SDM), 
will increasingly come under the spotlight as the carbon tax nears its implementation date in South 
Africa. The use of carbon offsets to reduce the carbon tax liability for South African entities would 
mirror current trends in a number of jurisdictions that employ economic instruments to reduce GHG 
emissions, including the EU and Australia.
131
 South African entities are currently able to develop
and sell or purchase carbon offsets from international carbon offset markets that were developed 
under international standards, such as the CDM.
132
Perceptions of carbon offsetting vary widely across the globe. In South Africa, there is less 
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See http://ghginstitute.org/2010/11/10/the-chicago-climate-exchange-closure-a-vote-for-robust-ghg-mrv/, accessed 
on 9 July 2017. 
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concept of CDM is 'rapidly increasing'.
133
 The increased appeal of the CDM can likely be ascribed
to the proposed carbon tax, in terms of which taxpayers may lower their tax liability by purchasing 
offsets from South African projects. In addition, more companies are realising that offsetting is an 
effective tool to cut their emissions cost-effectively, while simultaneously benefitting 
communities.
134
2.6  CONCLUSION 
Market-based policy instruments are now considered worldwide (including in South Africa) for 
nearly every environmental problem that is raised, ranging from endangered species preservation to 
the greenhouse effect and global climate change.
135
 However, MBIs should not be viewed as a
single solution in all circumstances, but as one component of a wider policy package.
136
 MBIs
should complement, rather than replace, existing CAC policies.
137
 That being said, there is a range
of MBIs designed to address environmentally-related market failures by way of a price mechanism. 
One such MBI is the use of environmental taxes.  
The basic rationale for an environmental tax is clear: it applies the polluter-pays principle and 
intends to change the behaviour of taxpayers. On this basis, the rationale is to reduce pollution to a 
level that takes full account of both the costs of the pollution and the benefits of the polluting 
activity.
138
 Taxes are often more effective than regulation as a way to achieve this.
139
 As
emphasised above, an example of an environmental tax is the carbon tax. 
A carbon tax places a price on CO2 emissions, thereby striving to internalise the cost of external 
GHG damages. It provides consumers and businesses with greater flexibility to decide how to 
change their behaviour and reduce harmful activity.
140
 In addition, the South African government
allows the use of carbon offsets to further mitigate the carbon tax liability.  
Carbon offsetting is an increasingly popular means of taking action against climate change. By 
paying someone else to reduce GHG emissions elsewhere, the purchaser of a carbon offset aims to 
133
 Climate Neutral Group 'What is carbon offsetting?' (n.d.), available at 
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compensate for – or offset – their own emissions. Carbon offset markets exist both under 
compliance schemes as well as under voluntary programs. The CDM is a full-fledged, 
internationally regulated carbon offset standard which has also been domestically approved as a 
carbon offset methodology.  
Making use of the current standards in existence to issue CERs will enhance the credibility and 
confidence in the market with regards to the carbon offset mechanisms. This will also ensure that a 
degree of local familiarity and existing competence in these standards could be capitalised on to 
implement and expedite the process of issuing CERs in South Africa. The above analysis has shown 
that South Africa has made significant progress towards putting a carbon tax in place. It will be 
shown in subsequent chapters that the CDM (as well as the SDM) requires similar attention. 
Having provided the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis, the next chapter will examine 
the policy considerations of the Kyoto Protocol in general, and the CDM in particular. Thereafter, 




The historical development and workings of the CDM and the SDM 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Having laid the theoretical foundation in the previous chapter, this chapter examines the theoretical 
and policy considerations underlying the legal aspects of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). While it is uncertain at the time of writing (mid-2017) whether the CDM will continue to 
exist alongside the SDM or will be replaced by it, this chapter investigates, among other things, 
questions around if and how the SDM refines and streamlines the CDM. In so doing, a better 
understanding might be gained of the factors that will contribute to the success (or failure) of the 
SDM. 
This chapter commences with an overview of the Kyoto Protocol and the establishment of the CDM 
under Art 12. Next, this chapter traces the evolution of the CDM and considers the new procedures 
and modalities for its ostensible successor, namely the SDM. The architectural components of the 
Paris Agreement will be explored in order to contextualise the origin and proposed implementation 
of the SDM. Lastly, the chapter will reflect on transitional arrangements for existing CDM  projects. 
As a point of departure, it should be emphasised that the CDM only applies to developing countries 
(or non-Annex I parties).  The other two flexible mechanisms, namely the Joint Implementation (JI) 
mechanism under Art 6 and the International Emissions Trading (IET) mechanism under Art 17 of 
the Kyoto Protocol, only apply between Annex I Parties (or developed countries). 
The JI mechanism allows a country with an emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol to earn Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission 
removal project in another Annex I Party.
1
 Each ERU is equivalent to one ton of CO2 (tCO2), which
can be counted towards meeting its Kyoto target.
2
 Joint implementation offers both Parties benefits:
1
Art 6.1 of the Kyoto Protocol states - 
'For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or 
acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic 
emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the 
economy ... ' 
2
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Joint Implementation (JI) (n.d.), available at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php, accessed on 1 July 2017. 
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the host Party benefits from foreign investment and technology transfer, while the participating 
Party obtains a flexible and cost-efficient means of fulfilling a part of their Kyoto commitments.
3
Art 17 of the Kyoto Protocol permits countries to trade with their allowances.
4
 In other words, if a
country does not emit its assigned amount of emissions, it can trade them with a country whose 
emissions are too high. The IET mechanism is a market-based instrument aimed at reducing 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Through emissions trading, an Annex I Party may transfer 
surplus carbon credits to, or acquire them from, another Annex I party. Developed countries that 
have exceeded their levels can either reduce GHG emissions, or borrow or buy carbon credits from 
developing countries. The IET mechanism encompasses both the secondary trading of JI and CDM 
carbon credits between Annex I countries, as well as a cap-and-trade market in emissions 
allowances.
5
Figure 3.1 below is a simplified portrayal of the workings of the flexible mechanisms, which 
nonetheless helps to illustrate the basic differences between them.
6




 Art 17 of the Kyoto Protocol determines that - 
‘The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles,  odalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for 
verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex II may participate in 
emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction 
co  it ents under that Article.’ 
5
 PA Ali & K Yano Eco-finance: the legal design and regulation of market-based environmental instruments (2004) at 
45. The authors also state that the international market in JI and CDM carbon credits envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol
is equivalent to the open markets in emissions credits. 
6
 Derived from the CDM Rulebook, available at http://www.cdmrulebook.org/321.html, accessed on 9 November 2016. 
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The JI and CDM are project-based, whereas the IET is a trading arrangement. The World Bank 
played a key facilitating role in the early carbon market, mobilising the first carbon fund (known as 
the Prototype) with contributions from the public and private sector of around US$180 million, 
which it subsequently invested in a range of projects under the CDM and JI.
7
As stated in Chapter 1, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
took effect in 1994. Together with its accompanying Kyoto Protocol, the framework endeavours to 
embrace the interests and needs of all countries. The 39 states included in Annex I of the Kyoto 
Protocol have assented to cut their GHG emissions by an agreed percentage below their 1990 levels 
in the period between 2008 and 2012. In order to accomplish this pledge, the parties have to rely 
primarily on domestic action.
8
 However, in acknowledgement of the importance of institutional
flexibility and private sector involvement, the Kyoto Protocol introduced the three mechanisms 
mentioned earlier to supplement domestic action.
9
 The mechanisms are also intended to lower the
compliance costs for industrialised countries and allow for geographical and temporal flexibility.  
The flexible mechanisms in general, and the CDM in particular, are 'among the most innovative 
aspects of the emerging climate change regime'.
10
 The next section explores the historical
development of the UNFCCC negotiations against the backdrop of decisions taken at select 
Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. 
7
 D Freestone 'Chapter 5: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – the basis for the climate 
change regime' in KR Gray et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (2016) at 109. 
The Prototype is a partnership between 17 companies and six governments and became operational in April 2000. 
More information is available at http://wbcarbonfinance.org/PCF, accessed on 9 November 2016. 
8
 In the preamble to the Marrakech Accords, the parties to the UNFCCC confirmed that 
'the use of the [flexible] mechanism shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall 
thus constitute a significant element in the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments included under Article 3, paragraph 1'. 
9
 Per C Streck 'New partnerships in global environmental policy: The Clean Development Mechanism' (2004) 13(3) The 
Journal of Environment & Development 295-322 at 296. 
10
 Ibid. The author also regards the flexible mechanisms as a solution to the problem of global warming on an 
international level and 'through mechanisms based on the principle of trading emission reduction offsets'. In this 
regard, the mechanisms might be viewed as a 'bridge between industrialised and developing countries' and a 'platform 
for a coordinated approach for public and private entities to implement' the Kyoto Protocol. 
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3.2  THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
3.2.1  A brief history 
For many countries, their focus on the promotion of renewable energies stems from their 
obligations under the legal regime of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. Although South Africa is a 
non-Annex I country in the Kyoto Protocol, it is a signatory. It ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 
31 July 2002, but as a developing country, does not have targets under the protocol. 
Prior to judging the outcome of the UNFCCC, it is necessary to view this agreement in the context 
of the wider Rio+20 agenda. Bodansky et al observe that the UNFCCC can be broken into four 
phases, namely the agenda-setting phase (1985 to 1990), the constitutional phase (1990 to 1995), 
the regulatory phase (1995 to 2005) and the renegotiating phase (2005 to 2016).
11
 Below is a brief
outline of the key decisions that have taken place during the major UN climate negotiations over the 
past decades.
12
 UN Conference on the Human Environment: The Stockholm Conference (1972)
The Stockholm Conference sought to draw attention to the link between economic development
and environmental degradation. The conference resulted in the formation of the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP).
 The Rio Earth Summit (1992)
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was conceptualised in 1987
to address the development needs of poorer countries while engaging the cooperation of
developed countries. In 1988, the World Meteorological Organisation and the UNEP joined
forces to create the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The UNCED
eventually took place in 1992, and was known as the Rio Earth Summit. Its agenda was not
simply global warming and climate change, but the full impact of economic and social
development on the environment. The tangible outcome of the UNCED was three agreements
and two legally binding conventions, of which the UNFCCC is the focus of this thesis.
13
11
 D Bodansky, J Brunnée & L Rajamani International Climate Change law (2017) at 96. 
12
 This précis is derived from the topography of international agreements and conferences in L Bossley 'Dealing with 
reality' (2012) 5(4) The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 345-365 and the overview of COP decisions of the 
Environmental and Energy Study Institute (EESI) Timeline of Major UN Climate Negotiations available at 
http://www.eesi.org/policy/international, accessed on 15 November 2016. 
13
 These agreements were: 
 The Agenda 21 agreement – a global action plan for sustainable development;
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development – principles defining the rights and obligations of states;
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 UNFCCC (1994)
The UNFCCC was adopted by the UN in New York on 9 May 1992 and was signed by 166
countries at the UNCED in June 1992. It entered into full force and effect on 21 March 1994.
A key concept underlying the UNFCCC is that of 'common but differentiated responsibilities',
as introduced in Art 4. It reflects the argument that developed countries have greater
responsibility for the (then) current level of GHG in the atmosphere attributable to their past
economic growth and should, accordingly, accept greater responsibility for solving the climate
change problem. It also reflected the fact that countries party to the UNFCCC signed up under
different categories with different obligations.
14
The UNFCCC sets no mandatory limits on GHG emissions. Instead, the treaty provides for
future negotiations to set emission limits. The first principal revision was the Kyoto Protocol.
15
 COP1 (1995)
The first Conference of the Parties (COP1) was held in Berlin. Parties agreed that mechanisms
under the UNFCCC were inadequate and agreed to what would later be referred to as the Berlin
Mandate, which allows parties to make specific commitments. Non-Annex I parties are exempt
from additional obligations. The outcome of COP1 provided a strong political mandate for
strengthening the commitments in the convention, which led to the adoption of the text of the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
16
 The Statement of Forest Principles – principles underlying the sustainable management of forests worldwide;
 The Convention on Biological Diversity; and
 The UNFCCC.
14
 The various categories are: 
 Annex I parties: the OECD and the Commonwealth of Independent States agreed to limit their own GHG
emissions and return to levels of emissions evident in an earlier historic period;
 Annex II parties: the OECD agreed, in addition to their Annex I commitments, to pay the costs of developing
countries in measuring and communicating their GHG emissions, to underwrite the cost of transferring green
technology and to provide assistance to vulnerable developing countries in adapting to climate change;
 Non-Annex I parties: everyone else committed to cooperate with the process, by facilitating the monitoring and
measuring of their own GHG emissions.
15
 It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the US has committed to the UNFCCC as an Annex I/Annex II party, 
despite rejecting the Kyoto Protocol. 
16
 UNFCCC Handbook at 115, available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf, accessed on 11 
August 2016. 
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 Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (1997)
Following intensive negotiations during COP3 held in December in Kyoto, Japan, the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted. The protocol outlined the GHG emissions reduction obligation for
Annex I countries, resulting in the mechanisms known as emissions trading, clean development
and joint implementation. Time constraints prevented COP3 from teasing out the details of how
the Kyoto Protocol should operate in practice.
 Bonn Agreements (2000)
After negotiations faltered at the Hague, in the Netherlands, the parties met again in Germany.
Consensus was reached on what was called the Bonn Agreements. Despite many details being
left to flesh out at the next COP meeting, the Bonn Agreement had paved the way for
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as its entry into force.
With the exception of the US (which participated in observatory status only), all nations agreed
on the mechanisms for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. In this regard, the Bonn
Agreements may be viewed as a set of political compromises for many contentious issues that
were left unresolved by the earlier Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
 Marrakech Accords (2001)
The US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001 (although it remained committed to
the UNFCCC as Annex I/Annex II party). At the COP7 held in Marrakech, Morocco, the
remaining parties (subsequent to the US's withdrawal) sought to flesh out the detail of the Kyoto
commitment. The Accords provided a detailed package for reporting and reviewing countries'
inventories based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) methodologies.
The detailed rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol were adopted and named as the
Marrakech Accords. In essence, the outcome of this COP resulted in a commitment to cut GHG
emissions by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels in the 2008–2012 period. This was agreed to by
166 countries. Also, two important funds were established during the COP7, namely the Special
Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
17
 and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). The
Marrakech Accords also cover the flexible mechanisms.
17
 The SCCF was formed to finance projects relating to adaptation; technology transfer and capacity building; energy 
transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management; and economic diversification. The LDCF's objective 
is to assist Least Developed Country Parties to carry out, among other things, the preparation and implementation of 
national adaption programmes of action. 
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 Coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol (2005)
COP3 (held in December 1997) was significant, as it adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol
required ratification by 55 states, including those countries that contributed 55 per cent of 1990
emissions, before it could enter into full force and effect. Russia turned the scales with its
ratification in October 2004 and the Kyoto Protocol entered into full force and effect on
16 February 2005. South Africa ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 31 July 2002. As a non-Annex I
country, it does not have targets under the protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol elaborates on the UNFCCC by placing more specific obligations on
developed countries and Countries with Economies in Transition.
18
 Essentially, the Kyoto
Protocol translated the UNFCCC into a specific action plan. Annex I countries were obliged to
reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by at least five per cent below 1990 levels between
2008 and 2012 (the first commitment period, which would end on 31 December 2012).
19
 Non-
Annex I countries were not required to make any comparable cuts unless they chose to do so.
20
 Bali Roadmap (2007)
During the COP13 meeting in Bali, parties agreed to the Bali Action Plan. This plan did not
require binding GHG targets for developing countries. It was during this conference that
discussions to determine the Kyoto Protocol's successor began in earnest.
 Copenhagen Accord (2009)
The COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, failed to reach agreement on binding
commitments after the Kyoto Protocol commitment period ended in 2012. At the eleventh hour
of the summit, leaders from the USA, Brazil, India, China, Indonesia and South Africa agreed to
what would be called the Copenhagen Accord.
21
The Accord started by noting that any future increase in global temperature should be below
2°C since pre-industrial times. As mentioned earlier, the UNFCCC did not bind the developing
non-Annex I countries to any specific mitigating action. The Copenhagen Accord sought to
18
 J Glazewski & L du Toit 'Chapter 3: International climate change law' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) 






 Significantly, this was the first time in nearly 20 years that a US president acknowledged anthropogenic global 
warming and accepted the need for human intervention to divert environmental catastrophe. 
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change that situation, by incentivising the participation of large developing countries (such as 
China and India) through new funding.
22
 Cancun Agreements (2010)
The COP16 parties officially adopted major tenets of the Copenhagen Accord in Cancun,
Mexico. A Green Climate Fund (GCF) was mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord, but was
formally established during the COP16 meeting. The GCF aims to assist government in scaling
up the provision of long-term financing for developing countries.
23
 The Cancun meeting
established the GCF as an operating entity of Art 11 of the UNFCCC, a financial mechanism,
governed by a board and administered by a trustee. The Cancun Agreements also undertook to
establish clear goals and a timetable for reducing GHGs to contain the global average
temperature rise to below 2°C.
 Durban Platform (2011)
During the COP17 meeting in Durban, South Africa, parties agreed to the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action which is a framework to establish a new international emissions reduction
protocol. The parties addressed the practical consequences of failing to provide for a successor
to the Kyoto Protocol by 1 January 2013.
24
 Kyoto Protocol extended (2012)
The Rio +20 summit took place in June 2012 and was the precursor to the COP18 meeting. This
was a meeting of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, not of the UNFCCC. Thus,
it had no authority or infrastructure to address the Kyoto Protocol or its succeeding treaty.
25
At the COP18 meeting in Doha, Qatar, parties agreed to extend the expiring Kyoto Protocol by
creating a second commitment phase that would begin on 1 January 2013 and end on
31 December 2020. The concept of 'loss and damage' was introduced as developed countries
22
 This cash incentive envisaged by the Copenhagen Accord was aimed at enabling and supporting mitigation, 
adaptation, development and transfer of technology and capacity-building. 
23
 The GCF will support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country parties. See 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/items/5869.php, accessed on 
19 November 2016. 
24
 Russia, Japan and Canada did not commit to new targets. 
25
 The outcome document, 'The Future We Want', was put forward as the common vision of the heads of states and 
governments which are members of the UN. This group includes the US, China, Russia and India. The document is 
available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/rio20_outcome_document_complete.pdf, accessed on 27 
November 2016. 
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pledged to help developing countries and small island nations pay for the losses and damages 
from climate change that they were already encountering. 
 Paris Agreement (2015-2016)
The landmark Paris Agreement was negotiated by representatives of 195 countries at COP21 in
Paris, France. It was adopted by consensus on 12 December 2015 and opened for signature on
22 April 2016. Following the ratification of the agreement by the EU in October 2016, there
were enough countries to enable it to come into force. The Paris Agreement came into effect on
4 November 2016.
South Africa had signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016. Thereafter, on
20 October 2016, Cabinet announced its approval for the treaty to be submitted to Parliament
for ratification. The ratification of the treaty was assented to by the National Council of
Provinces on 27 October 2016, and by the National Assembly on 1 November 2016.
Section 3.4 provides an overview of the key provisions of the Paris Agreement.
 COP22 (2016)
Following the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement, governments took the next steps at
the COP22 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, to move forward on the implementation of this
agreement.
The Marrakech Action Proclamation was adopted by Heads of State, reaffirming their
commitment to implement the Paris Agreement and mobilise US$100 million annually by
2020.
26
During the climate talks in Marrakech, two initiatives were launched to increase cooperation 
between all levels of government and accelerate the delivery of climate measures on the ground. 
The first, namely the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action, focuses on bolstering 
investments from 2017 to 2020.
27
 The second is the 2050 Pathways Platform, which targets
long-term deep decarbonisation action plans.
28
26
 The Marrakech Action Proclamation is available at  
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_action_proclamation.pdf, accessed 
on 20 November 2016. 
27
 See http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/global-climate-action-agenda, accessed on 22 November 2016. 
28
 See http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/high-level-climate-champions-launch-2050-pathways-platform/, 
accessed on 22 November 2016. 
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A key element of the UNFCCC is that its text refers pertinently to several of the guiding principles 
laid down by the Rio Declaration.
29
 The next paragraph focuses on two of these principles, namely
mitigation and adaptation. 
3.2.2  Mitigation and adaptation 
As a point of departure, Art 3(3) of the UNFCCC stipulates that parties should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate
30
 its adverse
effects. To this end, such policies and measures should be comprehensive in nature, take into 
account different socio-economic contexts, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases and adaptation,
31
 and comprise all economic sectors.
In terms of Art 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC, Annex I parties (ie developed countries) are committed to 
‘adopt national policies and take corresponding  easures on the  itigation of cli ate 
change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and 
enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs’. 
Moreover, Art 4(4) compels developed country parties to assist especially vulnerable developing 
country parties financially, so that they may meet the costs of adaptation. 
It could be argued that adaptation and mitigation are complementary to each other.
32
 For example, if
mitigation measures are undertaken effectively, the impacts to which we will need to adapt will be 
reduced; similarly, if adaptation measures are strong, the impacts linked to climate change will be 
29
 S Carter & M Barnard 'Demystifying the Global Climate Change Regime' in Humby, Kotzé, Rumble & Gilder (eds) 
Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 3-6. These are: 
 the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities – Art 3(1), UNFCCC;
 the precautionary principle – Art 3(3), UNFCCC;
 the principle of sustainable development – Art 3(4), UNFCCC;
 the cost-effectiveness principle – Art 3(1) and 3(2), UNFCCC; and
 the principle of inter-generational equity – Art 3(1), UNFCCC.
30
 The IPCC Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report – Appendix B Glossary of Terms, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/vol4/index.php?idp=204, accessed on 28 December 2016, defines 'mitigation' as an 
anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of GHGs. 
31
 IPCC (n30) defines 'adaptation' as an adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment. 
Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private and public 
adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation. 
32
Action on Climate Today (ACT) 'Adaptation and mitigation' (2015), available at 





 At any rate, according to Gilder, 'despite the fact that the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC includes both mitigation and adaptation considerations, it is mitigation that has seen the 
greatest development during the UNFCCC's history'.
34
Over time, adaptation has received more attention, partly due to 'the efforts of individual UNFCCC 
country parties and negotiating blocs to retain focus on the issue'.
35
 In particular, the release of the
Third Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2001, as well as the Contribution of Working Group II, 
shifted the focus to climate impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
36
Interestingly, the potential for developing synergies between climate change mitigation and 
adaptation has received increasing attention from climate researchers and policymakers, with a 
focus on defining the optimal mix of mitigation and adaptation.
37
 As regards South Africa, the need
for a stronger focus on adaptation is espoused in the South African Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC).
38
 For example, reference is made to the development of a National Climate
Change Adaptation Strategy and Plan to be integrated into all relevant sector plans and upon which 
the South African UNFCCC National Adaptation Plan (NAP) will be based.
39
Although both mitigation and adaptation are crucial elements of any climate change response 
strategy, it is the latter which will enjoy more prominence in poorer, developing nations, like those 
in Africa. This is so because sustainable development and adaptation are mutually reinforcing. The 
IPCC concludes that adaptation measures, if taken up in a sustainable development framework, can 





 A Gilder 'Epilogue' in Humby, Kotzé, Rumble & Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa 
(Original Service 2016) at Epilogue-20. 
35
 Ibid. He continues by stating that 'mitigation is less of an issue while adaptation is of primary importance for Africa'. 
36
 Carter & Barnard (n29) at 3-7. The Third Assessment Report is available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/, 
accessed on 28 December 2016. 
37
 For a review of some of these research findings, see S VijayaVenkataRaman, S Iniyan, & R Goic 'A review of 
climate change, mitigation and adaptation' (2012) 16(1) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 878-897 at 890. 
38
 South African INDC (2016) available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/South%20Africa%20First/South%20Africa.pdf, accessed on 
20 December 2016. 
39
 Id at 2. The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Plan is informed by an assessment of sectoral, cross-
sectoral and geographical vulnerabilities to the detrimental impacts of climate change. It will quantify and present 
pathways for adaptation towards a just transition for a climate resilient economy. 
40
 B Osman-Elasha 'Climate change impacts, adaptation and links to sustainable development in Africa' (2017), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0670e/i0670e03.htm, accessed on 15 October 2017. 
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To that end, it is encouraging to note that Africa is taking more of a leadership role in climate 
negotiations. For example, during recent meetings in Marrakech, 50 countries in the Climate 
Vulnerable Forum (CVF) pledged to achieve 100 per cent renewable energy between 2030 and 
2050; Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Madagascar and several other African states are part of this 
group.
41
 Regrettably, South Africa is not part of this forum.
The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)
42
 also reported strong progress in setting up the
infrastructure to deliver on its target of 300 GigaWatt (GW) of new renewable energy by 2030.
43
 It
is imperative that South Africa follows suit, as any further expansion of carbon-intensive 
infrastructure will 'make it impossible for South Africa to realise its international commitments'.
44
South Africa will have to maintain its progress on the National Adaptation Strategy, while the 
Integrated Energy Plan must focus on a renewable energy-based infrastructure rollout, coal-based 
power should be scaled down and investments in costly nuclear power should be avoided.
45
Having provided an outline of the development of the Kyoto Protocol, the next section examines 
one of its flexible mechanisms, namely the CDM. 
3.3  THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding that the CDM was designed to promote sustainable development in developing 
countries and to enable emission reductions in the most cost-effective way, the CDM has many 
shortcomings that have to be tackled (these will be explored in Chapter 7). The advent of the Paris 
Agreement presents an opportunity for the refinement of the CDM with a view to informing the 
41
 The CVF is an international partnership of countries that are highly vulnerable to a warming planet. The Forum 
serves as a South-South cooperation platform for participating governments to act together against climate change. 
For a list of member countries, see http://www.thecvf.org/web/climate-vulnerable-forum/cvf-participating-countries/, 
accessed on 22 November 2016. 
42
 The AREI is an African-owned and African-led effort to develop the use of the continent's renewable energy 
potential. The AREI operates under the mandate of the African Union and is endorsed by African Heads of State and 
Government of Climate Change. For more information, see http://www.arei.org/, accessed on 26 November 2016. 
43
 Per J du Toit, WWF South Africa's Climate Change Programme in 'Paris Agreement passes first stress test at COP22' 






design of the SDM. Importantly, the SDM will have to consider wider social and environmental 
factors, other than just the amount of carbon being traded.
46
The purpose of the CDM is to
47
‘assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, and to assist parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3’. 
Under the CDM, developed countries implement 'project activities' in developing country parties, 
which must result in 'real, measurable and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change'
48
 and emission reductions that are additional to those that would otherwise have occurred.
49
These emission reductions are referred to as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), with one CER 
equating to one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e).
50
The purpose of the CDM is to assist with the funding of certified project activities, when required.
51
The proceeds arising from certified project activities are to be used for administrative expenses and 
to help especially vulnerable developing countries to meet the costs of adaptation.
52
 In terms of the
Kyoto Protocol, both public and private entities are allowed to participate under the CDM.
53
The basic model for the CDM is that an Annex I party (and/or entities authorised by such party) 
finances or implements an emission reduction project in a developing country that is also a party. 
The CDM is achieved by the issue of carbon credits by the UN (known as CERs) equal to the actual 
emission reductions achieved by the project, to the relevant Annex I party financier. The Annex I 
party financier can then either use the CERs to discharge any compliance obligation it may have, or 
sell them on to a third party who has a compliance obligation. 
46
 J Voigt 'Lessons from the CDM for the SDM and climate finance' (2016), available at 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/watch-this-ngo-newsletter-14-lessons-from-the-cdm-for-the-sdm-and-climate-finance/, 
accessed on 31 July 2017. 
47
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12. 
48
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12(5)(b). 
49
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12(5)(c). 
50
 L du Toit 'Promoting Clean Development Mechanism Implementation in South Africa: Law and Policy' (2009) 1 SA 
Public Law 33-55 at 40 explains that if a developed country exceeds its emission reduction target by five metric 
tonnes of carbon dioxide or equivalent, it is obliged to offset this excess by earning five CERs through CDM project 
activities implemented in developing countries, or by acquiring five CERs through the other flexible mechanisms 
provided for under the Kyoto Protocol. 
51
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12(6). 
52
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12(8). 
53
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12(9). 
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The CDM has evolved somewhat from this basic model to allow developing countries and entities 
authorised by them to carry out unilateral projects without an identified Annex I party participant.
54
The premise is that the CERs will be delivered to the non-Annex I party with the understanding that 
they will sell them in the market once they have been received. 
Participation in the CDM is voluntary, and both the host and the Annex I party involved must 
approve the relevant project through that party's Designated National Authority (DNA). The CDM 
is supervised at an international level by the CDM Executive Board, which itself operates under the 
authority of the COP/MOP.
55
 In order for a project to be eligible as a CDM project, it is required to
undergo a rigorous approval and assessment process administered by the CDM Executive Board. 
This procedural process is described in para 3.3.3 below. 
3.3.2 Politics and policies 
The CDM was a latecomer in the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.
56
 Prior to the drafting of the
Kyoto Protocol, the discussions on emission offsets from projects had been limited to the JI.
57
Drawing on Brazilian proposals concerning the GCF (refer to para 3.2.1),
58
 which would collect
revenues from fines imposed on Annex I parties and redistribute them as finance for projects in 
non-Annex I parties, the CDM draft text was reworked in informal contact groups in the final days 
of Kyoto to become a global carbon market mechanism.
59
 Although China and the G77 endorsed
54
 Linklaters 'Carbon the Commodity' (2007), available at 
 http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/Insights/environment/InternationalEmissionsTrading.pdf, accessed on 9 November 
2016. 
55
 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP) currently meets every 
two years in conjunction with the regular meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. To date, the COP/MOP has held eight meetings. See 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_mopmeetings.shtml, accessed on 15 October 2017. 
56
 J Werksman 'The clean development mechanism: unwrapping the "Kyoto Surprise"' (1998) 7 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 147-158 at 7 describes this as the 'Kyoto surprise' because of the 
rapid and seemingly haphazard way in which it emerged. 
57
 Streck (n9) at 300. 
58
 The linking of the CDM with the GCF is proposed in Chapter 7 as a possible means of leveraging the positive 
attributes of both mechanisms. 
59
 P Newell 'The international political economy of governing carbon' in A Payne & N Phillips (eds) Handbook of the 
International Political Economy of Governance (2014) at 421. 
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the GCF, developed countries were strongly opposed to penalties for non-compliance.
60
 Moreover,
developing countries were also staunch opponents of any mechanism that would replicate the logic 
of the JI.
61
 Their concerns ranged from a feared 'neo-colonialism', to concerns that Annex I
countries would be 'let off the hook'.
62
 Yet, developing countries also had significant interest in
channelling resources to their countries, which would enable them to implement adaptation and, to a 
lesser extent, mitigation measures.
63
The political and commercial drivers for the CDM included the need to avoid imposing costs on 
powerful nations and sectors that feared loss of competitive advantage if emissions cuts were 
required of them, but not of their emerging competitors in countries such as India and China.
64
 This
logic underpinned the subsequent refusal by the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
65
During November 1997, the US and Brazilian negotiators aimed to reach an agreement by 
suggesting that the GCF be converted to a 'positive scheme', whereby countries with commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol would be allowed to exceed their emissions quotas by supporting 
emission reduction projects in developing countries.
66
 In contrast to the JI mechanism, the new
mechanism would place as much emphasis on the promotion of sustainable development as on 
assisting developed countries to meet their commitments.
67
 Following concentrated efforts to attain
a resolution, the CDM was finally included as Art 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, signed on 
11 December 1997. 
Notwithstanding that Art 12 sets out important principles, the CDM was 'little more than an empty 
shell' after Kyoto.
68
 The main operational guidelines of the CDM were only agreed upon in
November 2001 as part of the Marrakech Accords.
69
 The reasons it took the international
60
 F Lecocq & P Ambrosi 'The clean development mechanism: History, status, and prospects' (2007) 1(1) Review of 




 Streck (n9) at 300. 
63
 Id at 301. 
64
 Newell (n59) at 421. 
65
 Ibid. The author also mentions that an aggressive lobbying campaign by many US companies was embodied in the 
Byrd-Hagel Senate resolution that prevented the US from ratifying a treaty that did not include binding emissions cuts 
for leading developing countries. 
66
 Lecocq & Ambrosi (n60) at 134. 
67
 Id at 135. 
68
 Id at 136. 
69
 Ibid. The process was only completed in 2003, with the agreement over the rules governing forestry-related CDM 
projects in the so-called Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) projects. 
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community four years to negotiate the Marrakech Accords go 'far beyond the CDM' and are related 
to uncertainty surrounding ambiguities in the text, as well as misunderstandings between the US 
and Europe.
70
 The criticisms and uncertainties pertaining to the CDM will be addressed later in
Chapter 7. In the interim, the procedural process for CDM projects will be discussed next. 
3.3.3 The CDM approvals process 
By taking into account the concerns of developing countries, the CDM established a scheme of JI 
between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.
71
 In terms of the CDM, the parties participating in a
CDM project must both be parties to the Kyoto Protocol
72
 and are required to designate a national
authority (a DNA) for the CDM.
73
 As participation in the CDM requires ratification of and
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol from all participating parties, the CDM also provides an 
opportunity to broaden the ratification of and compliance with the Protocol.
74
The main criteria specified in the Marrakech Accords for the validation of a CDM project are as 
follows: 
 the participation requirements have been satisfied;
 comments by local stakeholders have been considered and reported to the Designated
Operational Entity (DOE);
 environmental impacts of the project activity have been properly assessed;
 the project reduces emissions below those that would have otherwise occurred (the principle of
additionality); and
 the baseline and monitoring methodologies are compliant with the stipulated requirements of the




 Streck (n9) at 302. 
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 COP Decision 3/CMP.1 Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol paras 30 and 31, available at https://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/COPMOP/08a01.pdf, accessed on 
27 November 2016. 
73
 Id para 29. 
74
 Streck (n9) at 302. 
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3.3.4 The CDM project cycle 
As per the Marrakech Accords, the CDM project cycle may be summarised as follows
75
 (and
depicted in Figure 3.2 on the next page): 
i) The project developer produces the Project Design Document (PDD).
 The developer could be the project sponsor, investor, potential carbon buyer or a third-party
(eg a consultant company).
 The PDD includes, inter alia, a description of the project, an explanation of how the baseline
and monitoring methodology will be applied, a discussion of the environmental impacts of
the project, and a compilation of stakeholders' comments (if any).
ii) Letter of Approval
 The buyer(s) and seller(s) – even if they are private entities – must each get a Letter of
Approval (LoA) from the entity in charge of reviewing CDM projects in their respective
governments, namely the DNA.
 The LoA states that the country approves participation in the project and, for the host
country that the project contributes to sustainable development.
75
 Supplemental information was derived from Linklaters (n54) at 4-5 and Lecocq & Ambrosi (n60) at 137. 
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Figure 3.2 The CDM Project Cycle
76
iii) Validation
 Once finalised, the PDD and the LoAs are validated by an independent third party (typically
an auditing company) accredited by the CDM Executive Board, namely the DOE.
 The DOE reviews the PDD to determine whether the relevant requirements have been
complied with. One such requirement is that the reductions in anthropogenic emissions are
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the proposed activity.
77
76
 Derived from Linklaters (n54) at 6. 
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 By validating the project, the DOE determines that the project has been approved by the
parties involved, and that it correctly applies the selected baseline and monitoring
methodology.
iv) Registration
 Once the validation is successful, the DOE has to submit a request for registration to the
CDM Executive Board. This request takes the form of a validation report and includes the
PDD and LoA.
78
 The CDM Executive Board will register the project after an eight-week period, during which
the validated project is publicised and third parties are given the opportunity to object to
registration.
79
 In the absence of an off-the-shelf baseline and monitoring methodology, the DOE first
submits a new methodology for validation by the Executive Board. Once the methodology is
approved, the DOE submits the PDD.
v) Verification
 Once the project is registered and has become operational, a second DOE is charged with
reviewing and certifying the emission reductions generated by the project.
 With the exception of small scale CDM projects, the second DOE must be a different
operational entity from the one that validates the project.
vi) Issuance of CERs
 Once verification is complete, the verification report is submitted to the CDM Executive
Board.
 Once a project has been implemented, the CERs generated by the project are calculated
according to the methodology included in the monitoring plan.
80
 The DOE then verifies that
the CERs calculated have actually resulted due to the project activity.
81
 The CERs are formally issued by the Executive Board six weeks later (provided there were
no objections) and transferred to the project participants' accounts.
77
 Decision 3/CMP.1 (n66) para 37(d). 
78
 Decision 3/CMP.1 (n66) para 40(g). 
79
 Id para 41. 
80
 Id para 59. 
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 Id para 61. 
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 At that point, the CERs are essentially fungible with other Kyoto allowances, such as
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) or Emission Reduction Units (ERUs).
3.3.5 Concluding remarks on the CDM 
The CDM is a project-based scheme, which allows carbon credits to be claimed by developed, 
capped countries for emissions reductions in developing, uncapped countries.
82
 This interchange
aims to promote sustainable economic growth and has a concomitant benefit of clean technology 
transfer.
83
 The result is an actual, net cost-effective global reduction in emissions.
84
 The CDM 'has a
key role' in helping countries achieve the goals of the UNFCCC in general, and the Paris Agreement 
in particular.
85
 With almost 8 000 projects and close to 300 large-scale programmes of activities
established in 125 countries, the CDM has been successful in 'generating climate action on the 
ground'.
86
Despite criticisms levelled against the CDM (which will be explored in Chapter 7), the CDM 
became an important source of climate finance for developing countries. The only real obligation on 
the part of the host country was to provide the requisite governance structure to ensure the issuance 
of the CERs. But this will no longer be the case, given the provisions of the Paris Agreement. 
Whether one regards the CDM as a success or a failure, the CDM is not likely to be repeated or 
replicated, at least not under the terms that existed within the Kyoto Protocol.
87
South Africa's law and policy framework for the regulation of the CDM is examined in the next 
chapter. The international status of the CDM is considered in Chapter 5, while Chapter 7 evaluates 
the barriers preventing the expansion of the CDM. As such, this chapter will not address these 
matters. The next section examines the Paris Agreement and its core components, followed by 
subsequent analyses of the envisaged SDM. 
82






 UN 'Governments see CDM as crucial for Paris Goals' (2016) available at http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-




D Hone 'A new reality to come to terms with' (2016), available at 
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3.4  THE ARCHITECTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
The Paris Agreement
88
 entered into force on 4 November 2016 and is the culmination of many
years of negotiations. It marks the end of the strict differentiation between developed and 
developing countries. Instead, a common framework is used that commits all countries to put 
forward their best efforts and to improve on these in years to come. Broadly, the Paris Agreement 
reflects a hybrid approach, blending bottom-up flexibility (to achieve broad participation) with top-
down rules (to promote accountability and ambition).
89
 This hybrid model recognises that climate
change is a global challenge, but it requires political will to address it, which primarily occurs 
within the domestic realm.
90
In order to contextualise the SDM, the following paragraphs provide a concise overview of a 
selection of key provisions in the Paris Agreement.
91
3.4.1  Legal character 
The legal character of the Paris Agreement has been the subject of some debate, but what is clear is 
that it is a treaty under international law, with only certain provisions being legally binding.
92
 The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a treaty as 'an international agreement 
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law'.
93
 Treaties can be
referred to by a number of different names: international conventions, international agreements, 
88
 United Nations Paris Agreement (2015) available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf, accessed on 11 
March 2016. 
89
 Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions (CCES) 'Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris' (2015) 
at 2, available at http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop21-paris/summary, accessed on 15 November 
2016. 
90
 D Bodansky & E Diringer Building flexibility and ambition into a 2015 Climate Agreement (2014), available at 
https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/int-flexibility-06-14.pdf, accessed on 19 July 2017.    
91
 A detailed analysis of all of the provisions in the Paris Agreement fall outside the scope of this thesis. See, instead, 
Bodansky et al (n11) at 210-247 for an in-depth review of the Paris Agreement. 
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 D Bodansky 'The Paris climate change agreement: a new hope?' (2016) 110(2) American Journal of International 
Law 288-319 at 290. 
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 VCLT Art 2(a). The text of the VCLT (1969) is available at 
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3 November 2016. 
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covenants, final acts, charters, protocols, pacts, accords, and constitutions for international 
organisations.
94
Although it now appears settled that the Paris Agreement will be a treaty within the definition of the 
VCLT, debate continues over which provisions of the agreement should be legally binding.
95
 The
issue of which provisions to make binding (expressed as 'shall', as opposed to 'should') was a central 
concern for many countries, in particular the US.
96
 The Paris Agreement contains a carefully crafted
'mix of hard, soft and non-obligations, the boundaries between which are blurred'.
97
 A final step in
the Paris negotiations was a technical correction substituting 'should' for 'shall' in a provision calling 
on developed countries to undertake absolute economy-wide emissions targets. 
3.4.2  Differentiation 
The Paris Agreement includes references to developed and developing countries, stating in several 
instances that the developed countries should take the lead. Notably, it makes no mention of the 
Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries, as contained in the UNFCCC. In short, many 
provisions establish common commitments, while allowing flexibility to accommodate different 
national capacities and circumstances.
98
 This is done by way of self-differentiation – as implicit in
the concept of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – or through more detailed operational 
rules which have yet to be developed.
99
94
Berkeley Law Library Treaties and International Agreements (2013) available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/dynamic/guide.php?id=65, accessed on 15 November 2016.   
95
 For an interesting exposition on the legal character of the Paris Agreement and its constituent parts, see D Bodansky 
(2015) 'Legally Binding versus Non-Legally Binding Instruments' in S Barrett et al (eds) (2015) Towards a Workable 
and Effective Climate Regime. 
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 Per CCES (n89) at 2, the US wanted an agreement the president could accept without congressional approval.  
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 For a narrative on the drafting of the provisions, see L Rajamani 'The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, 
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3.4.3  Long-term goal 
The goal
100
 of containing average warming below 2°C is reaffirmed in the Paris Agreement.
101
Moreover, parties are urged to 'pursue efforts' to limit this to 1.5°C, which is a top priority for 
developing countries that are highly vulnerable to climate impacts.
102
3.4.4  Mitigation 
The Paris Agreement articulates two long-term emission goals: first, a peaking of emissions as soon 
as possible, followed by a goal of net GHG neutrality in the second half of this century.
103
 The
agreement commits parties to 'pursue domestic measures with the aim of achieving the objectives' 
of their NDCs,
104
 but does not make the implementation or achievement of NDCs a binding
obligation.
105
 It also encourages, but does not require, countries to develop and communicate long-
term low-emission development strategies. 
The core mitigation commitments are common to all parties, but there is some differentiation in the 
expectation set: developed countries 'should' undertake absolute economy-wide reduction targets, 
while developing countries 'are encouraged' to move towards economy-wide targets over time.
106
 In
addition, developing countries are to receive support to implement their commitments.
107
 NDCs will
be recorded in a public registry maintained by the UNFCCC secretariat, rather than in an annex to 
the agreement, as some countries had proposed.
108
100
 Bodansky et al (n11) at 228 remark that parties had explored different options for formulating long-term mitigation 
goals. These goals comprise a limitation on temperature increase, a GHG emissions reduction goal (50 per cent by 
2050 for example) or as a time frame for peaking of emissions. 
101




 In respect of the first goal, it is recognised that it will take longer for developing countries; as regards the second 
goal, this neutrality is expressed as 'a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks'. 
CCES (n89) at 3 remarks that the latter was an alternative to terms like 'decarbonisation' and 'climate neutrality' 
espoused by some parties. 
104
 Paris Agreement, Art 4(2). 
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3.4.5  Adaptation 
A major priority for many developing countries was strengthening adaptation efforts under the 
UNFCCC.
109
 The Paris Agreement does that by:
 Establishing a global goal of 'enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing
vulnerability to climate change';
110
 Requiring all parties, 'as appropriate', to plan and implement adaptation efforts;
111
 Encouraging all parties to report on their adaptation efforts and/or needs;
112
 Committing enhanced adaptation support for developing countries;
113
 and
 Including a review of adaptation progress, and of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation
support, in the global stocktake to be undertaken every five years.
114
Bodansky et al point out that the Paris Agreement
115
 extends the progression principle beyond
mitigation to also include adaptation and support.
116
 Thus, although each party has a different
starting point (as reflected in their self-differentiated NDCs), the principle of progression ensures 
that all parties travel in the same direction towards more ambitious and rigorous actions.
117
3.4.6  Carbon markets 
During the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement, it was uncertain which states would 
agree to the inclusion of market-oriented language in the final accord.
118
 Eventually, proponents of
market mechanisms succeeded in including a separate article on markets.
119
 So as to also
109
 CCES (n89) at 4. 
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 Ibid. The authors comment that a small number of states had strongly opposed the inclusion of such a provision. 




accommodate market opponents, Art 6 does not directly refer to 'markets'.
120
 The article also
explicitly recognises the important of non-market approaches.
121
Article 6 effectively provides for two market-based mechanisms. The first refers to 'cooperative 
approaches' in terms of which parties may use Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes 
(ITMOs) to implement their NDCs (this is referred to again later in para 3.5.4).
122
 The second is the
creation of the SDM, which is discussed in greater detail in section 3.5 below.
123
3.4.7  Stocktake 
The Paris Agreement establishes two linked processes, each on a five-year cycle, so as to promote 
rising ambition. The first process is a global stocktake to assess collective progress towards meeting 
the agreement's long-term goals. The first stocktake took place in 2012. The second process is the 
submission by parties of new NDCs, 'informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake'.
124
The global stocktake is necessary to gauge whether national efforts (as expressed in each party's 
NDC) as a collective add up to what is required to limit temperature increase to below 2°C.
125
Broad guidance is provided on the nature, purpose, tasks and outcome of the stocktake.
126
 It is left
up to the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (COP/CMA) to 
determine the mechanics of the stocktake.
127
3.4.8  Transparency 
Because the Paris Agreement does not contain binding obligations of result (as regards the 
commitments in parties' NDCs), it relies on transparency as a means of holding countries 
accountable.
128
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COP Decision 1/CP.21 'Adoption of the Paris Agreement' paras 90-101, available at 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/session/9057/php/view/decisions.php#c, accessed on 20 November 2016. 
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influence behaviour in an attempt to be as effective as legal obligation. 
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necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving' their NDCs.
129
 With the exception
of least developed and small island countries, these reports are to be submitted at least every two 
years.
130
In addition, developed countries shall report on support provided;
131
 developing countries should
report on support received;
132
 and all should report on their adaptation efforts.
133
 Information
reported by countries on mitigation and support will undergo 'expert technical review' and each 
party must participate in 'a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress' in implementing and 
achieving its NDC.
134
3.4.9  Implementation and compliance 
A new compliance mechanism is established by the Paris Agreement to 'facilitate implementation' 
and 'promote compliance'.
135
 This mechanism takes the form of a committee of experts and is to be
'facilitative' in nature and operate in a 'non-adversarial and non-punitive' manner.
136
 It will report
annually to the COP.
137
 The fact that the Paris Agreement addresses 'compliance' - and not just
implementation – speaks to the concerns that the Paris Agreement would recreate a Kyoto-like 
compliance with enforcement and consequences for non-compliance.
138
3.4.10  Finance 
As was the case in past COP meetings, finance was a contentious issue in Paris.
139
 The Paris
Agreement commits developed countries to provide finance for mitigation and adaptation in 
129
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 Other parties are encouraged to provide such support voluntarily.
141
 In
addition to reporting on finance already provided and received, developed countries commit to 
submit, every two years, 'indicative quantitative and qualitative information' on future support, 
including, 'as available', projected levels of public finance. Other countries, in contrast, are 
encouraged to do so voluntarily.
142
 Finance will also be considered in the global stocktake
(mentioned in para 3.4.7 above).
143
3.4.11  Loss and damage 
The Paris Agreement includes a free-standing provision which extends the Warsaw International 
Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage.
144
 The mechanism, established as an interim body at
COP19, is charged with developing approaches to help vulnerable countries cope with unavoidable 
140
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The issue of 'loss and damage' is a complex and controversial area, not least because of the concept of extreme event 
attribution (for example floods and droughts). For example, views range from no attribution, to every extreme event 
being ascribed to climate change. The scientific position is more nuanced. See, in this regard, R James, F Otto, H 
Parker, E Boyd,  R Cornforth, D Mitchell & M Allen 'Characterizing loss and damage from climate change' (2014) 
4(11) Nature Climate Change 938-939, wherein the losses and damages relevant to the WIM are discussed. Criticism 
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impacts, including extreme weather events and slow-onset events, such as sea-level rise.
145
 At the
insistence of developed countries (led by the US), the accompanying COP decision specifies that 
the loss and damage provision 'does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or 
compensation'.
146
Bodansky et al emphasise the importance of Art 8 for two reasons.
147
 First, the issue of loss and
damage now falls within the ambit of the Paris Agreement.
148
 Second, they argue that because it is a
free-standing article, it delineates loss and damage from adaptation (as was long sought after by 
developing countries).
149
3.4.12  Concluding remarks on the Paris Agreement 
While countries continue to work post-COP22 to finalise the fine print of the Paris Agreement, it is 
evident that more needs to be done in coming years to clarify the consistency of national targets. 
Over time, NDCs will expand to cover all GHG emissions in all economies.
150
 Every NDC, either
specifically or notionally, is linked to a quantitative carbon budget and there is an expectation from 
the Paris Agreement that these budgets will be delivered.
151
The following features of the Paris Agreement is worth highlighting:
152
 It is a legally binding instrument (with many non-binding elements);
 It has a global reach and applies to both developed and developing countries;
 It specifies the same core obligations for all countries;
 It establishes a long-term, durable architecture;
 It institutionalises an iterative process, in which parties will take stock of progress every five
years;
 It creates an expectation of progressively stronger action over time;
 It establishes an enhanced transparency and accountability framework; and
 It commands near-universal acceptance.
145
 CCES (n89) at 4 also remarks that potential approaches include early warning systems and risk insurance. 
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 Bodansky A new hope (n92) at 290-291. 
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Having concluded the discussion of the Paris Agreement, the next section examines the nascent 
SDM. 
3.5 THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
3.5.1  Introduction 
Central to the subject matter of this thesis is Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. This article contains 
three different provisions, namely a general framework for approaches that involves the transfer of 
mitigation options, now termed 'cooperative approaches'; a separate SDM; and a framework for 
non-market approaches. The focal point of this section is an analysis of the text of Art 6(4), namely 
the SDM.
153
 Paragraph 3.5.4 briefly compares the cooperative approaches and the SDM, as it is
unclear how they will interact with each other and the varied NDC landscape. 
It is suggested that the SDM is a successor-in-interest to the regulatory infrastructure established 
under the Kyoto Protocol's CDM and is set to replace the CDM from 2020 onwards.
154
 It will be
created and managed under the authority and rules of the UNFCCC Secretariat.
155
 The SDM's core
purpose could be defined as the delivery of an emissions reduction against some reference which is 
contained within the NDC, but also to ensure an overall reduction in global emissions, while 
delivering sustainable development benefits. Thus, the SDM promotes GHG mitigation efforts 
above and beyond what a nation commits to under its NDC.
156
The CDM became an important source of climate finance for developing countries, where the only 
real obligation on the part of the host country for a given project was to provide the necessary 
governance structure to ensure eventual issuance of the CERs.
157
 However, this is no longer the
case, as the provisions of the Paris Agreement and Art 6 are now effectively the same for all 
153
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 Therefore, all countries will be able to generate and/or use offset credits, ie developed
countries will compete with developing countries for the investment in mitigation activities.
159
Ultimately, the major difference between the new SDM and the old CDM is that carbon markets 
will no longer be limited to developed country parties. Instead, all parties will be able to participate 
in this mechanism. The remainder of this chapter will investigate if, and how, the SDM effectively 
refines and streamlines the CDM. 
3.5.2  The genesis of the SDM 
The International Centre for Climate Governance prepared a comprehensive and enlightening paper 
which presents the evolution of the ideas contained in Art 6 of the Paris Agreement.
160
 The report
provides an insightful view of how the ideas emanating from the negotiation process were captured 
in textual form in different drafts of the agreement.
161
 This section will highlight aspects of this
report, in order to trace the origins of the SDM.
162
The markets/non-markets text in the Paris Agreement was one of the last issues to be agreed upon 
on the last night of COP21.
163
 The inclusion of markets provisions (via Art 6) can be seen as a
'major success, and a minor miracle', as the prediction throughout 2015 was for a diminutive 
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Art 6 groups together issues that had originally been spread over a number of articles – both in 
drafts of the Paris Agreement, as well as in drafts of the related COP decision.
165
 Three issues were
central to the debate on the scope of the SDM:
166
a) Which parties can host the SDM?
b) Which parties can use the product of the SDM?
c) Is the SDM one or more than one mechanism? Alternatively, is it narrowly defined or does it
provide space for many approaches that may emerge in the future?
Each of these matters will now be considered in turn. 
3.5.2.1  Which parties can host the SDM? 
As a basis, it should be noted that no reference is made in paras 6.4 to 6.7 of the Paris Agreement to 
any differentiation or limitation that would prohibit certain parties from participating in the SDM. 
Paragraph 6(4)(c) only refers to the 'host Party' – no qualifiers are provided. All parties to the Paris 
Agreement undertake through their NDCs to contribute to mitigation efforts. It follows, therefore, 
that all parties that have NDCs should have access to the SDM.
167
In this context, the November 2014 submission of Brazil refers to an 'enhanced Clean Development 
Mechanism or CDM+'. There is also a reference in the 10 November draft of the Paris Agreement 
to 'build on the mechanism defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol'.
168
 This could be interpreted
as a 'general demand to build on what was learnt from the CDM experience'.
169
Later, the Brazil-EU submission
170
 introduced differentiation in a direct way –
‘ echanis  to contribute to the  itigation of greenhouse gas e issions and to support sustainable 
develop ent [in developing countries]’. 
This theme was carried through to the 10 December draft, but was challenged by many developed 
countries, as well as a few developing countries.
171
 Their contention was to ensure that the SDM
165
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was a 'resilient mechanism, which would be fit for the long-term'.
172
 This argument prevailed in the
final version of the Paris Agreement, as Art 6 makes no reference to any type of differentiation. 
3.5.2.2  Which parties can use the product of the SDM? 
A similar debate took place on the issue of 'who can use the mitigations outputs of the SDM'.
173
 The
Brazil-EU submission limited use of the output of the SDM to countries that had NDCs with 
absolute caps:
174
‘Assist Parties with a ### that reflects an absolute target in relation to a base  ear to fulfil their ###, through 
the use of emission reductions fro   itigation activities [in developing countries]’. 
This language was then included in the 9 and 10 December 2015 versions of the draft Paris 
Agreement:
175
‘Enhance  itigation a bition b  [developing countr ] Parties [, b  incentivising supple entar  voluntary 
cli ate action, be ond their ###]’. 
Again, there was robust opposition from both developed and developing countries, as they felt that 
all parties, regardless of the type of NDC they had put forward, should have the option of having 
access to the output of the SDM.
176
 The final text of Art 6 contains no differentiation and mention is
made that 'another Party' can use the output of the SDM. 
3.5.2.3  Is the SDM more than one mechanism? 
Article 6(4) of the Paris Agreement refers to the fact that 'a mechanism to contribute ... is hereby 
established ...'. This allusion to 'a mechanism' and the interpretation thereof was also a bone of 
contention during negotiations.
177
 Two opposing arguments were put forward in this regard.
The first is that the SDM is a single mechanism. The line of reasoning is that if the mechanism 'had 
been detailed to a high level of granularity' in the Paris Agreement, the creation of additional 
mechanisms would require amendments to the Paris Agreement.
178
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 Id at 15. 
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Agreement would entail a complex and drawn-out process, which no one would really want to 
consider, the text would rule out the creation of other mechanisms.
179
The second argument interprets the text in such a way that multiple approaches are identifiable in 
Art 6 and, indeed, possible.
180
 The basis for this view is that there is no specific language in Art 6
that would definitely preclude such interpretation.
181
 Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol experience
shows that numerous types of projects and activities were accepted in the CDM over time, so that 'a 
mechanism' cannot be interpreted as a unique approach.
182
In addition, Art 6(4) to Art 6(7) refer to mitigation activities and the 'reduction of emission levels in 
the host Party'. This could be regarded as a broad interpretation of the type of activities covered, as 
both reductions and removals lead to a reduction in emission levels.
183
 Accordingly, the 'multiple
mechanisms' notion is plausible, as many types of mitigation approaches can be defined under the 
paragraphs of this Article.
184
3.5.3  Interpretational issues with the SDM 
In this next section, a number of interpretational issues are assessed, commencing with a 
comparison of the legal text of the CDM and SDM. 
3.5.3.1  Comparison of the legal text 
The CDM is defined in Art 12(2) of the Kyoto Protocol as follows: 
‘The purpose of the clean develop ent  echanis  shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in 
achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction co  it ents under Article 3.’ 
The SDM is defined in Art 6(4) of the Paris Agreement in this way: 
‘A  echanis  to contribute to the  itigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable 
development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the  eeting of the Parties to this Agree ent for use b  Parties on a voluntar  basis...’. 
179
Ibid. The author points out that non-CDM type mechanisms could be created domestically and their ITMOs 












In many ways the SDM is remarkably similar to the CDM, as set out in Table 3.1 below.
185
Despite these similarities, there are also significant differences:
186
 The distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I parties is omitted from the SDM.
Consequently, both developed and developing countries can now host mitigation projects, and
also purchase ERUs.
 The CDM is project-based. In contrast, the SDM does not specify the scope of the mitigation
activities and could be considered as a sectoral mechanism.
185
 Derived from M Cames, S Healy, D Tänzler, L Li, J Melnikova, C Warnecke, M Kurdziel International market 
mechanisms after Paris – Discussion Paper (2016) 17-18, available at 
https://newclimate.org/2016/11/17/international-market-mechanisms-after-paris/, accessed on 2 January 2017. 
186
 Ibid. 
Table 3.1 Similarities between the CDM and SDM 
CDM (Art 12, Kyoto Protocol) SDM (Art 6.4-7 & para 37-38, Paris Agreement) 
Resulting in certified emission reductions Verification and certification of emission reductions 
Achieving sustainable development and contributing 
to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC 
Contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and 
support sustainable development 
Additional to any that would occur in the absence of 
the certified project activity 
Additional to any that would otherwise occur 
Supervised by an executive board of the CDM Supervised by a body designated by the COP/CMA 
Approval of the party involved Incentivise and facilitate participation ... by public and 
private entities authorised by a party 
May use the certified emission reductions ... to 
contribute to compliance 
Be used by another party to fulfil its NDC 
Share of the proceeds from certified project activities 
is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to 
assist developing country parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to 
meet the costs of adaptation 
Share of the proceeds from activities ... is used to cover 
administrative expenses as well as to assist developing 
country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of 
adaptation 
Elaborate modalities and procedures Adopt rules, modalities and procedures 
Voluntary participation On a voluntary basis 
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 The CDM is an offset mechanism, but does not directly contribute to the reduction of global
GHG emissions. The SDM, however, includes a provision that it shall aim to deliver an overall
mitigation in global emissions.
187
The first interpretational issue which might prove problematic pertains to the scope of the SDM. 
3.5.3.2  The scope of the SDM 
As mentioned earlier, the SDM does not specify the scope of the mitigation activities covered by 
the mechanism. This arguably provides more flexibility in terms of which types of mitigation 
activities can be addressed by the SDM.
188
 The scope of project- and programme-based activities
under the CDM could be extended to entire sectors or even to policies.
189
 Whether or not parties
will agree on regulating the scope or providing full flexibility, largely depends to which extent 
mitigation outcomes of larger scopes can be accurately identified and monitored.
190
A concomitant issue for parties to consider is whether an initial investment in new technologies, as 
in the case of the CDM and JI, is required or whether activities which are mainly operational in 
nature may qualify under the SDM as well.
191
 Notwithstanding the challenges involved in




 Admittedly, it remains to be seen how that requirement can be operationalised, but it seems clear that the SDM 
should aim to exceed pure offsetting. 
188




 Ibid. In this context, the authors suggest a number of questions which country negotiators must address (at 19): 
 How could a sector or policy be exactly delineated from another? For sectors, international classifications are
available, but these may not be appropriate for emissions reduction monitoring, as they were elaborated from an
economic and financial perspective.
 How will the heterogeneity in terms of potential mitigation technologies be dealt with? Some technologies may
be applicable across many sectors, while others may cover only a certain sector.
 How will shortcomings in data availability be addressed? There may be no appropriate data to identify base year
emissions or to estimate BAU emission projections. A lack of appropriate data may require the insertion of






3.5.3.3  Relationship to nationally determined contributions 
Unlike the CDM, which only allows the generation of CERs in countries without targets, the SDM 
can be used by all parties. Under the Paris Agreement, almost all parties have NDCs, which include 
different types of targets. This results in a number of interpretational hurdles which will have to be 
navigated – whether an activity is within or beyond the coverage of the NDC; the transfer of credits 
generated from activities which fall in the scope of the list of policies and measures; differentiation 
of NDCs between unconditional and conditional parts, and strengthening of the NDCs.
193
3.5.3.4  Linkage between NDCs 
Art 6 of the Paris Agreement contains a number of safe haven provisions for the development of 
market and non-market mechanisms to drive future mitigation. The relevant provision covers any 
linkage
194
 that might exist between NDCs, such as that which could occur between cap and trade
systems residing in different countries:
195
‘Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntar  basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote 
sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and 
shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with guidance 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agree ent’.
196 
In other words, emissions reductions occurring outside of the geographic jurisdiction of a party to 
the Paris Agreement can be counted toward achieving that party's NDC via ITMOs. Consequently, 
exchanges between compliance entities within the jurisdictions of two different parties are now 




 These quandaries are examined in some by detail Cames et al (n185) at 19-21. 
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 Paris Agreement, Art 6.2. 
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 See RN Stavins 'Market mechanisms in the Paris Climate Agreement: international linkage under Article 6.2' (2016), 
available at http://www.rff.org/blog/2016/market-mechanisms-paris-climate-agreement-international-linkage-under-
article-62, accessed on 29 December 2016, for an explanation of the three types of heterogeneity which are important 
in regard to linkage under Art 6(2). 
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Art 6(4) could prove to be a seminal proposal, with the potential to drive new investment and 
markets. The SDM aims - 
1. To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, while fostering sustainable
development;
2. To incentivise and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by
public and private entities authorised by a party;
3. To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host party, which will benefit from
mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another party to
fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and
4. To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.
The text above does not refer to project activity or identify developing countries as the beneficiaries 
of the activities undertaken. This is in contrast to Art 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which evidently 
identified such a role for the CDM. Instead, Art 6(4) of the Paris Agreement is defined more 
broadly as a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of GHG, while promoting sustainable 
development.
198
 Accordingly, the SDM could have a 'very wide scope and operate on many
fronts'.
199
The SDM could be designed so as to establish sector baselines and issue sovereign credits for 
performance in excess of those baselines.
200
 These credits might then be purchased by external
climate funds to channel investment.
201
 In this way, the SDM would resemble the CDM. Under the
CDM, crediting from one country acting as a direct offset in another country was possible, because 
the project host country had not quantified an emissions management goal.
202
 As such, national
198
 It is for this reason that the SDM is also referred to as the 'Emissions Mitigation Mechanism' (EMM), as it is a 
mitigating mechanism that supports sustainable development, and not a sustainable development mechanism which 
happens to result in an emissions burden. As such, according to Hone Developing Article 6 (n194), it may be 'short 
sighted' to refer to the SDM as the CDM 2.0. For the sake of consistency, this study will refer to the SDM (and not 
the EMM). 
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International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) (2016) A vision for the market provisions of the Paris 
Agreement at 3. 
100 
accounting effectively took place on one side only. However, unlike the CDM, the provisions of 
Art 6(5) of the Paris Agreement prevent one-sided accounting: 
‘E ission reductions resulting fro  the  echanis  referred to in para 4 of this Article shall not be used to 
demonstrate achievement of the host party's nationally determined contribution if used by another Party to 
de onstrate achieve ent of its nationall  deter ined contribution.’ 
As a result, the transfer of credits from a project across a national border – in the style of the CDM 
–will impact the national inventory reports of both parties. These transfers will then have to be
executed in a similar fashion as the JI, whereby emissions are governed by an allocation of 
ERUs.
203
 This accounting dilemma will be explored in further detail in Chapter 7.
3.5.3.5  Governance 
Similar to the CDM, the SDM will be supervised by a body under the guidance of the COP/CMA. 
The Executive Board (EB) of the CDM could thus serve as a role model for this body, with rules 
and procedures for decision-making built on those for the CDM. 
The composition of the body may differ from that of the EB, as Art 6 does not assign certain roles 
to groups of countries. Accordingly, the formation of the SDM body may perhaps not be 
proportionate with respect to the share of developed and developing countries.
204
In addition, the competencies of the SDM body, such as accreditation of independent verifiers, 
issuance of units etc, will have to be agreed upon by the parties, but may be developed 
incrementally by the body after its establishment.
205
3.5.3.6  Purpose 
In comparison with the CDM, the purpose of the SDM is quite general and seems to be more open 
to other purposes than merely contributing to the attainment of targets under the UNFCCC. In fact, 
despite the more limited purpose of the CDM, it, too, could be used for purposes other than 
compliance with mitigation obligations under the UNFCCC, such as the following:
206
203
 Ibid. IETA explains that the JI style effectively requires an adjustment to the project host country's national goal if 
the crediting unit was to be used by another party to meet their goal. 
204
 Cames et al (n185) at 21 remark that this could contribute to establishing a less politicised body than the EB. 
205
 Id at 22. 
206
 These extended purposes were identified by Cames et al (n185) at 22. 
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 Private entities cancelled CERs to voluntarily offset emissions not covered by any obligation
(for example, flights); the EB responded by creating a platform whereby private entities were
allowed to cancel CERs directly under the UNFCCC for offsetting any private emissions.
 The methodologies and tools developed by the CDM may also be used in the context of results-
based carbon funding.
 CERs may also be used to offset CO2e from international aviation above the 2020 baseline
emissions.
It is reasonable to assume that these extended purposes will become even more prominent under the 
SDM, since the scope of the Paris Agreement is 'larger and more heterogenic' than the Kyoto 
Protocol.
207
 After all, crediting mechanisms are catalysts for competitive mitigation options, as they
provide incentives to public and private entities to gain financial support for the implementation of 
a broad range of climate mitigation technologies.
208
3.5.4  Comparing cooperative approaches and the SDM 
Article 6(1) of the Paris Agreement opens by recognising that certain parties choose to pursue 
voluntary cooperation in the implementation of the NDCs. One form of voluntary cooperation is set 
out in Art 6(2), known as the Cooperative Approaches (CAs). CAs enable parties to use ITMOs 
towards their NDCs and require parties to apply robust accounting, which avoids double counting.  
Although it is not the main purpose of this chapter to analyse the CAs, it is worthwhile highlighting 
some key features,
209
 as this might help to shed light on the interaction between CAs and the SDM,
as well as their interaction within the general construct of the Paris Agreement. 
 Voluntary nature
Parties must accede to CAs on a voluntary basis. Thus, no provisions in terms of the accounting






 For a more detailed discussion of these attributes, see P Martins & G Barata 'Study on approaches to incorporation of 
mitigation contributions in international market mechanisms, including through development standards for setting 
emissions reference levels' International Emission Transfers after 2020 (2016) at 22-29, available at 
http://get2c.pt/get2c/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Parisian-Market-Accounting-FINAL_PMB_clean3.pdf, accessed on 
5 January 2017 and Cames et al (n185) at 11-17. 
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such infrastructure as may be necessary for tracking the transfer of units must be accepted by 
parties at a national level. 
 ITMOs
Art 6(2) establishes ITMOs, which may be used towards NDCs. It seems probable that ITMOs
should follow similar common metrics across a diversity of NDCs and are likely to be expressed
as an emission unit (e.g. one tCO2e) or as an emission reduction.
210
 The transfer of mitigation
outcomes across national borders is a process with various stages, as depicted in Figure 3.3 on
the next page.
211
Figure 3.3 Stages of the process of transferring mitigation outcomes 
210
 This view is based on a joint reading of paras 31 and 32 of Decision1/CP.21 with Art 6.   
211
 N Kreibich & L Hermwille 'Understanding Environmental Integrity Challenges' (2016) JIKO Policy Paper No 
02/2016 at 5-6 available at 
 http://www.carbon-
mechanisms.de/fileadmin/media/dokumente/Publikationen/PP_2016_02_Robust_Transfers_bf.pdf, accessed on 7 
January 2017 describe the different stages of the process. The authors address the risks associated with each of these 
steps at 7-13. 
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 Environmental integrity and transparency
CAs must ensure 'environmental integrity and transparency', thus indicating the need for any
CAs to report internationally in terms of the underlying mechanism, the generation of ITMOs,
the governance system and, potentially, an assessment of their environmental integrity.
 Use towards NDCs
CAs involve the use of ITMOs towards NDCs. Therefore, domestically transferred units and
any units that are not used towards a party's NDC are excluded.
212
 The wording of 'mitigation
outcome' also seems to raise a number of questions: it appears to purposefully broaden the scope
of what could be internationally transferred, without a strict one-to-one relation to unit holdings
in a registry. This, in turn, raises the possibility of periodic reconciliation between parties (net
transfer accounting) based on a mutually agreed definition of mitigation outcome.
 Promotion of sustainable development
This replicates earlier language from the CDM, although it might be difficult, in practical terms,
to agree on the operative conditionality of a sustainable development or co-benefit criterion.
 Robust accounting
The reference to 'robust accounting' demonstrates a keen awareness of the threat of double
counting and emphasises the importance of developing multilateral guidance, which is to be
adhered to.
Table 3.2 offers a comparison of the main elements of the CAs and the SDM.
213
212
 Martins & Barata (n209) at 23 argue that the phrase 'use towards NDCs' is indicative of the fact that parties decided 
to exclude issues of generation or transfer from the purview of the Article, except if these were to have an impact on 
the use towards NDCs. 
213
Martins & Barata (n209) at 30. 
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At present, it is unclear how the CAs and SDM will interact with each other and the diverse NDC 
landscape.
214
 The guidance that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA) has been requested to develop and recommend in para 37 of Decision 1/CP.21 refers to 
Art 6(2), but not specifically to Art 6(4). Does this mean that the units produced by the SDM differ 
from the ITMOs in Art 6(2)? Will they be counted differently to ITMOs? 
A related issue is the level of governance. One interpretation of the text of Art 6(2) is that CAs are 
bilateral or collective initiatives between a group of parties not entirely under the auspices of the 
COP/CMA, while the SDM is established under the authority and guidance of the COP/CMA. The 
question then arises as to how much oversight the COP/CMA will have when it comes to the CAs 
214
 The subsequent research questions are based on issues identified by Martins & Barata (n209) at 29-30. 
Table 3.2 Comparison of the Cooperative Approaches and the SDM 
Cooperative Approaches  
(Art 6.2-3, Paris Agreement) 
The SDM  
(Art 6.4-7, Paris Agreement) 
Implied to be bilateral or among a group of 
parties 
Multilateral, under the authority and guidance of 
the COP/CMA, supervised by a body designated 
by the COP/CMA 
Robust accounting shall be applied, consistent 
with guidance adopted by CMA 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) to develop and recommend 
guidance 
SBSTA to develop and recommend rules, 
modalities, and procedures 
'ensure the avoidance of double counting' 'shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of 
the host Party's NDC if used by another Party to 
demonstrate achievement of its NDC’ 
General role for private entities unclear Incentivise and facilitate participation by public 
and private entities 
'promote sustainable development' 'foster sustainable development' 
- 'contribute to the reduction of emission levels in 
the host Party' 
- 'deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions' 
- Share of proceeds for administrative expenses 
and for adaptation in vulnerable countries 
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of the parties. Another issue of contention is the role of private entities in CAs: both public and 
private entities have a clear role in the SDM, but CAs mention no presumed role for the latter.  
An additional point to consider is that, while CAs are meant to 'promote' sustainable development, 
the SDM is supposed to 'foster' sustainable development. Is there a difference between 'promoting' 
and 'fostering' sustainable development? And will a requirement check actually be operationalised 
for either of these provisions? 
Finally, while the SDM is meant to 'contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party', 
the lack of a similar provision under CAs would seem to imply that there is no obligation for a host 
party's own contribution (as the contribution is deemed to be the NDC itself).  
These wrinkles remain to ironed out in the coming years before the SDM and CAs can be 
successfully launched. Another important issue is the transition of existing CDM projects – this will 
be considered in the next section. 
3.6  EXISTING CDM PROJECTS 
Given that there is no sunset clause for the Kyoto Protocol or its CDM, such projects can formally 
continue to exist beyond 2020.
215
 Whether the CDM can generate new credits after 2020 is a legally
contentious issue.
216
 However, even if there was a clear consensus that the CDM could continue to
issue credits post-2020, it is uncertain whether parties would be likely to politically agree on the 
continuation of these mechanisms.
217
The first apparent challenge relates to the overlap of projects. CDM projects currently undergoing 
validation and registration under the Kyoto Protocol (or those already registered) will, based on 
current guidance and unless decided otherwise, be allowed to issue units under Kyoto for a number 
of years into the first and second cycles of contributions under the Paris Agreement.
218
 This overlap
will evidently present problems in terms of double counting. One way of resolving this would be 
only to allow a contribution under the Paris Agreement to overlap with the scope of a CDM project 
215
 Cames et al (n185) at 23 remark that the administration of mechanisms is likely to continue for approximately three 





 Ibid. The authors contend that it seems 'very unlikely' that the CDM will continue to issue credits, because as soon as 
the SDM comes into force, there is little sense in maintaining other crediting mechanisms which aim to reduce the 
same emissions and are largely based on the same concepts, but which do not take into account the new context under 
the Paris Agreement. 
218
 Martins & Barata (n209) at 34. 
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if the emission reduction is not counted towards any other contribution for the same period.
219
Given that NDCs will become operational as of 2020, it is imperative to manage such an overlap. 
The second difficulty refers to a potential overlap between the scope of the CDM and the SDM. To 





Both these issues imply the need for a clear and well planned transition period. One option is for 
parties to either progressively convert such projects into their own crediting schemes, or to take 
charge of the projects and count these projects towards their contributions.
222
 Another issue which a
transition from CDM to SDM would create is a separate formal transition period and an evaluation 
of the ways in which current CDM projects satisfy key criteria for the SDM.
223
 In the case where
issuance of CERs has already more than absorbed costs for the project, it would make economic 
sense for parties to gather such 'low-hanging fruit'.
224
Between the two extremes of the discontinuation of existing projects and quasi-automatic 
continuation under the SDM, are a range of non-mutually exclusive options which would allow 
some projects to continue generating credits under the SDM:
225
 Continuation of certain project types;
226
 Continuation only in certain countries;
227





 In economics and finance, arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference between similar financial 
instruments on different markets or in different forms. Arbitrage exists as a result of market inefficiencies. See 
Investopedia, available at 
 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp?optly_redirect=integrated&lgl=term-video-bid, accessed on 15 
October 2017. 
221
 Martins & Barata (n209) at 34 explain that arbitrage occurs when parties select the mechanism with the least 




 Ibid. The authors observe that a similar precedent existed for the transition of certain projects from the Activities 




 Cames et al (n185) at 23. 
226
 For example, those at great risk of the cessation of mitigation activity should no further revenues from credits be 
expected. 
227
 For instance, many least developed countries (LDCs) did not have the capacity to develop projects in the early years 
of the CDM and started to make use of the mechanism at a very late stage. 
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 Continuation after a re-registration of the project under the rules, modalities and procedures of
the SDM.
An important criterion for judging which option (or combination of options) is most appropriate is 
their potential contribution to reducing global GHG emissions.
228
3.7  CONCLUSION 
Annex I parties, through participation in the Kyoto Protocol, made a commitment to reduce a 
quantified amount of six specific GHGs measured by a given methodology. An element of 
flexibility to increase efficiency in reducing emissions was added through three flexible 
mechanisms. Under the Kyoto Protocol, parties may satisfy their commitments by reducing 
domestic emissions, enhancing domestic carbon sinks, as well as through investments in emission 
reductions or sinks in developing countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (through the 
CDM), investments in emission reductions or sinks in other industrialised countries (the JI), and the 
acquisition of ERUs from other parties (through the IET).  
Against the backdrop of the Paris Agreement, the SDM was analysed and found to have many 
interpretational issues which remain to be resolved in the coming years. In terms of the design of 
the two market mechanisms pursuant to Art 6(2) and 6(4) (namely, CAs and the SDM), the 
international dialogue has only just started. Many fundamental or more technical questions still 
have to be negotiated and it is not yet clear which positions individual parties will take.
229
 Although
the SDM can (and should) build on experiences from the CDM, a number of issues have yet to be 
discussed among UNFCCC parties before the SDM can effectively be implemented. This is of 
particular importance if the SDM is to be applied at the sector, instead of the project level.  
This chapter highlighted two key differences between the CDM and SDM. First, under the Paris 
Agreement, all parties submitted NDCs to contribute to mitigation and should therefore have access 
to the SDM to fulfil their NDCs, whereas the CDM was based on the distinction between Annex I 
and non-Annex I countries. Thus, developing countries can now participate in carbon markets under 
the SDM. Second, the SDM aims 'to deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions'.
230
 With the
CDM, every tCO2 reduced in a non-Annex I country was used to allow for an additional tonne to be 
228
 Martins & Barata (n209) at 23. The authors further counsel that these projects should be clearly reflected in the 
inventory and that the appropriate accounting of their CERs should be ensured. 
229
 Cames et al (n185) at 27 mention that some of these questions are overarching and similar for both mechanisms, 
such as the relationship to NDCs or procedures to ensure robust accounting. Others, for example the nature of the 
ITMOs or governance, are quite different and very specific for each of the mechanisms. 
230
 Paris Agreement, Art 6(4)(d). 
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emitted in an Annex I country. This was, at best, a zero sum game. Now, the SDM aims to ensure 
an overall reduction in global emissions. 
The Paris Agreement established a new paradigm in international climate policy. The Kyoto 
Protocol was based on so-called 'targets & timetables', while the Paris Agreement, on the other 
hand, is based on a so-called 'pledge & review' hypothesis.
231
 The Kyoto Protocol was based on
commonly agreed targets for Annex I countries and stringent provisions for emissions accounting 
and compliance control under the UNFCCC, including enforcement provisions.
232
 Conversely, the
Paris Agreement refers to 'nationally determined contributions', instead of 'targets'. Also, 
notwithstanding that the Paris Agreement includes an Article on compliance, it does not refer to 
enforcement. Rather, it highlights that this process shall be 'facilitative in nature and function in a 
manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive'.
233
It is evident that the Paris Agreement has introduced a very different world of international 
emissions trading to the one that has existed under the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is still a long 
way to go in designing the concepts laid down in Art 6 of the Paris Agreement at COP22 in 
Marrakech, this landmark agreement marks a decisive and positive change towards climate action. 
The Paris Agreement has moved purposefully beyond the categories of Annex I and non-Annex I 
parties. South Africa thus finds itself in a markedly different environment and will have to 'redouble 
its efforts to implement its national climate policy, and to make contributions to the global efforts 
set out under the Paris Agreement'.
234
 In light of the aforementioned, the next chapter will describe
the law and policy framework that facilitates (or hinders) the CDM – and, by extension, the SDM – 
in South Africa. 
231
 Cames et al (n152) at 7. 
232
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 18. 
233
 Paris Agreement, Art 15 
234
MAPS 'What might the Paris Agreement mean for South Africa?' (2016) available at 




South Africa's law and policy framework for the regulation of the CDM 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Having examined the theoretical and policy considerations underlying the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)  in the context of the Paris Agreement, including the evolution from the CDM 
to the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM), this chapter now focusses on the legal and 
policy framework governing the CDM in South Africa. As such, the chapter provides an overview 
of the South African legislation and policies that facilitate (or hinder) the CDM. These comprise a 
broad array of laws from environmental assessment provisions to fiscal laws, including a brief 
account of the tax incentives for clean (or renewable) energy. This chapter also outlines the funding 
solutions and incentive opportunities available to green technology producers and consumers. 
In general, the political stability and effectiveness of laws have a significant impact on how 
potential investors view a country.
1
 In order to qualify as a host country for the CDM, South Africa
was required to establish the necessary policies and legislative measures to be considered eligible. 
This 'policy readiness' also influences the revenue-generating potential of the CDM. Ultimately, 
South Africa's capacity to develop and implement SDM law and policy could have an important 
role to play in attracting foreign investment inflows. As such, apart from the various legislative 
enactments, this chapter also considers the domestic policy framework, including the National 
Climate Change Response Strategy, which could potentially create an enabling environment for the 
SDM.  
Lastly, this chapter highlights some of the practicalities that emanate from the above policy and 
legal frameworks. These range from implementing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology 
to the role of local government in implementing green reform. 
1
 Evidence of this is the decline in foreign direct investment following the perceived political instability and concern 
over the recent credit ratings downgrades in South Africa. See, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
South African Country Report no. 16/217 'Article IV Consultation – press release; staff report; and statement by the 
Executive Director for South Africa' (2016), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16217.pdf, 
accessed on 7 March 2017. 
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4.2  SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY FRAMEWORK
2
4.2.1 Introduction 
The South African government, through its primary agent for climate change mitigation – the 
Department of Environmental Affairs – has developed a plethora of climate change response 
policies over the last decade.
3
 This section will highlight the policies that are of relevance to the
2
 Some parts of this section are drawn from a paper which this author presented at the 6
th
 International Conference on 
Clean Electrical Power (ICCEP) held in Ligure, Italy, on 26 to 29 June 2017, and which was subsequently published 
as L-A Steenkamp 'A review of policy options for clean electricity supply in South Africa' (2017) Clean Electrical 
Power (ICCEP), 2017 6th International Conference IEEE 94-102.  
3
 A set of key policy documents contribute to the control, guidance and growth of the energy sector. These include (but 
are not limited to): 
 The Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP) is a government initiative launched in 1991 to
provide capital subsidies to municipalities in order to address the electrification backlog of permanently occupied
residential dwellings. For more policy documents regarding INEP, see
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/policies/p_electricity.html, accessed on 13 December 2016.
 The White Paper on Energy Policy intends to minimise environmental impact and manage supply and demand. It
was released by the Department of Energy (known then as the Department of Minerals and Energy) in 1998.
Available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26169_1.pdf, accessed on 14 December 2016.
 The Energ  Efficienc  Strateg  was published in  001 in light of South Africa’s high levels of greenhouse gas
emissions, as well as its high energy intensity. The strategy document aims to improve energy efficiency by 12%
by 2015, to be achieved in three phases. Available at
 http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/electricity/ee_strategy_05.pdf, accessed on 14 December 2016.
 In the 2006 Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa, the South African National Treasury explored market-based
instruments, or incentive-based measures, in some detail. Available at
 http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Draft%20Environmental%20Fiscal%20Reform%20Policy%20
Paper%206%20April%202006.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2016.
 The Energy Security Master Plan – Electricity was released in 2007 to plan for electricity supply until 2025.
Available at http://www.gov.za/documents/energy-security-master-plan-electricity, accessed on 14 December
2016.
 The Biofuels Industrial Strategy of the Republic of South Africa (the Biofuels Strategy) introduced a target of a
2% penetration of biofuels into the market in 2007. Available at
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/renewables/biofuels_indus_strat.pdf(2).pdf, accessed on 14 December
2016. 
 In January 2008, the (former) Department of Minerals and Energy released the National Response to South
Africa’s Electricity Shortage: Interventions to address electricity shortages. The document detailed interventions
to reduce ‘the risk of load shedding’. Available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/resp_elec.pdf,
accessed on 15 December 2016.
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CDM context and will do so in accordance with the timeline of their development (see Figure 4.1 
below). 
Figure 4.1 Timeline of South Africa's climate change policies 
4.2.2 National Climate Change Response Strategy 
South Africa's obligations under the UNFCCC were crystallised in the National Climate Change 
Response Strategy for South Africa to Address Climate Change (NCCRS) in 2004.
4
 The NCCRS
outlines the steps that should be taken by government and other role players at a national level to 
respond to climate change. A number of principles and factors guided the formulation of the 
NCCRS, including poverty alleviation, access to basic amenities, as well as infrastructure 
 The (former) Department of Minerals and Energy published the Nuclear Energy Policy in 2008. The policy
views nuclear energy as a way of providing energy diversification, energy security and a way of reducing GHG
emissions. Available at http://www.energy.gov.za/files/policies/policy_nuclear_energy_2008.pdf, accessed on 15
December 2016.
 The South African Renewables Initiative aims to mobilise domestic and international funding, and sector
expertise, to support South Africa to scale up renewable energy. Available at http://www.gov.za/south-african-
renewables-initiative,  accessed on 17 December 2016.
 In November 2011, the Green Economy Accord was signed as an agreement between government, labour and
business. It seeks to shift the country's economy towards sustainable development, the creation of 'green' jobs and
industrial development. Available at http://www.economic.gov.za/communications/publications/green-economy-
accord, accessed on 1 February 2017.
 Government and its social partners signed a Local Procurement Accord in October 2011, as an outcome of social
dialogue on the New Growth Path. The agreement aspires towards the use of products that are manufactured
locally (75% of all products used should be manufactured locally). Available at
http://www.economic.gov.za/communications/publications/local-procurement-accord, accessed on 1 February
2017. 
4
 Department of Environmental Affairs National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) (2004), available at 


















development, job creation, rural development, foreign investment, human resource development 
and improved health.
5
 These ambitious principles aim to result in sustainable economic growth.
6
South Africa's responsibilities, as contained in the NCCRS, include the establishment of a national 
inventory of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the Long Term Mitigation Scenario and the Technology 
Needs Assessment Report. The following paragraphs address the manner in which these obligations 
relate to the CDM. 
4.2.2.1 A national inventory of GHGs 
The NCCRS states that South Africa 'shall monitor and periodically report to the international 
community the countr ’s     inventor , steps taken and envisaged to i ple ent the UNFCCC 
and any other information relevant to the achievement of the objective of the UNFCCC including 
information relevant for the calculation of global emission trends'.
7
During June 2014, the Minister of Environmental Affairs published the National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory for South Africa, for the period 2000 to 2010, for public comment.
8 
The objective of this
inventory is to ensure that South Africa comprehends its emissions profile and the key drivers of 
change in emissions.
9
 In 2014, South Africa submitted its first Biennial Update Report to the








 Department of Environmental Affairs National GHG Inventory and tracking GHG emissions Session 21: Using data 
effectively to track the transition to a low carbon South Africa (2014) at 3, available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/nationalghginventoryandtracking_ghgemissions.pdf, 
accessed on 22 January 2017. 
8
 Department of Environmental Affairs National Greenhouse Gas Inventory for South Africa (2000 to 2010) (2014) in 
GG No 37701. 
9
 Per the Department of Environmental Affairs Inventory (n7) at 34, the reporting of the emissions is in line with the 
IPCC 2006 guidelines in order to ensure that the GHG inventory report is accurate, consistent, complete and 
transparent. 
10
 Department of Environmental Affairs South Africa’s 2nd Biennial Update Report (2016), available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/reports/2ndBUR2000_2012_draftforpubliccomments.pdf, 
accessed on 23 January 2017. 
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These comprehensive inventory reports can be used to organise approved CDM methodologies 
throughout the country in an effort to reduce GHGs.
11
 In other words, the level of GHGs can serve
as the baseline against which improvements can be measured.
12
4.2.2.2 Long Term Mitigation Scenario
13
The Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) Research Project took place in South Africa between 
2005 and 2008.
14
 It was hailed as a 'seminal and resounding success', because it successfully placed
climate change mitigation on the formal domestic policy agenda.
15
 The LTMS project was a
Cabinet-mandated process, led by the (former) Department of Water and Environmental Affairs.
16
At a technical level, the LTMS was a unique blend of facilitated stakeholder process and rigorous 
research. It was implemented using a scenario-building team, composed of strategic thinkers from 
government, business and civil society.
17
 The credibility of the study came from the robustness of
data and analysis.
18
 At the time, there was limited experience of analysing national mitigation
options. However, it was recognised that the key to the success of the LTMS was a process to 
11
 DF Humphris South Africa's law and policy framework for the regulation of the Clean Development 




 This section is drawn from a monthly report which this author compiled in her capacity as South Africa's country 
manager for the Climate Scorecard citizens' initiative. See L-A Steenkamp 'South Africa: The Long Term Mitigation 
Scenarios Research Project' (December 2016) in L Barber & R Israel (eds) Climate Scorecard Report #5: Leading 
Climate Change Research Studies, available at http://climatescorecard.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/ClimateScorecardReport5.pdf, accessed on 30 July 2017. 
14
 For the detailed technical report comprising the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios, see H Winkler Long Term 
Mitigation Scenarios Technical Report (2007), available at 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33713/1/07-Winkler-LTMS-Technical%20Report.pdf?1,  
accessed on 15 February 2017.  
15
MAPS ‘The Long Ter  Mitigation Scenarios: a decade later’ (n.d.), available at 
http://mapsprogramme.org/outputs/the-long-term-mitigation-scenarios-a-decade-later/, accessed on 12 November 
2016. 
16
 The department is now known as the Department of Environmental Affairs. See https://www.environment.gov.za/, 
accessed on 12 November 2016. 
17
 For more in-depth reports related to energy and the LTMS, see UCT's Energy Research Centre documents at 
 http://uct.academia.edu/Departments/Energy_Research_Centre/Documents?page=11, accessed on 16 November 
2016. 
18
 The study drew on strong local academic institutions and stakeholder engagement. A broad technical research team 
was established, consisting of approximately 30 researchers from different institutions. This broad collaborative 
approach provided the best available scientific data on energy, emissions and economic impacts. 
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accumulate information, to analyse it in a consultative way and to present the results in such a 
manner as to assist policy makers.  
The LTMS research was peer-reviewed twice and was found to be of best practice to the extent that 
reviewers recommended sharing the experience with other developing countries. The LTMS 
approach drew on international best practice, notably a report written by the UN, titled Economics 
of Greenhouse Gas Limitation: Technical Guidelines.
19
The LTMS study was conducted during a period when little was known about the scale of the 
climate change problem in South Africa and the options to address it. The research teams gathered 
large amounts of data to conduct modelling and assessments. The LTMS developed national and 
sub-national mitigation scenarios for South Africa under plausible future climate conditions and 
development pathways. The LTMS was the first interpretation of international climate mitigation 
policy in a domestic developing country context.  
The LTMS team explored a wide range of detailed mitigation actions and proposals for four 
strategic options that South Africa could pursue.
20
 The LTMS process design centred around two
‘outer’ scenarios, called ‘envelopes’. The first is the  rowth Without Constraints ( WC) Scenario, 
which is a ‘no action’ scenario, with a projection that     e issions will rise dra aticall . The 
fourth scenario is purely notional, showing what would happen if we restrained the economy 
towards an emission target required by climate science in order to stabilise the climate – known as 
the Required by Science (RBS) scenario.   
To address the gap between the GWC and RBS scenarios, the researchers identified technology, 
market and policy actions which could be implemented by government. These second and third 
scenarios comprised the current development plans to increase growth, with the addition of some 
emission reduction plans. Figure 4.2 below depicts the scenarios explored in the LTMS process. 
19
 A Markandya Economics of Greenhouse Gas Limitations (1998), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/cd_roms/na1/mitigation/Resource_materials/UNEP_Economics_Greenhouse_Gas_Limitati
ons_Guidelines_1999/UNEPMethGuidelines.pdf, accessed on 23 January 2017. 
20
 For a summary of the various phases of the LTMS research project, see SANBI The Long-Term Adaptation Scenarios 
Flagship Research Programme (LTAS) for South Africa (2016), available at http://www.sanbi.org/biodiversity-
science/state-biodiversity/climate-change-and-bioadaptation-division/ltas, accessed on 15 February 2017. 
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Figure 4.2: The gap in GHG emissions in the four scenarios
21
The LTMS provides a policy response comprising six broad themes.
22
 Unfortunately, almost a
decade later, it is apparent that the LTMS was not successfully integrated into the policy agenda of 
any departments other than its champion, the Department of Environmental Affairs. Another 
limiting factor is that the LTMS occurred in a time of a 'domestic policy vacuum', which resulted in 
a lack of momentum to sustain its implementation.
23
The government followed the LTMS study by committing to a peak, plateau and decline trajectory 
in carbon emissions from 2030 to 2035, through a reduction in coal dependence, an increased use of 
renewable energy sources and the adoption of clean energy technologies (including carbon capture 
21
 Source: Case studies available at http://www.ggbp.org/case-studies/south-africa/long-term-mitigation-scenarios, 
accessed on 16 November 2016. 
22
 The policy themes are available at https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/southafrica/name-24380-en.php, 
accessed on 23 January 2017 and are as follows: 
 GHG emission reductions and limits;
 Build on, strengthen and/or scale up current initiatives;
 Implementing the 'business unusual; call for action;
 Preparing for the future;
 Vulnerability and adaptation; and
 Alignment, coordination and cooperation.
23




However, it should also be borne in mind that South Africa's economy is very reliant upon coal-
based energy and energy-intensive mineral extraction. This arguably causes powerful push-back 
and resistance towards a low-carbon transition. Ultimately, the government's commitment to reduce 
emissions, whilst simultaneously ensuring economic development, can be met through instruments 
such as the CDM. This is due, in part, to the private sector's profit motive and, to a lesser extent, the 
sector's corporate social responsibility goals. Both can be met through investing in CDM projects. 
4.2.2.3 South Africa's Technology Needs Assessment Report 
In order to meet the third obligation under the NCCRS, South Africa had to undertake a Technology 
Needs Assessment (TNA).
25
 The TNA report was submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat as a
National Communication to the Convention.
26
 Developed country parties can use the report as a
means to cooperate with developing countries in order to meet their obligations in terms of 
technology transfer with respect to climate change.
27
The TNA report remarks on the many advantages that large-scale investments in renewable 
energies have effected in other countries, including significant job creation and technology 
innovation. The report emphasises that 'South Africa could harness financial benefits through global 
funding mechanisms, including the Clean Development Mechanism'.
28
 In other words, developed
country parties can use the TNA report to identify the specific needs where investment in South 
Africa will be most beneficial, and use the CDM as a means to achieve this.
29
The Department of Energy first launched a programme to provide grants to renewable energy 
projects in 2005/2006, continuing to 2008. The Renewable Energy Finance and Subsidy Office 
(REFSO) was set up within the department to handle the programme. Its mandate is to manage 
renewable energy subsidies and offer advice to developers and other stakeholders on renewable 
24
 A Niemack The effectiveness of the clean development mechanism and emissions trading within the climate change 
regime (Master's dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2011) at 1. 
25
 Department of Science and Technology South Africa's Climate Change Technology Needs Assessment Synthesis 
Report (2007), available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/DST_SA-climate-change-technology-needs-
assessment_25102007_0.pdf, accessed on 24 January 2017. 
26




 Id at 6. 
29
 Per Humphris (n11) at 33. 
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energy finance and subsidies.
30
 The type of financing options available to developers included
grants for feasibility studies; long- and short-term finance; export credits and soft loans; equity or 
loans; and the purchase of carbon emission reduction credits.
31
 Similar support programmes would
offer a valuable tool to project developers to help gain sufficient access to capital in the 
development of a CDM project.
32
In spite of production costs of renewable energy declining each year, renewable energy in South 
Africa still requires an enabling environment to become even more competitive relative to 
traditional energy sources. One policy instrument which could add impetus to the renewable energy 
agenda, is the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
(REIPPPP).  
4.2.3 Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP)
33
In its White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy,
34
 the South African government laid the
foundation for policies to stimulate the uptake of renewable energy. One such policy is the 
REIPPPP, which was among the programmes identified as a climate change flagship programme in 
the White Paper.
35
The REIPPPP replaced the 2009 Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) programme.
36
 The
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) had commissioned the development of a 
30
Department of Energy Renewable Energy Finance and Subsidy Office (n.d.), available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/renewables/r_refso.html, accessed on 24 January 2017. 
31
International Energy Agency Renewable Energy Subsidies DME (2013), available at 
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/southafrica/name-23044-en.php, accessed on 24 January 2017. 
32
 Based on the argument put forward by Humphris (n11) at 34, when commenting on the original REFSO. 
33
 This section is derived from portions of a chapter which this author has co-contributed to a new book that addresses 
energy law and policy in Africa from various perspectives. The book forms part of an inaugural collaborative research 
project within the CCLA-NIALS partnership. See J Glazewski, L-A Steenkamp & PK Oniemola 'Promoting 
renewable energy in African countries: An outline of fiscal and financial incentives in South Africa and Nigeria' 
(accepted for publication). 
34
 Department of Energy White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (2003), available 
at http://www.polity.org.za/article/white-paper-on-the-renewable-energy-policy-of-the-republic-of-south-africa-2004-
06-11, accessed on 14 December 2016.
35
 L McDaid 'Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme Review 2014' at 3 Electricity 
Governance Initiative South Africa, supported by World Resources Institute (2014), available at http://www.egi-
sa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/EGI-REI4P-review-2014-pdf.pdf, accessed on 25 February 2017. 
36
 For a comprehensive analysis of the REFIT, see L du Toit Promoting renewable energy in South Africa through the 
inclusion of market-based instruments in South Africa's legal and policy framework with particular reference to the 
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REFIT for South Africa in 2007, under its authority to regulate electricity tariffs in the country. 
Essentially, the REFIT required Eskom to purchase renewable energy from qualifying generators at 
pre-determined prices. The motivation behind the REFIT programme was certainly commendable: 
by securing the prices, renewable energy developers and private investors were to be incentivised 
and financial risks were to be reduced, which would have resulted in greater market clarity.  
Unfortunately, the REFIT programme did not realise its objectives, largely due to uncertainty 
regarding the legal basis of the REFIT, as well as concerns about the potential cost of the 
programme.
37
 Yet, Du Toit posits that a properly designed and implemented feed-in tariff policy
need not be expensive and could provide security and stability to investors.
38
 This, in turn, would
encourage investment and growth in the renewable energy sector.
39
Jointly launched by the Department of Energy, NERSA and Eskom in 2011, the REIPPPP is a 
tendering programme tasked with deploying 3 725 MW of renewable energy by 2016.
40
 The
REIPPPP is  eant to be the  odel for 'private participation' in the turf of South Africa’s state 
monopolies.
41
 It could be regarded as one of the most important acts of privatisation in the past
decade and has led to private investors putting down billions to build wind and solar power plants.
42
The REIPPPP covers a variety of renewable energy technologies, including onshore wind, solar 
photovoltaic (PV), concentrated solar power, landfill gas, biomass, small hydro and biogas.
43
feed-in tariff (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2014) as well as L du Toit 'Promoting Renewable 
Energy in South Africa: An overview of recent legal and policy developments' (2012) 19(2) South African Journal of 
Environmental Law and Policy 75-107. 
37
 Du Toit Feed-in tariff (n36) at 339. 
38
 Ibid. The author proposes a framework for a feed-in tariff policy and makes a number of key recommendations, 





Department of Energy 'Fact Sheet for the Media Briefing Session on 31 August 2011 re the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer (IPP) Programme' (2011), available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/IPP/Aug%202011/Fact%20Sheet%20for%20the%20Media%20Briefing%20Session%20o
n%2031%20August%202011%20re%20the%20REIPPP.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2017. 
41
 D van Rensburg 'Eskom's green gaffe' (2016), available at http://city-press.news24.com/Business/eskoms-green-




 G Nhamo & C Mukonza 'Policy, institutional and programme readiness for solar energy uptake in South Africa' 
(2016) 45(4) Africa Insight 69-90 at 70. 
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The REIPPPP consists of two phases. First, bidders are required to meet numerous qualification 
criteria relating, inter alia, to environmental, legal and financial requirements.
44
 Thereafter, bidders
are evaluated with regard to bid price and a number of economic development objectives (in other 
words, the fixed price element of REFIT has been removed).
45
 The REIPPPP included five bidding
windows, the last of which was known as window 4.5. All winning bidders receive a 20-year power 
purchase agreement with Eskom, backed by government guarantees that already total more than 
R200 billion.
46
 The guarantees were crucial to making the programme work, because they make the
projects automatically bankable and fundable.
47
The main evaluation criterion for the bid selection process is pricing, which carries a 70 per cent 
weighting.
48
 Other factors, such as job creation, local content and black economic empowerment,
weigh 30 per cent.
49
 This encourages joint ventures with local renewable energy companies and
encourages foreign firms to set up local factories, catering for export.
50
 Funding is provided through
a mix of foreign private equity, local private equity and large commercial and development banks.
51
The REIPPPP is designed to contribute to meeting the national renewable energy target, while 
encouraging foreign investment and developing socio-economic and environmentally sustainable 
growth. Ultimately, the programme aims to stimulate the renewable industry in South Africa. In 
comparison with the REFIT programme, which never really got off the ground, the REIPPPP could 
be regarded as a success.
52
Provided it is run properly, the REIPPPP could prove to be instrumental in meeting South Africa's 
energy demand. Furthermore, it could mitigate slowed economic development growth caused by 
unpredictable provision of power, encourage foreign investment and result in a number of socio-
44
 L du Toit & J Glazewski 'Chapter 18: Energy law and the environment' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) 








 Energy Intelligence 'REIPPP: all you need to know!' (2016), available at http://www.energyintelligence.co.za/reippp-




 Ibid. As a result, some international PV production facilities, such as JinkoSolar, SMA Solar Technology, ILB 
Helios, JA Solar, ABB, SunTech and SunPower have set up local production units. 
51
 Ibid. Some of the funding is composed of local private equity funds for black economic empowerment purposes to 
represent surrounding communities.  
52
 Nhamo & Mukonza (n43) at 79. 
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economic benefits related to job creation and skills development.
53
 The contribution of renewable
energy to South Africa's primary energy supply will be examined in Chapter 6, where an 
assessment of CDM projects in the country is made. 
More generally, apart from specific programmes such as the REIPPPP, energy policy in South 
Africa is governed by two policies: the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP)
54
 and the Integrated Resources
Plan (IRP).
55
 These are considered in the next section.
4.2.4 Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 
The IEP is an overarching plan that informs the development of various parts of the energy policies 
and roadmaps, such as the IRP. The latter focuses specifically on electricity generation and sets out 
the development of new generation capacity for South Africa. 
During South Africa's 2008 energy crisis, the Department of Energy commissioned the 2010 
Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity, which would help to meet the country's energy demands 
for the next 20 years.  
Although the IRP 2010 does not address the optimisation of the country's energy mix, this plan was 
a major step towards fulfilling South Africa's commitments to mitigating climate change, as 
expressed at the Copenhagen climate change summit. Written during a time of crisis, it called for a 
doubling of the national grid and was based on ambitious growth rates. A number of government 
departments are involved in various capacities in the execution of the IRP 2010 and IEP, including 
53
 In fact, as pointed out by T Murombo Law, regulation, and the promotion of renewable energy in South 
Africa (Doctoral dissertation, Universit  of the Witwatersrand,  016) at 80, Esko ’s unstable electricit  suppl  partl  
explains the commitment with which the REIPPPP was executed. 
54
 The development of a national Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) was envisaged in the White Paper on Energy Policy of 
1998 and the Minister of Energy, as entrenched in the National Energy Act of 2008, is mandated to develop and 
publish the IEP on an annual basis. The latest update was effected in 2016. See Department of Energy Integrated 
Energy Plan – 2016 update (2016), available at http://www.energy.gov.za/files/IEP/2016/Integrated-Energy-Plan-
Report.pdf, accessed on 7 March 2017. 
55
 Department of Energy Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 2010-2030 (2011), available at 





 the Department of Environmental Affairs,
57
 the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI)
58
 and the Department of Public Enterprises.
59
Updated in 2013, the IRP now takes the impact of recent developments on demand projections and 
generation capacity requirements to 2030 into account. However, Eskom apparently would not use 
the 2013 update for its projections as Cabinet had not signed off on it.
60
The IRP 2010 identified the preferred generation technology required to meet expected demand 
growth up to 2030. It was indicated at the time that the IRP 2010 should be a 'living plan', which 
would continue to be revised by the Department of Energy.
61
 Since the promulgation of the IRP
2010,
62
 the policy-adjusted IRP has incorporated a number of government objectives.
63
While the IRP 2010 remains the official government plan for new generation capacity until its 
replacement by an updated plan, a number of assumptions have changed. On 
25 November 2016, the Department of Energy published a Draft IEP report and the IRP Update 
Assumptions, Base Case Results and Observations for public comment.
64
 An update was
necessitated due to adjustments to the following assumptions:
65
 The altered electricity landscape over the past three years, particularly in electricity demand and
the underlying relationship with economic growth;
 New developments in technology and fuel options (locally and globally);
 Scenarios for carbon mitigation strategies and the impact on electricity supply up to 2050; and
56
 As regards the determination of value for money, affordability and sovereign guarantees. 
57
 The Department of Environmental Affairs fulfils the role of environmental custodianship. 
58
 The DTI shapes industrial policy, local content, import control and broad-based black economic empowerment. 
59
 The Department of Public Enterprises is a shareholder in Eskom and is involved with local procurement. 
60
 See S Kings Politics of power ignores reality (2015), available at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-09-politics-of-
power-ignores-reality, accessed on 15 May 2016. Eskom's sluggishness to transition to renewable energy may well be 
ascribed to the socio-political environment it operates in, rather than policies founded on credible scientific research. 
See, in this regard, Murombo (n53) at 194, who comments that the politics of energy was apparently intertwined with 
the final policy adjustments made to the IRP 2010. 
61
 Department of Energy Integrated Resource Plan 2016 (n55) at i . 
62
 In GN 908 in GG 32342 on 6 May 2011. 
63
 According to the Department of Energy Integrated Resource Plan 2016 (n55) at 6, these include: affordable 
electricity, carbon mitigation, reduced water consumption, localisation and regional development, producing a 
balanced strategy toward diversified electricity generation sources and gradual decarbonisation of the electricity 
sector. 
64
 In GN 14321 in GG 40445 on 25 November 2016. 
65
 Department of Energy Integrated Resource Plan 2016 (n55) at 6. 
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 The affordability of electricity and its impact on demand and supply.
As regards the assumptions underlying a proposed energy mix, preliminary results from the carbon 
budget scenario indicate a significant change in the energy mix and timing, with increased 
renewables, no new capacity from coal and nuclear due to come online around 2026.
66
 It is
suggested that the increased focus on renewable energy presents an opportunity for CDM project 
investment in alternative energy production in terms of a recognised CDM methodology. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the driving force pushing South Africa into renewable 
energy policies was not a major commitment to address the issues of climate change, but was rather 
triggered by a crisis in the supply of electricity. This supply predicament was a result of the load 
shedding (or rolling blackouts) initiated by the power utility, Eskom, in 2008 and again in 2014. 
The need for broader mix of energy supply became more apparent than ever.  
All of the above developments laid the basis for South Africa's National Climate Change Response 
Policy, which was published as a White Paper in 2011 – prior to hosting the hosting the 17th 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the UNFCCC in Durban.
67
66
 Id at 27. H Winkler 'South Africa's new energy plan has sparked strong emotions' (2016), available at 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/soapbox/south-africas-new-energy-plan-has-sparked-strong-
emotions/, accessed on 24 January 2017 presents the main points of the most likely scenario, referred to as the 'base 
case': 
 Electricity demand between 310 and 355 TWh (TeraWatt hours) in 2030 (about 100 TWh lower than envisaged
in the 2010-2030 plan), with demand rising to between 390 and 530 TWh in 2050. This is based on projection
models developed at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
 The construction of 37.4 GW (1 000 GigaWatts equal 1 TeraWatt) of wind capacity and 17.6 GW of solar
photovoltaic capacity between 2020 and 2050.
 The gradual decommissioning of most existing coal power stations by 2050, in line with international carbon
emission agreements.
 A substantial increase (35.3 GW) in electricity generation from gas. Due to the high cost of gas, it is generally
used only as a backup. It would, in any event, contribute only about seven per cent of total energy generation.
 The construction of just over 20 GW of nuclear power. But this would only gradually come on line between 2037
and 2050. Given that construction of the plants would take ten years, the decision to go ahead with the nuclear
build could still be delayed for another decade.
67
 The White Paper was approved by Cabinet in October 2011, GG 34695 (19 October 2011), available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf, 
accessed on 29 January 2017. 
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4.2.5 The National Climate Change Response Policy White Paper ('White Paper')
68
4.2.5.1 Introduction 
The White Paper is South Africa’s first polic  focusing specifically on climate change. It represents 
the culmination of an iterative and participatory policy development process that was started in 
October 2005. It is founded on s24 of the Constitution, namely protecting the right to a healthy 
environment. The White Paper also supports the sustainable development objectives of the NEMA 
(most notably the social development aspects), the NDP and international instruments to which 
South Africa has agreed, such as the Millennium Declaration and the UNFCCC.  
The Department of Environmental Affairs delivered presentations on the developments that led to 
the White Paper and on the strategies outlined in the policy. In 2005, a ground-breaking climate 
change conference was held, which yielded the LTMS process addressed in para 4.2.2.2 above. As 
mentioned earlier, this process outlined two major scenarios (GWC and RBS) and subsequently 
modelled the results of different strategies to close the gap between the two scenarios. Carbon 
pricing was found to be the most effective strategy overall. A draft Green Paper was published in 
November 2010, followed by a wide consultative process with stakeholder participation and review, 
which saw 4 000 issues raised. The White Paper was subsequently adopted in 2011. 
The White Paper provides an overarching policy framework for facilitating a just transition to a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient economy. It presents the South African government's vision for an 
effective climate change response and has two objectives, namely:
69
 Effectively manage climate change impacts through interventions that build and sustain South
Africa's social, economic and environmental resilience and emergency response capacity; and
 Contribute fairly to the global effort of stabilising GHG concentrations.
The policy provides for the use of incentives and disincentives (or penalties), including regulatory, 
economic and fiscal measures.  
68
 This section is based on a monthly report which this author compiled in her capacity as South Africa's country 
manager for the Climate Scorecard citizens' initiative. See L-A Steenkamp 'South Africa: National Climate Change 
Response Policy White Paper' (November 2016)  in L Barber & R Israel (eds) Climate Scorecard Report #4: 
Description of Leading Climate Change Policies, available at http://climatescorecard.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/ClimateScorecardReport4.pdf, accessed on 30 July 2017. 
69
 Department of Environmental Affairs 'Minister Edna Molewa addresses media on recently approved National 
Climate Change Response White Paper' (2011), available at 
 https://www.environment.gov.za/speech/molewa_mediabrieing_climatechange_policy, accessed on 12 October 
2017. 
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A Climate Change Response Measurement and Evaluation System (hereinafter referred to as the 
'MRV') was formulated to measure the cost, outcome and impact of responses to climate change. 
This allows the monitoring of the success of these responses, and the replication of those that prove 
to work well. The White Paper frames MRV in ter s of ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’, which is a 
function established in the Presidency, headed by a Minister in the highest political office.
70
4.2.5.2 The White Paper and the CDM 
The White Paper conveys the South African government's vision for an effective climate change 
response via two overarching objectives, namely to effectively manage climate change impacts and 
to stabilise GHG concentrations.
71
Chapter 6 of the White Paper presents South Africa's mitigation approach. The South African 
government recognises that:
72
‘As a responsible global citizen and as a global citizen with moral as well as legal obligations under the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, South Africa is committed to contributing its fair share to global GHG 
 itigation efforts in order to keep the te perature increase well below  °C.’ 
This acknowledgement from the government of its association with international agreements, such 
as the Kyoto Protocol, is notable, as it arguably gives more credibility to CDM projects.
73
The key objectives of the White Paper mentioned earlier should be viewed within the context of 
South Africa's developmental challenges. Indeed, the White Paper states that
74
‘[T]he countr   ust ensure that the necessar  cli ate change-related investments contribute to building South 
Africa's future economic competitiveness and economic growth and contribute to its over-riding national 
priorities for sustainable development, job creation, improving public and environmental health and poverty 
eradication.’ 
In other words, the White Paper promotes mitigation measures to effect sustainable development in 
socio-economic, as well as environmental terms. Both elements can be addressed through the 
70
 For more information regarding South Africa's approaches to measuring, reporting and verifying, see A Boyd, B 
Rennkamp, H Winkler, R Larmour, T Letete, S Rahlao & A Trikam 'South African approaches to measuring, 
reporting and verifying: A scoping report' in The Measurement and Performance Tracing Project (2012), available at 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/119/Papers-2012/12-Boyd-
etal_Approches_to_MRV.pdf, accessed on 14 December 2016. 
71
 Department of Environmental Affairs White Paper (n67) at 11. 
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 Id at 25. 
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 Humphris (n11) at 35. 
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utilisation of the CDM, as the additionality component of the CDM is likely to promote sustainable 
development.
75
 The inflow of foreign capital speaks to the socio-economic element, as an increased
inflow of foreign capital results in monetary investment and job creation.
76
The White Paper recognises that responding to climate change is 'expensive and will require a 
comprehensive resource package'.
77
 The mobilisation of resources is crucial for both mitigation and
adaptation responses and includes 'financial resources, technical cooperation and technology 
transfers at domestic, sub-regional, regional and international levels'.
78
International cooperation and finance is central to CDM investment. As such, the remainder of this 
section will examine the key elements of the White Paper mitigation approach, viewed through the 
lens of CDM advancement. Table 4.1 below depicts the interaction between the White Paper 
mitigation approaches and their application to CDM projects. 
75








The White Paper upholds the energy efficiency and increased investment in a renewable energy 
programme in the electricity sector as the 'most promising' mitigation option.
79
 The CDM has an
essential role to play in South Africa's mitigation approach, as energy efficiency and optimal energy 
consumption can be achieved through the CDM, whilst simultaneously providing for environmental 
and monetary incentives. 
South Africa's climate change response has to be considered in conjunction with its national 
development approach, which is the focus of the next section. 
79
 Department of Environmental Affairs White Paper (n67) at 26. 
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4.2.6 National Development Plan 
Generally speaking, the National Development Plan (NDP) of 2011 sets out a vision until 2030 for 
South Africa’s energ  sector, including a reference to ‘environ ental sustainabilit ’ through efforts 
to reduce pollution and mitigate the effects of climate change.
80
 The NDP supports procurement of
at least 20 GigaWatt (GW) of renewable energy by 2030 in its outline of the country's development 
path.
81
 It can thus be considered as a blueprint for how the country can eradicate poverty and reduce
inequality by the year 2030. 
Chapter 5 of the NDP,
82
 titled 'Ensuring environmental sustainability and equitable transition to a
low-carbon econo  ’, points out that South Africa has taken  ajor steps to for ulate and 
implement measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change.
83
 These steps are based on the
country's commitment to reduce its emissions to below a baseline of 34 per cent by 2020 and 42 per 
cent by 2025. The NDP aims for the transition of South Africa to an 'environmentally sustainable, 
climate change resilient, low-carbon economy and just society' to be well under way by 2030.
84
 It
aims to achieve this in a number of related objectives. In the context of the CDM, these include:
85
‘ rowth in the renewable energ  sector b   030, as envisaged in the IRP  010, launches in response to falling 
technology costs, government's bold support for the sector and the introduction of targeted carbon-pricing 
mechanisms to facilitate private investment in renewable energy. The development and marketing of niche 
products and services, coupled with mutually beneficial partnerships with neighbouring countries, create jobs 
in domestic manufacturing of renewable energy technologies. 
South Africa reduces its carbon emissions, in line with its international commitments, while maintaining its 
competitiveness in the global economy by carefully managing investments in local and regional renewable 
energy resources and aggressively promoting just and equitable trading arrangements.’ 
The NDP goes on to state that, based on international experience, the most effective way to manage 
the transition to a low-carbon economy and encourage emitters to change their behaviour is to 
internalise the social and environmental costs of their behaviour.
86
 The NDP therefore advocates a
80
National Planning Commission National Development Plan 2030 (2011), available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-
%20make%20it%20work.pdf, accessed on 17 December 2016. 
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carbon-pricing strategy, with a related carbon budget approach.
87
 A carbon budget sets the amount
of carbon that can be emitted in a given amount of time, benchmarked against the national GHG 
trajectory range.
88
 Notwithstanding that the proposed carbon tax is yet to be implemented in South
Africa, the NDP recognises that the principle of a carbon tax as a mechanism for establishing a 
domestic price for carbon has been accepted by the government.
89
 Consequently, the country's
carbon tax policy is an important component of South Africa's climate change response. 
4.2.7 Carbon Tax Policy Paper 
Turning to fiscal policies specifically, National Treasury published the Carbon Tax Policy Paper: 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and facilitating the transition to a green economy (the Carbon 
Tax Policy Paper) in 2013.
90
 The Carbon Tax Policy Paper deals with a number of background
issues (which were also discussed in a foregoing Carbon Tax Discussion Paper), including the 
rationale for, and international experiences with, carbon pricing.
91
 This policy paper also clarified
the design elements of the proposed carbon tax, namely the tax base, the tax level and the use of the 
revenue.
92
 These elements have been developed further in the Carbon Tax Bill, published during
2017, as was alluded to earlier in Chapter 2. 
While there is no legislation that deals specifically with climate change, there are a number of laws 
that are of relevance to climate change.
93
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green economy (2013), available at  
    http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Carbon%20Tax%20Policy%20Paper%202013.pdf, accessed on 15 
December 2016. 
91




 Id at para 3.4.4 highlight the follow legislation: 
 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (the NEMA);
 The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004  (the NEMAQA);
 The National Water Act 36 of 1998;
 The National Energy Act 34 of 2008;
 The National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008;
 The Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983; and
 The Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002.
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4.3  SOUTH AFRICA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
4.3.1 Introduction 
South Africa's environmental law framework is embedded in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. 
Section 24 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, for the right of everyone to an environment that 
is not detrimental to their health or well-being. In addition to the Constitution, the National 
Environmental Management Act
94
 (NEMA) and the National Environmental Management: Air
Quality Act
95
 (NEMAQA) are two key statutes that contain general and specific provisions related
to air quality management. These provisions are also indirectly related to the combating and 
mitigation of climate change.
96
4.3.2 The Constitution 
In South Africa, sustainable development has become a key feature of the domestic constitutional 
and statutory law framework.
97
 It is entrenched in the environmental right provided by the
Constitution
98
, namely that everyone has the right:
99
  ‘(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative  and other measures that—
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable
econo ic and social develop ent’ [own e phasis].
As part of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights provides for a substantive and enforceable 
environmental right. The Constitution affords the respect, protection and fulfilment of the rights 
referred to in the Bill of Rights, including the s24 environmental right.
100
 The government is
specifically mandated to enact legislation and to take various other measures to protect the 
94
 107 of 1998. 
95
 39 of 2004. 
96
 J Glazewski 'Chapter 5: The Bill of Rights and environmental law' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) Environmental 
Law in South Africa (2016). It should be pointed out that there are many other environmental statutes. Only the most 
pertinent ones, directly relating to the objectives of the CDM and SDM, are discussed in this chapter. 
97
 L Kotzé, T Humby, O Rumble, A Gilder & K Lehmann 'Chapter 1: Setting the scene' in T Humby, L Kotzé, O 
Rumble & A Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 1-18. 
98
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
99
 Constitution, s24. 
100




 although it is acknowledged that any attempt to apply this clause to climate change
presents a challenge.
102
To begin with, the Constitution obliges courts to consider international law when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights,
103
 as well as obliging courts to interpret legislation in conformity with international
law.
104
 According to the Constitutional Court, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution comprises both
binding and non-binding instruments of international law.
105
 Binding instruments include treaties to
which South Africa is a party, or binding obligations resulting from such a treaty, as well as 
customary international law.
106
 The Constitution therefore makes provision for South Africa to
adopt international agreements. As regards the question whether the Paris Agreement is a legally 
binding instrument, see para 3.4.1 of the previous chapter.
107
Sustainable development is entrenched in the Constitution and therefore acts as a foundational 
principle of South Africa's primary environmental framework law, namely the NEMA.
108
101
 Constitution, s24(b). 
102
 For a discourse on how the inclusion of an environmental right in the Bill of Rights was developed in the broader 
context of the array of policies, principles, legislation and case law following the enactment of the Constitution, see 
Glazewski (n96). 
103
 Constitution, s 39(1)(b). 
104
Constitution, s239(1) and s23. According to J Glazewski 'Chapter 2A: International environmental law: The 
international dimension' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) Environmental Law in South Africa (2016) at para 2A.1.2, 
the leading case dealing with these provisions is the Constitutional Court decision in Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). The court stated (amongst other things) at para 205 that: '. . . any 
obligation binding upon the Republic under international law must not conflict with express provisions of the 
Constitution, including those in the Bill of Rights'. 
105
 E De Wet & A Du Plessis 'The meaning of certain substantive obligations distilled from international human rights 
instruments for constitutional environmental rights in South Africa' (2010) 10(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 
345-376 at 347.
106
 Ibid. The authors state that non-binding instruments include those which are not open to ratification. 
107
 Humphris (n11) at 23 posits that, despite the fact that South Africa agreed to the climate change mitigation targets in 
the Kyoto Protocol voluntarily, this would be of a binding nature in light of the Constitution. In a similar vein, it 
could be argued that once the Paris Agreement's obligations are enacted into national law, they will become binding 
on a domestic level. 
108
 Per Kotzé et al (n97) at 1-19. 
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4.3.3 The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
4.3.3.1 Sustainable development 
The NEMA serves as South Africa's environmental legislation framework.
109
 A number of national
environmental management principles are contained within in the NEMA, one of which is the 
notion of sustainable development.
110
  The NEMA bases the environmental management principles
which underpin this Act  on the general provision that 'development must be socially, 
environmentally and economically sustainable'.
111




‘the integration of social, econo ic and environ ental factors into planning, i ple entation and decision-
making so as to ensure that develop ent serves present and future generations’. 
Moreover, the tenet of sustainable development is also directly linked to the principle of 
sustainability, as contained in the UNFCCC
113
 -
‘The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the 
climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party 
and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic 
develop ent is essential for adopting  easures to address cli ate change.’ 
Domestically, 'sustainable development' has been considered in a number of cases. For example, in 
BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation and Land Affairs,
114
 it was
stated that sustainable development is a 'fundamental building block around which environmental 
legal norms have been fashioned, both internationally and in South Africa'.
115
 The Constitutional
Court endorsed not only sustainable development but also co-operative governance in Fuel 
109
 JG Nel & W Du Plessis 'An evaluation of NEMA based on a generic framework for environmental framework 
legislation’ ( 001) 8 SAJELP 1-36 at 35. The authors conclude that the NEMA complies 'more or less' with the 
generic characteristics of international environmental framework legislation, viz. it is flexible, and deals with the 
issue of overarching and sectoral-specific issues and includes policy and/or principles. 
110
 It is not, however, the purpose of this chapter to elaborate on these environmental management principles. For a 
discussion of these, see, for example, J Glazewski 'Chapter 7: The National Environmental Management Act' in J 
Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) Environmental Law in South Africa (2016) at para 7.2.2. 
111
 NEMA, s3(2). 
112
 NEMA, s1, Definitions. 
113
 UNFCCC, art 3(2). The objective of sustainable development is also reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol and Paris 
Agreement. 
114
 2004 (5) SA 124 (W). 
115
 At 144A-144C. 
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Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province.
116
Sustainable development lies at the heart of the CDM. The institutional and legal provisions for the 
CDM in South Africa are laid out in the Regulations for the Establishment of a Designated National 
Authority for the Clean Development Mechanism.
117
 These regulations have been promulgated
under s25(3) of the NEMA. The regulations define a number of key terms, such as CDM, 
Designated National Authority (DNA) and Steering Committee, as well as setting out the duties of 
each party to the CDM project. The role of the DNA was discussed in Chapter 3, which included, 
among other things, evaluating a CDM project proposal in order to determine if it would contribute 
to sustainable development in the host country. To this end, the South African DNA has adopted the 
'sustainable development' definition enshrined in the NEMA.
118
The private sector is also allowed to enter into a voluntary agreement with certain regulatory 
authorities for the purpose of promoting compliance with the principles laid down in the NEMA.
119
Such agreements are referred to as Environmental Management Co-operation Agreements 
(EMCAs) and may have bearing on the CDM. In terms of EMCAs, the private sector can also 
negotiate CDM project implementation with investor countries on a voluntary basis.
120
 This, in turn,
will give effect to the above-mentioned legislation, as well as the Kyoto Protocol.
121
 Following the
same line of reasoning, EMCAs would also be of relevance for the SDM.  
South Africa's global and international responsibilities relating to the environment are also provided 
for in the NEMA, in that the actions of the state must be discharged in the national interest.
122
 This
provision correlates with the application of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and acknowledges 
that South Africa has international obligations that are of importance to the environment.
123
116
 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC). 
117
 GN R721 in GG 27788 (22 July 2005). 
118
G Nhamo 'Institutional and legal provisions for the Clean Development Mechanism in South Africa' (2006) 
Environmental Economics and Investment 167-176 at 171. 
119
 NEMA, s35. 
120




 NEMA, s2(4)(n). 
123
 Humphris (n11) at 25. The author further comments that the importance of this became evident when the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs published the Montreal Protocol in the Government Gazette for general information. This is an 
indication that South Africa's climate change responses (including involvement in CDM projects) should be in the 
interest of the country, and not only to the benefit of the international community. The Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in GN 201 in GG 33005 of 8 March 2010. 
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It is evident that sustainable development is a central aspect of South Africa's climate policy 
framework.
124
 In this regard, three key dimensions of sustainable development are used by the
Department of Energy for CDM project evaluation. These comprise economic, social and 
environmental aspects,
125
 with a related number of indicators,
126
 which are elaborated on in
Chapter 6. Concomitant to sustainable development, is the tenet of environmental assessment, 
which is highlighted in the next paragraph. 
4.3.3.2 Environmental assessment 
An environmental assessment is conducted prior to a proposed project's being approved and is a 
decision-making tool which accounts for environmental factors in a planning or development 
decision.
127
 Indeed, environmental assessment is essential to modern environmental management.
128
All of the environmental assessment tools have sustainability as an underlying principle.
129
 In South
Africa, environmental assessment is one of the main measures of achieving the environmental 
sustainability of development.
130
Chapter 5 of the NEMA, titled Integrated Environmental Management, lays down the legislative 
basis for environmental assessment in South Africa. A key principle in the NEMA is that 
'the social, economic and environmental impacts of activities, including disadvantages and benefits, 
must be considered, assessed and evaluated, and decisions must be appropriate in the light of such 
consideration and assessment'.
131
 The NEMA is augmented by a set of Environmental Impact
124
 Kotzé et al (n97) at 1-19. 
125
 These principles are derived from s2(3) of the NEMA. 
126
 See generally LJ Kotzé 'Phiri, the plight of the poor and the perils of climate change: time to rethink environmental 
and socio-economic rights in South Africa?' (2010) 1(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 135-160. 
Kotzé provides an informative account of how these socio-economic rights were considered in the Constitutional 
Court judgment of Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
127
 J Glazewski & S Brownlie 'Chapter 10: Environmental Assessment' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) Environmental 
Law in South Africa (2016) at para 10.1.1. 
128
 F Kidd & M Retief 'Chapter 27: Environmental Assessment' in RF Fuggle & MA Rabie (eds) Environmental 
Management in south Africa (2009) at 971. The authors provide an account of the historical evolution of the 
environmental assessments in South Africa. 
129
 Glazewski & Brownlie (n127) at para 10.1.1. The authors mention that a number of professions, ranging from 
engineers to management consultants to lawyers, have become involved in carrying out environmental assessments 
because of their interdisciplinary nature. 
130
 Kidd & Retief (n128) at 971. 
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 These contain the general regulatory framework for the purpose,
procedures, contents, qualifications of environmental assessment practitioners, and related 
matters.
133
Environmental assessments recently came to the fore when the South African High Court 
adjudicated on climate change for the first time and handed down judgment in favour of non-
governmental organisation (NGO) EarthlifeAfrica.
134
 The Department of Environmental Affairs
was ordered to first consider a full and final climate impact report, along with public comment on 
the issue, before the construction of the Thabametsi coal-fired power station in Limpopo could go 
ahead. EarthlifeAfrica had previously challenged the department's decision to sign off the power 
plant without a comprehensive climate change impact assessment.  
The Minister's arguments provide some insight into the government's current climate change 
management approach.
135
 Of particular relevance to this study, are the following points
136
 –
 Until such time as the Paris Agreement's obligations are enacted into national law, they are not
binding on any party on a domestic level (including Thabametsi);
 South Africa's transition to a low-carbon economy is anticipated to be rigid and slow;
 Current challenges faced by the energy sector are acknowledged in the Nationally Determined
Contribution (NDC); and
 The Thabametsi project will establish a high efficiency power plant with modern emission
abatement technology that complies with the government's obligations under the Paris
Agreement.
The next sections will demonstrate how the three arms of sustainable development permeate to 
South Africa's climate change response policies, as well as how domestic policies and legislation 
provide the necessary vehicles to promote the CDM. Furthermore, Chapter 6 will analyse South 
Africa's registered CDM projects, measuring the sustainable development goals mentioned in each 
132
 R 982 (Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations 2014); R 983 (Listing Notice 1); R 984 (Listing Notice 2); 
and R 985 (Listing Notice 3) GG 38282 (4 December 2014). 
133
 Glazewski & Brownlie (n127) at para 10.3.3.2 examine the regulations. 
134
 EarthlifeAfrica Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2017 (2) All SA 519 (GP). 
135
Available at http://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/First-Second-and-Third-Respondents-Answering-
Affidavit.pdf, accessed on 6 March 2017. 
136
 Derived from the Answering Affidavit (n135) and a summary provided by S Gore & A Pienaar 'Paris to Pretoria: 
High Court to adjudicate on climate change for the first time' (2017), available at 
https://www.fanews.co.za/article/legal-affairs/10/general/1120/paris-to-pretoria-high-court-to-adjudicate-on-climate-
change-for-the-first-time/21870, accessed on 6 March 2017. 
135 
project design document against the key sustainable development criteria. While the NEMA 
provides the overall legislative framework to further sustainable development, specific legislation 
relating to air quality is now ensured by way of the NEMAQA. 
4.3.4 The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act (NEMAQA) 
The NCCRS identified the NEMAQA as an important instrument in combating climate change in 
the context of GHG emissions. To achieve this objective, the NEMAQA provides for a number of 
regulatory mechanisms. For example, the Act empowers the Minister of Environmental Affairs to 
make regulations in certain instances.
137
 These instances include, amongst others, any matter
necessary to give effect to the government's obligations in terms of an international agreement 
relating to air quality and climate change.
138
The NEMAQA aspires to protect the environment through reasonable measures for
139
 –
 protecting and enhancing the country's air quality;
 preventing air pollution and ecological degradation; and
 securing ecologically sustainable development, while promoting justifiable economic and social
development.
In light of the above, it is contended that the Minister is empowered to actively promote the CDM 
as a climate change mitigation mechanism, as well as a tool to enforce air quality compliance 
through the setting of standards.
140
A national framework for achieving the above objectives was established in 2007 and was 
subsequently repealed and replaced by an amended national framework in 2013.
141
 The framework




 NEMAQA, s53. 
138
 NEMAQA, s53(a). 
139
 NEMAQA, s2. 
140
 Humphris (n11) at 26. 
141
 Department of Environmental Affairs National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act (39/2004): Amendment 
to the 2007 National Framework for Air Quality Management in the Republic of South Africa in GN 919 in GG 
37078 (29 November 2013). 
142
 J Glazewski & L Du Toit 'Chapter 22: Atmospheric pollution' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) Environmental Law 
in South Africa (2016) at para 22.5.3. 
136 
The framework includes a number of stipulated features, including various mechanisms, systems 
and procedures to comply with ambient air quality standards, national norms and standards and 
international obligations.
143
 These standards open the possibility for GHG mitigation standards,
such as those envisaged by the CDM methodology,
144
 and have the capability to assist local
government in playing an active role in the CDM process.
145
 Moreover, the CDM can be used as a
vehicle through which emission controls concerning GHGs can be established.
146
 This is made
possible through the utilisation of the CDM methodology as a baseline measuring method for 
compliance.
147
Chapter 6 of the NEMAQA pertains to international air quality management and empowers the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs to investigate any situation with regard to transboundary air 
pollution and air pollution that may violate international agreements.
148
 The Minister may therefore
apply pressure on neighbouring countries (signatories to the Kyoto Protocol) to utilise the 
methodologies used for the CDM.
149
The success of a comprehensive climate change response is dependent upon adequate resources to 
implement the various policies and regulations. One mechanism of accelerating the uptake of a 
transition to cleaner technology is that of so-called 'green taxes'. These taxes offer incentives by 
way of tax exemptions or deductions to reduce the taxes owed to government. For example, in 
attempt to enhance the uptake of CDM projects in South Africa, National Treasury introduced 
income tax relief in 2009. This, together with other green tax incentives, is examined in the next 
section. 
143
 NEMAQA, ss7(1)(a)-(g). 
144
The UNFCCC approved methodologies available under the CDM can be viewed at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/documentation/index.html, accessed on 19 January 2017. 
145




 Ibid. Section 53(m) of the NEMAQA provides for requirements in respect of monitoring. This could be done via an 
emission database. 
148
 NEMAQA, s50(1). 
149
 Humphris (n11) at 28 refers to this pressure being applied in an endeavour to become a 'good neighbour'. The author 
continues (at 29) to aver that the CDM can be a vehicle through which the methodologies identified can evolve into 
mandatory methods of pollution minimisation. 
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4.4  SOUTH AFRICA'S GREEN TAX INCENTIVES 
4.4.1 Section 12K exemption
150
The tax relief came in the form of an exemption, contained in s12K of the South African Income 
Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, as amended (the Income Tax Act). Section 12K provides an exemption 
from income for any amount received by or accrued to a person in respect of the disposal of any 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) derived by that person in the furtherance of a qualifying 
CDM project carried on by that person. The exemption came into effect on 11 February 2009 and 
applies in respect of disposals on or after that date. 
National Treasury addressed the limited uptake of CDM projects in South Africa by providing for 
greater tax relief.
151
 This decision was considered part of South Africa's domestic policy response to
climate change and was intended to overcome the market failure associated with environmental 
protection.
152
 This incentive is available for any person holding a CDM project registration while
that person implements the project. Essentially, amounts received or accrued upon disposal of these 
CERs are exempt from normal tax and capital gains tax.
153
Initially, s12K contained a sunset clause to coincide with the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol on 
31 December 2012. However, during the COP18 meetings held in December 2012, the CDM was 
extended as a flexible mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, enabling developing countries to 
continue their participation in the global carbon market. Consequently, s12K was amended on 
1 January 2013 and the exemption was extended to 31 December 2020. 
There are no tax consequences at the time that the CER is granted to the taxpayer. When the CERs 
are subsequently disposed of for proceeds, s12K deems that there is no resulting taxable income. 
The expenses incurred in securing the approval and registrations required for the CERs will not 
qualify for a taxable deduction, as these expenses were not incurred in order to produce taxable 
150
 This section is drawn from a chapter which this author contributed to a book. See L-A Steenkamp 'Chapter 13: Fiscal 
incentives to advance the uptake of renewable energy in South Africa' in OC Ruppel & B Althusmann (eds) 
Perspectives on energy security and renewable energies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Practical opportunities and 
regulatory challenges, 2
nd
 ed (2016). 
151
 National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (2009) at 27, available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2009-01%20-
%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Taxation%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202009.pdf, accessed on 15 
May 2016, explains that the lack of uptake stemmed mainly from high financial (and bankable) hurdle rates, given the 
risks associated with CDM project activities. In addition, from a tax perspective, the disposal of CERs was largely 
untested, thereby creating further uncertainty for CDM projects. 
152
 Id at 28. 
153




 Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that there is no receipt of taxable income, the value of
CERs held by the taxpayer at year-end will not be taken into account as closing or opening stock.
155
Box 4.1 below illustrates the workings of s12K by way of an example.
156
4.4.2 Other 'green' income tax incentives 
In addition to the s12K incentive, there are numerous other income tax provisions aimed at 
encouraging investment in renewable energy and conserving the environment – these are 
summarised in Table 4.2 below. 
154
 National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum (n151) at 28, in conjunction with the workings of s23(f) of the Income 
Tax Act. Normally, non-capital expenditure actually incurred in the production of income and in the carrying on of a 
trade would qualify for a deduction from taxable income, in terms of s11(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
155
 Ibid. Section 22 of the Income Tax Act deals with trading stock. 
156
 Adapted from National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum (n151) at 28. 
Box 4.1 Example to illustrate the workings of the Section 12K exemption 
Hypothetical case: SA Ltd is a South African company acting as a project developer in a 
small scale CDM project in Cape Town. This project was developed to retrofit 2 000 low-
income houses in an urban township of Cape Town with solar water geysers, thereby 
improving thermal performance of low-income housing units and thus reducing GHG 
emissions.  
The UNFCCC Executive Board issues CERs worth R5 million to SA Ltd on 10 June 2010. 
SA Ltd disposes of the CERs to a foreign company for R12 million on 10 July 2012. 
Results: The mere receipt of CERs (i.e. R5 million) by SA Ltd from the UNFCCC Executive 
Board is a non-taxable event under common law principles. The proceeds from the disposal 
of the CERs (i.e. R12 million) are included in SA Ltd's gross income, but are then fully 
exempt in terms of s12K. The net effect on SA Ltd's taxable income is therefore Rnil. 
As no taxable income results from the disposal of CERs, any expenditure incurred by SA Ltd 
will  not qualify for a deduction. This is due to the workings of s11(a), read with s23(f), of the 
Income Tax Act. Similarly, because there is no taxable income, the value of the CERs held 
by SA Ltd will not be taken into account under s22 of the Income Tax Act as closing or 
opening stock. 
139 
Besides the tax incentives outlined above, there are numerous funding solutions which are available 
to green technology manufacturers and service companies, as well as those who make use of such 
services. These include, amongst others, financing by way of loans, equity, grants and subsidies and 
are listed in Annexure B. A good grasp of the various tax incentives and funding opportunities can 
enable investors and suppliers of green technology solutions to pass those benefits on to their 
customers or clients, thereby improving the viability and attractiveness of their products and 
projects. 
140 
Having examined the policy and legal framework that interplay with CDM projects, the next section 
considers some practical issues and responses emanating from these frameworks. 
4.4  PRACTICALITIES 
It will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6 that South Africa's economy is heavily reliant on coal. 
Furthermore, the International Energy Agency (IEA) ranks South Africa as fifth in the list of net 
coal-exporting nations, as depicted in Table 4.3 below.
157
The question then arises: how much coal reserves remain for South Africa to extract? The most 
recent report of Statistics South Africa places the country's coal reserves at 66 700 Mt in 2014.
158
157
International Energy Agency (IEA) Key World Energy Statistics (2017) at 17, available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2017.pdf, accessed 14 October 2017. 
158
Statistics SA Environmental Economic Accounts Compendium (2017) at 15, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-04-05-20/Report-04-05-20March2017.pdf, accessed on 14 October 
2017. 
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However, depletion rates vary greatly. For example, the South African Chamber of Mines regards 
the country's coal reserves to be sufficient 'for more than a century' if current production rates are 
maintained.
159
 This is in contrast to the Department of Energy's estimate of 50 years of coal
supply.
160
 Yet another approximation is 256 years,
161
 while Eskom projects 200 years.
162
Whatever estimate is used, Eskom acknowledges that the burning of coal (for South Africa's 
electricity production) results in 'the most waste problems of all energy sources'.
163
 This waste
includes sulphur and nitrogen oxides, organic compounds, heavy metals, radioactive elements, 
GHGs and a large amount of ash.
164
With plenty of both high- and low-grade coal, the South African government is mindful of 
mitigating its GHG emissions from its many coal-based power plants. In addition to carbon offsets 
(as exemplified by the CDM), Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is an important technology which 
is considered in the next section. In fact, CCS projects have the potential to qualify as CDM 
projects and thus generate CER revenue. 
4.4.1 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
CCS is a technology that can capture up to 90 per cent of the CO2 emissions produced from the use 
of fossil fuels in electricity generation and industrial processes.
165
 In so doing, it can prevent CO2
from entering the atmosphere.
166
 The CCS chain consists of three parts, namely capture,
transportation and storage of the CO2.
167
159
 Chamber of Mines 'Coal' (n.d.), available at http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/sa-mining/coal, accessed 14 October 
2017. 
160
 Department of Energy 'Coal Resources' (n.d.), available at http://www.energy.gov.za/files/coal_frame.html, accessed 
on 14 October 2017. 
161
 Statistics South Africa (n149) at 13. 
162
 Eskom 'Coal Power' (n.d.), available at 







 Carbon Capture and Storage Association What is CCS? (n.d.), available at http://www.ccsassociation.org/what-is-
ccs/, accessed on 31 January 2017. 
166
 Ibid. The Association also states that the use of CCS with renewable biomass is one of the few carbon abatement 




The White Paper briefly refers to a 'Carbon Capture and Sequestration Flagship Programme', which 
is led by the Department of Energy in partnership with the South African Energy Research 
Institute.
168
 The programme includes, among other proposals, the 'development of a Carbon Capture
and Sequestration Demonstration Plan to store the process emissions from an existing high carbon 
emissions facility'.
169
The South African authorities have embarked on a long-term study to investigate the feasibility of 
CCS in South Africa.
170
 More recently, the South African Centre for Carbon Capture and Storage
(SACCCS)
171
 commenced with a Pilot CO2 Monitoring Capacity Building Project (PMP).
172
 The
PMP aims to use findings gathered from the monitoring research to establish a baseline monitoring 
for the Pilot CO2 Storage Project (PCSP).
173
As is the nature of large-scale integrated projects, there are a number of challenges to overcome, for 
example, technical issues of integration and scale-up, legal and regulatory requirements to reduce 
investor risk, policies to create market drivers and mitigate economic impacts (including fluctuating 
electricity prices) and financing mechanisms to facilitate investment in the technology.
174
The CCS is likely to be instrumental in the expansion of the CDM and its successor in South Africa. 
There is a direct financial incentive for this, as the CCS qualifies as an eligible project activity 
under the CDM.
175
 Provided that CCS projects result in 'real, measurable and long-term benefits
168




 For a comprehensive report on the interaction of the various environmental laws with CCS and recommendations for 
a longer term dedicated CCS legal and regulatory regime, see J Glazewski, A Gilder & E Swanepoel Carbon Capture 
and Storage: Towards a regulatory and legal regime in South Africa (2012) IMEL and ACDI: University of Cape 
Town, available at http://www.imel.uct.ac.za/usr/law/imel/downloads/CCS_Report.pdf, accessed on 31 January 2017. 
171
 The SACCCS is a division of the South African National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI), a state-owned 
entity established under s7 of the National Energy Act 34 of 2008. 
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SACCCS ‘South Africa e barks on capacit  building for CO  Storage Project’ (2016), available at 
https://www.sacccs.org.za/Newsroom/index.php/;focus=HETZA_cm4all_com_widgets_News_931752&path=?m=d
&a=20161122081955-3449&cp=1#HETZA_cm4all_com_widgets_News_931752, accessed on 31 January 2017. 
173
 Ibid. The PMP is conducted at the natural CO2 release sites located within Mbizana (in the Wild Coast region of the 
Eastern Cape) and Harding (in the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal). 
174
 N Kulichenko & E Ereira 'Carbon Capture and Storage in Developing Countries: a Perspective on Barriers to 
Deployment' (2011) World Bank Group, available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-9609-
4, accessed on 15 February 2017 assess some of the most important barriers facing CCS deployment within 
developing and transition economies.  
175
 Glazewski et al CCS (n170) at 12. This is based on Decision 10/CMP.7 Modalities and procedures for carbon 
dioxide capture and storage in geological formations as clean development mechanism project activities. 
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related to the mitigation of climate change', achieve emission reductions that are additional to those 
that would otherwise have occurred, and assist in their host countries achieving sustainable 
development, such projects have the potential to earn CERs under the CDM.
176
Notwithstanding the obstacles faced by CDM projects, local governments are arguably best 
positioned to champion CDM projects. As such, the next section considers the role that cooperative 
local governance can play in promoting CDM projects. 
4.4.2 Local Governance 
In order to bring a CDM project to fruition, two components are essential. First, the municipality 
must have someone to champion the project, navigate regulatory hurdles and garner support among 
councillors and officials.
177
 Equally important is a transaction advisory team, with the requisite
technical, CDM, legal and financial skills to support the 'champion'.
178
Secondly, the municipality must ensure that all procedural and regulatory approvals have been 
identified and are being addressed.
179
 These approvals may include:
180
 procurement and supply chain management requirements;
 environmental approvals; and
 local and international CDM-specific approvals.
In the context of a public-private partnership, in the case where the municipality is developing the 
CDM project itself, the selection of and negotiation with the private party must be done following a 
procedure which, on the one hand, complies with local government legislation and, on the other 
hand, is seen by potential buyers as 'streamlined and efficient' and not 'cumbersome and overly 
bureaucratic'.
181
 The role of local governments in environmental governance should be viewed
against the broader responsibilities envisaged by the UN, as elaborated on below. 
176
 Id at 12-13. 
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The UN's adoption of Local Agenda 21
182
 and the launch by the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)
183
 of a number of flagship local government proposals, have
aided our understanding of the position and role of cities and local governments in environmental 
governance.
184
 Local Agenda 21 was, in short, an attempt to implement at the local level the global
environmental strategy that came out of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. Over the following decade, 
Local Agenda 21 impelled over 6 000 initiatives to locally adapt and adopt the global 
programme.
185
 Yet, despite its robust consultative processes, Local Agenda 21 was often weak in
implementation.
186
At the UN Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015, world leaders adopted the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle climate change by 2030.
187
Of especial relevance to this section of the study, is the inclusion of SDG 11 on Sustainable Cities 
and Human Settlements. This is the only goal of the 2030 Agenda to have a sub-national focus and 
represents 'unprecedented recognition of local governments in the international development 
agenda'.
188
 Consequently, it may be argued that municipalities enjoy 'considerable global
182
 Agenda 21 is a non-binding, voluntarily implemented action plan of the UN with regard to sustainable development. 
It was adopted in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. See United 
Nations (UN) Agenda 21 (1992), available at 
 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2017. 
183
The ICLEI is an international association of local governments and national and regional local government 
organisations that have made a commitment to sustainable development. More information is available at 
http://www.iclei.org/, accessed on 20 February 2017. 
184
J Glazewski & O Rumble 'Chapter 6: Administration and governance' in J Glazewski & L du Toit (eds) 
Environmental Law in South Africa (2016) at para 6.7 discuss the respective rights and duties of the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government in the context of environmental concerns. 
185
Per T Ribera 'Want sustainable urban develop ent? It’s ti e for Local Agenda  030' (2017), available at 
http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/commentary/2017/01/want-sustainable-urban-development-its-time-local-agenda-2030, 
accessed on 18 July 2017, who further remarks that the project raised the question of environment at the local level 




 United Nations (UN) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015), available at 
https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/08/120815_outcome-document-of-Summit-for-adoption-of-
the-post-2015-development-agenda.pdf, accessed on 18 July 2017. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the SDGs 
build on the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
188
 The Global Network of Cities, Local and Regional Governments (UCLG) (n.d.) 'The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development', available at: https://www.uclg.org/en/issues/2030-agenda-sustainable-development, accessed on 18 
July 2017. 
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recognition' for their role in responding to climate change.
189
 Moreover, local authorities operate at
the level of government closest to the people, as well as 'closest to the effects of climate change'.
190
Du Plessis remarks that, despite the belief that local authorities have a 'significant function in the 
world's transition to an inclusively perceived sustainable future', domestic law and policy makers 
continue to 'grapple with the details of the role that local authorities can play in this pursuit'.
191
Indeed, an earlier review of the REIPPPP system revealed a lack of clarity regarding the role of 
local municipalities in engaging with renewable energy projects within their municipal 
boundaries.
192
 The review also found that there is 'no structured partnership with the local
municipality and local government is only engaged in a fragmented, peripheral and uncoordinated 
manner with renewable energy projects'.
193
In terms of the South African Municipal Systems Act,
194
 local government has formal legal
processes to consult communities in the development of general local government plans. Public 
meetings are required in the wards, and ward committees are conceived as the formal conduit for 
community structures to engage with political leadership around local development.
195
 However, a
subsequent review process (in 2014) showed that renewable energy projects often operate outside 
such structures.
196
 This results in the creation of 'multiple parallel private sector driven processes',
which determine economic priorities within the same geographical area as that which should be 
governed by local authorities.
197
Given the challenges faced by local government to operate transparently and to consult 
meaningfully with the public, the review also remarks that it is 'not surprising that renewable energy 
189
 A du Plessis & LJ Kotzé 'The heat is on: local government and climate governance in South Africa' (2014) 58(1) 
Journal of African Law 145-174 at 173. 
190
 Id at 174. 
191
 AA du Plessis 'The "brown" environmental agenda and the constitutional duties of local government in South Africa: 
A conceptual introduction'  (2015) 18(5) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 1846-1880 at 1847. Du Plessis 
provides a compelling examination of the interplay between the so-called brown and green environmental agendas 
and local government in the South African context. The author also offers a response to what the conceptual framing 
of South Africa's constitutional environmental right beyond the green agenda promises for communities and implies 
for local government. 
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 Act 32 of 2000. 
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developers should also be sceptical of engaging local government'.
198
 After all, the amounts of
money that will flow into communities for economic benefits are substantial, and developers 
(rightly or wrongly) have a perception that this money will not find its way into community 
projects.
199
At any rate, it could be argued that local municipalities must be informed and directed by s24 of the 
Constitution as regards the quantity, quality and sustainability of basic municipal services to be 
provided.
200
 These range from water and sanitation services to electricity and local planning, and
interplay with the green agenda of environmental protection. 
This study concurs that local governments must improve their institutional planning processes, 
increase transparency around local development decision-making processes and emphasise 
meaningful public participatory processes.
201
 Moreover, it is advisable that social economic plans,
developed by renewable energy projects, are aligned with local government development planning 
processes.   
The South African government acknowledged that 'the perceived efficiency of the government in a 
potential CDM host country influences investors' decisions whether or not to invest in a country'.
202
Accordingly, in order to increase the uptake of the CDM, government has to increase its capacity 
and perceived efficiency. Similarly, the government has to ensure that inter-departmental 
cooperation is promoted.
203







 Du Plessis (n191) at 1848. 
201
 McDaid (n35) at 35-36. 
202
 Department of Energy White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (2003) at 25, 
available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/white-paper-on-the-renewable-energy-policy-of-the-republic-of-south-
africa-2004-06-11, accessed on 14 December 2016. 
203
 L du Toit 'Promoting Clean Development Mechanism Implementation in South Africa: Law and Policy' (2009) 1 SA 
Public Law 33-55 at 50 rightly comments that climate change and the CDM are 'cross-cutting issues' and that various 
government departments are affected by these, including the Departments of Environmental Affairs, Energy, 
Agriculture, Trade and Industry, and Water Affairs and Forestry, 
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4.5  CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the underlying policy and legislative frameworks, as well as some practical 
considerations, which set the stage for the implementation of the SDM. The analysis reveals that 
there have been significant policy developments from the South African government towards 
ensuring the country's energy security, but that limited progress has been made towards securing 
sustainable energy security.  
The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement (and SDM) will depend on the modalities 
and procedures that will guide the implementation of the cooperative approaches. This 
implementation will not bear fruit if parties do not 'seek the opportunity for complementary action 
and do not show the willingness to link domestic action with action under the provisions of the 
Paris Agreement'.
204
The South African government's willingness to implement market-based mechanisms as a means of 
responding to climate change is evident from the various White Papers, policies and other 
instruments that it has developed. This effort was kick-started by the LTMS study and continued 
with numerous legislative responses. It is evident that South African policies and legislation provide 
for the requisite vehicles to promote the CDM. For example, NEMAQA makes it possible to 
promulgate regulations specific to CDM projects concerned with air quality and to promote the 
CDM amongst other signatory countries on the African continent. 
The EarthlifeAfrica judgment will be an important indicator of the extent to which the Paris 
Agreement will bring climate change to the forefront of development disputes. While there are 
manifold domestic regulations and legislation which deal, inter alia, with energy, electricity, coal, 
gas and liquid fuels, none deals specifically with climate change.
205
 Indeed, the prevailing opinion
among certain leading South Africa climate change scholars seems to be that there is little appetite 
for the development of a dedicated Climate Change Act.
206
 This could be ascribed to the fact that
there are many useful laws in place, but that they lack proper implementation.
207
Nevertheless, there are other scholars who argue for new legislation that will translate the 
government's policy positions on renewable energy into binding legal obligations. Murombo, for 
204
 C Streck, P Keenlyside & M von Unger 'The Paris Agreement: a new beginning' (2016) 13(1) Journal for European 
Environmental & Planning Law 3-29 at 17. 
205
 Per L du Toit Promoting CDM (n203) at 44, who mentions the stance of the Department of Environmental Affairs 
(in 2009) that such legislation was not (at the time) necessary, as climate change can be dealt with sufficiently 
through the amendment of other legislation. 
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instance, remarks that South African laws have primarily regarded climate change as an 
environmental matter, but that the evidence demonstrates that it is a 'multidisciplinary cross-sectoral 
challenge that requires co-ordinated and integrated regulatory and implementing action'.
208
 Taylor
et al call for greater legislative clarity on mandates and reforms to simplify the working of local 
government.
209
 Certainly, cooperative governance is an essential ingredient in overcoming the
challenges of environmental planning and sustainable development.
210
Ultimately, it would appear that the South African government is promoting a mix of regulatory 
measures, which effectively shifts the state's role from a 'regulator/enforcer' to a 
'conductor/facilitator'.
211
 A vast opportunity exists for 'creative governance arrangements',
especially in light of the Paris Agreement's recognition of the role of non-state parties.
212
 Whether
these regulatory vehicles are adequately powered and directed, is another matter entirely. The 
successes and failures related to the country's legal and policy frameworks will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, together with possible solutions for overcoming these barriers. 
The next chapter will reflect on the status of the CDM internationally, thereby considering 
prospects for the implementation of the SDM. The chapter also discusses the CDM network of 
China and India in more detail, as these countries are recognised as global leaders in the CDM 
environment.  
208
 T Murombo 'Chapter 18: South Africa's energy mix – towards a low-carbon economy' in T Humby, L Kotzé, O 
Rumble & A Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 18-26. He 
uses the REIPPPP (at 18-25) as an example that no specific renewable energy law or climate change law may be 
required at this stage, as amendments to the fossil fuel-focussed legislation have enabled the regulators and 
government to promote renewable energy. 
209
 A Taylor, H Davies, G Oelofse & S Roux 'Chapter 11: Urban adaptation' in T Humby, L Kotzé, O Rumble & A 
Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 11-2 argue that local 
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See, in this regard, LK Mahlatsi 'Chapter 4: Co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations' 
Developmental mandate of district municipalities in the Free State: challenges in promoting environmental 
rights (Doctoral dissertation, North West University, 2010). 
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The status of the CDM internationally 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have examined the theoretical and policy considerations of the Kyoto Protocol; 
the architectural foundations of the Paris Agreement; the progression of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM); and the legal and policy 
framework informing the CDM in South Africa. Having considered the policies and politics which 
inform the workings of the CDM, this chapter will observe the status of the CDM from an 
international perspective. In so doing, the prospects for the SDM will become increasingly apparent. 
The next chapter will hone in on the status of the CDM in South Africa specifically. 
This chapter also elaborates on the CDM network of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (BRICS) member countries (refer to section 5.3.1), in particular China and India, as these 
countries are recognised as global leaders in the CDM environment. This comparison is done with 
the object of identifying the elements that should be included in any future SDM policy in South 
Africa. 
The first section of this chapter considers the global contribution of the CDM by providing high-
level analytics of the geographical distribution of CDM projects, as well as using various indicators 
to gain insight on CDM participation among countries and regions. 
5.2  THE GLOBAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE CDM 
The equitable distribution of the CDM project has been a major concern since the inception of the 
mechanism, with smaller and least developed countries (LDCs) slow to pick up pace in the 
implementation thereof.
1
 Since the onset of the CDM’s i ple entation, a few well developed host
countries have represented the bulk of CDM project development.
2
 In particular, India was among
the early promoters of the CDM and took the lead in project development in 2003 to 2004.
3
1
S Lütken 'Indexing CDM distribution: Levelling the playing field' UNEP Risø Centre on Energy, Climate and 
Sustainable Development (2011) at 1, available at http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/5571867/Indexing_CDM_distribution.pdf, 
accessed on 9 October 2016. 
2




The first CDM project was registered in Brazil
4
 and, by the end of 2005, there were 63 registered
projects – of which India hosted 17.
5
 The great breakthrough for the CDM project came in 2006,
when 409 projects were registered.
6
 Brazil took the lead with 83, India with 124 and the newcomer
in the market, China, hosting 33.
7
In order to provide a broad view of the global CDM uptake, the following graphs are shown: 
Figures 5.1 through 5.3 depict the geographical distribution of CDM projects in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa respectively.
8
 China, India, Brazil and South Africa emerge as the clear leaders
in the various regional clusters. This result further strengthens the case for focusing the remainder 
of this chapter on the BRICS grouping. 
Figure 5.1: Geographical distribution of CDM projects in Asia
9
4
 The project is located in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It aims to reduce GHG emissions from a landfill site by 
capturing methane for use in generating electricity for the local community of Nova Igacú. See United Nations (UN) 
'The K oto Protocol’s Clean Develop ent Mechanis  takes off: first CDM project registered' ( 004), available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/press/releases/2004_02.pdf, accessed on 26 March 2017. 
5
 Lütken (n1) at 4. 
6




 It should be noted that all subsequent graphs and analyses are based on data as at 1 March 2017. 
9
 All graphs are based on analyses conducted by the UNEP DTU Partnership (formerly UNEP Risø Centre) on regularly 
updated information. The partnership collaborates with the energy branch of the UN Environment's Economy 
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Figure 5.2: Geographical distribution of CDM projects in Latin America
10
Figure 5.3: Geographical distribution of CDM projects in Africa
11
development. For more information, see http://www.unepdtu.org/, accessed on 26 March 2017. Refer to CDM 
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As regards the equitable distribution of CDM projects across the globe, Bodansky et al point out 
that since the start of CDM negotiations many LDCs and African nations were apprehensive that, 
given the limited scope to reduce emissions in their countries, they would receive very few CDM 
projects.
12
 Eventually, these countries' calls resulted in efforts to address the lack of CDM projects
in LDCs and small island states, including through financial and other support.
13
 Despite attempts
to enhance the equitable geographical distribution of CDM projects, market forces have continued 
to skew the distribution, whereby the private sector prefers low-risk and high-opportunity locations 
and projects.
14
However, in contrast to the traditional approach of tallying the number of projects per country, a 
more nuanced analysis indicates a more equal distribution of the uptake of the CDM, even in 
LDCs.
15
 There are many ways to apply relativity and, accordingly, the four approaches discussed
below shed a different light on CDM participation among countries and regions.
16
 These approaches
comprise the CDM's project generation ability, its contribution to the economy, its investment 
capability and actual emissions reduction. 
5.2.1 Indicator 1: Project generation ability 
One way to estimate a country's likelihood to participate in the CDM project is to consider its 
national carbon emissions.
17
 Notwithstanding that the emissions data is incomplete and excludes
methane emissions, it does indicate the level of activity in a country and the emissions attributable 
to it.
18
 Thus, it is possible to determine both the level of current emissions that might be reduced




 D Bodansky, J Brunnée & L Rajamani  International Climate Change Law (2017) at 189. The authors also mention 





 Id at 190. 
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 Lütken (n1) at 1. 
16
 These four indicators were first introduced by Lütken (n1). 
17
 Id at 9. These emissions were calculated in 2008 by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre for the UN, 






It should be pointed out that, for all four indicators discussed in this section, countries have been 
grouped together in five regions participating in the CDM, namely Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
Middle East and Eurasia, as well as a group for the LDCs.
20
 South Africa is included in the 'Africa'
category. 
The first indicator considers the number of CDM projects relative to a host country's emissions. 
This is an indirect indicator of a country's ability to identify emissions reduction options and 
transform them into actual projects.
21
 This reveals the prominence of CDM in relation to the actual
opportunity for emissions reduction and may be a result of heightened awareness.
22
 It could also be
the product of a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) carbon intensity.
23
 Figure 5.4 illustrates the
project generation ability of specific country groupings; that is, the number of projects divided by 
the national carbon emissions. 
Figure 5.4: Project generation ability
24
20
 Id at 11.The author explains that the basis for calculation is the countries that have actually participated in the CDM 
at any level of participation (implying that even a project under validation is sufficient to enter the statistics). 
21
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5.2.2 Indicator 2: Contribution to the economy 
Another measure of relativity is based on the size of the economy of a particular host country. The 
GDP is used to gauge the health of a country's economy. Despite being an appropriation, GDP may 
be employed as a more consistent platform – compared to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), for 
example – for providing an estimate of a country's project financing capacity.
25
Evaluations compared to GDP may be twofold: either in comparison to the expected amount of 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from all projects for a given host country, or in comparison 
to number of CDM projects in the pipeline.
26
 The former indicator measures the CDM's
contribution to the economy. The amount of CERs generated from CDM projects relative to the 
GDP of a host country is an immediate expression of the importance of CDM to the economy, as 
well as the prominence of CDM compared to other economic activities.
27
 This indicator is depicted
in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5: CDM contribution to the economy
28
25
 Lütken (n1) at 10 states that, while in an idealised scenario CDM projects would materialise on a basis of FDI, the 
reality is that more projects materialise predominantly on local finance. The size of the FDI is not necessarily linked 
to the size of the economy, though, but rather to the investment climate. However, finance figures fluctuate 
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5.2.3 Indicator 3: Investment capability 
As mentioned in para 5.2.2 above, one of the evaluations used to compare GDP refers to the number 
of CDM projects in the pipeline. This indicator is thought to illustrate the project financing 
capability of a given host country, regardless of the country's actual emissions.
29
 Applying this
reasoning therefore negates the case for eliminating the emission intensity argument for the first 
indicator. It should be cautioned, however, that project options and project sizes vary between 
countries and could consequently skew the results.
30
This third indicator therefore corresponds to the first indicator, but eliminates the emission intensity 
of a host country. Thus, this indicator is focused on a country's financing capacity; or, phrased 
differently, on the ability to attract external (non-domestic) financing, independently of the actual 
emissions reduction options.
31
 Figure 5.6 illustrates the investment capability of countries, ie the
number of projects divided by the country's GDP. 
Figure 5.6: Investment capability
32
29
 Lütken (n1) at 10. 
30
 Ibid. The author illustrates this limitation as follows: assuming comparable levels of GDP, country A may have ten 
small scale project options and developers to exploit them, while country B may develop a single project that 
compares to the ten in terms of investment. While the two countries may perform equally well in terms of CER 
generation, country A with its many projects reveals a higher level of economic activity related to CDM. This, in turn, 
could be indicative of the involvement of more developers and financing institutions. 
31
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5.2.4 Indicator 4: Actual emission reduction 
The fourth indicator is a factual one. If the emissions which are expected to be reduced through 
CDM projects in a given host country are compared to the national carbon emissions, a rough 
estimate of the country's domestic emissions reduction effort may be established.
33
 These reductions
are established on a basis of domestic financing. In other words, these are actual project activities, 
as compared to reductions achieved by Annex I countries, where a significant share is achieved 
through offsets.
34
The fourth indicator therefore demonstrates to what extent CDM is supporting the emissions 
reduction efforts in a given host country.
35
 Figure 5.7 portrays the actual emissions reduction, ie the
percentage of country emissions covered by CERs. 
Figure 5.7: Actual emission reduction
36
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5.2.5 Observations about the CDM's global contribution 
Each indicator paints a different picture of the regions' comparative performance. For the first 
indicator, it is evident that: 
 The project generation capability of Latin America (0.41%) and Asia (0.43%) are on par, both
significantly outperforming the rest.
 Africa is not the lowest performing region, as is traditionally thought. Standing at 0.11%, it
performs somewhat better than the Middle East (at 0.08%).
Concerning the second indicator, the CDM's contribution to the economy, it is evident that: 
 Asia (85.98), LDCs (81.06) and Eurasia (75.41) are closely matched.
 In this metric, Africa (at 37.36) narrowly outperforms Latin America (at 31.37), with the Middle
East again coming in last at 12.53.
With regard to the third indicator of investment capability: 
 Asia clearly ranks the highest at 0.64.
 Eurasia performs approximately half as well as Asia, standing at 0.33.
 They are followed by Latin America and the LDCs, which are virtually tied at 0.24 and 0.23
respectively.
 The Middle East is clearly lagging at 0.06.
As regards the fourth indicator, that of actual emissions reductions, the following observations can 
be made: 
 Three regions perform approximately equally well at around 5% - namely Asia (5.4%), Latin
America (5.8%) and the LDCs (4.7%). It is not surprising that Asia holds the lead, as the two
largest CDM participators (China and India) are included in this mix.
 Africa is not faring too well (at 2.7%), which may be indicative of drawbacks in financing
capability and challenges in the energy sector. It attains only about half the performance of the
previous three regions, although still fares considerably better than the Middle East (at 1.7%).
In general, Africa – which is typically thought of as the 'lost continent in CDM' – is not so lost after 
all.
37
 On all parameters, Africa is faring better than the Middle East, although it is evident that there
is plenty of room for improvement.  
37
 Lütken (n1) at 13. 
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As stated earlier, it is both appropriate and necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
BRICS countries. The next section examines the energy context and CDM uptake of these 
countries. 
5.3  THE ENERGY CONTEXT IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) concept was first conceived in 2001 by Goldman Sachs 
as part of an economic modelling exercise to forecast global economic trends over the next half 
century. South Africa was invited to attend the third BRIC summit in Sanya, China, on 14 April 
2011
38
 and subsequently became a member, changing the acronym to BRICS.
The BRICS countries are characterised by rapidly growing economies and increasing international 
influence.
39
 With over 40 per cent of the world's population, the BRICS countries contribute more
than 20 per cent of global GDP, with some economists predicting that Brazil, China, India and 
Russia will join the US as the five largest economies in the world by 2050.
40
 The BRICS members
are all developing or newly industrialised countries, but they are distinguished by their large, fast-
growing economies and significant influence on regional and global affairs.
41
 Moreover, all five
countries are G-20 members.
42
It could be argued that, provided comparable preconditions prevail, it is worth contemplating the 
experiences of other legal systems and benefiting from certain experiences that have proved 
themselves in practice. In light of South Africa's membership of BRICS and similarities in their 
economies, the energy context of these countries merits further exploration. 
Table 5.1 portrays key indicators of the BRICS countries' (excluding Russia) economies and 
emissions. Russia is excluded, as it does not participate in the CDM project.  
38
See http://www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/, accessed on 14 November 2015. 
39
 B O'Bo le ‘Explainer: what are the BRICS?’ ( 014), available at http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-are-
brics?gclid=CjwKEAjwgPe4BRCB66GG8PO69QkSJAC4EhHhx7KLgq7CvBvEDb3vNAVFR5FKXGzOuDUUo7m




 GL Ribeiro & T Dwyer Social, Political and Cultural Challenges of the BRICS (2015) at 168. 
42
The G-20 is an international network of finance ministers and central bankers from eleven developed countries and 
eight less-developed countries, as well as representatives from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. 
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Table 5.1: Key indicators in BRICS countries 
No. of CDM 
projects 
registered as 


















56 54.00 411.04 437.37 11 858 
Brazil45 342 206.08 2 412.23 476.02 54 361 
India46 1 639 1 295.29 2 195.65 2 019.67 195 293 
China47 3 763 1 364.27 8 230.12 9 086.96 620 263 
Next, Table 5.2 offers a rudimentary comparison of various measures of the success of the CDM in 
these countries. It is acknowledged that this is an overly simplified depiction of the CDM 
contribution in BRICS countries, but it does offer a starting point for comparative analysis.
48
43
 UNFCCC Project search, available at https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html, accessed on 1 March 2017. 
44
Based on the indicators used in the IEA South African statistics, available at 
https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=SOUTHAFRIC&product=indicators&year=Select, 
accessed on 19 March 2017. 
45
 Based on the indicators used in the IEA Brazilian statistics, available at 
https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=BRAZIL&product=indicators&year=2014, accessed on 
19 March 2017. 
46
Based on the indicators used in the IEA Indian statistics, available at 
https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?year=2014&country=INDIA&product=Indicators, accessed on 
19 March 2017. 
47
 Based on the indicators used in the IEA Chinese statistics, available at 
https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=CHINA&product=indicators&year=2014, accessed on 19 
March 2017. 
48
 An in-depth review across all indicators is considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis. This could, however, be 
the subject matter of future research, including an analysis of year-on-year comparisons, CER date, size of 
investments, etc. 
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As a proportion of the population size, South Africa (at 1.04 CDM projects per person) 
underperforms compared to the other countries, with China in the lead (at 2.76). When CDM is 
expressed relative to GDP, South Africa is on par with Brazil (both at 0.14 projects per thousand 
US$), with India in the lead (at 0.46).  
Although South Africa has a far smaller population and economy compared to the other BRICS 
countries, it is by far the largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter on a per capita basis (coming in at 
8.10 tCO2 per person), followed by China (6.66), Brazil (2.31) and India (1.56). Perhaps the most 
telling indicator is the anticipated success of the CDM, measured as the estimated emission 
reductions in metric tonnes of CO2e p.a. Using this indicator, South Africa ranks first, with an 
estimated 212 Kt of CO2e reduction per CDM project. China is next (at 165), followed by Brazil 
(159) and India (119). However, it should be cautioned that these rankings are based on the
expected emissions reductions – not on the actual. Further in-depth research would be required to 
establish the true outcomes and impact of CDM projects.
The remainder of this section will delve into each member country's energy mix and CDM 
participation in more detail, starting with Brazil. 
Table 5.2: A comparison of the CDM contribution in BRICS countries 
CDM/population 











(Kt per project) 
South 
Africa 
1.04 0.14 8.10 212 
Brazil 1.66 0.14 2.31 159 
India 1.27 0.75 1.56 119 
China 2.76 0.46 6.66 165 
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5.3.2 Brazil 
5.3.2.1 Energy profile 
Brazil is the eighth-largest energy consumer in the world and the third-largest in the Americas, 
behind the US and Canada.
49
 Due to sustained economic growth, the total primary energy
consumption in Brazil has nearly doubled in the past decade, with the largest share of energy 
consumption going to oil and other liquid fuels, followed by hydroelectricity and natural gas.
50
 At
the same time, Brazil is an important oil and gas producer in the region.
51
 Figure 5.8 depicts the
total primary energy supply in Brazil. 
Figure 5.8 Total primary energy supply in Brazil
52
Brazil has a clean, low-carbon energy mix in which renewable energy sources (mainly hydropower 
and biofuels) accounted for approximately 40 per cent of total primary energy supply in 2014. As a 
result, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from energy generation and use are relatively low 
compared to many OECD countries.
53
Brazil's emissions profile is very different to that of South Africa (refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2). In 
2014, Brazil produced 476.02 MtCO2. While this largely corresponds with that produced by South 
Africa, namely 437.37 MtCO2, the two countries differ drastically in terms of per capita emissions. 
Brazil's per capita emissions are only 2.31 tCO2/capita, compared to South Africa's 8.10tCO2/capita. 
49
 US Energy Information Administrator (EIA) Brazil, available at 







 International Energy Agency (2014) Share of total primary energy supply in 2014 – Brazil, available at 
http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/BRAZIL4.pdf, accessed on 19 March 2017. 
53
 OECD Environmental Performance Review: Brazil 2015 at 23. 
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This can probably be attributed, in part, to the fact that coal accounts for only 5.8 per cent of the 
primary energy supply in Brazil, whereas in South Africa, coal contributes nearly 70 per cent of the 
primary energy supply. Brazil is the world's seventh-highest emitter, but much of its emission is due 
to deforestation of the Amazon, rather than the burning of fossil fuels.
54
Since 2006, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has established increasingly closer co-operation 
with Brazil, whom it considers a key partner country, including the signing of bilateral work 
programmes at the IEA Ministerial meetings in 2011 and 2013.
55
 Brazil’s energ  polic  choices and
achievements measure up well against so e of the world’s  ost urgent energ  challenges.
56
 A
concerted policy effort has meant that access to electricity is now almost universal across the 
country.
57
5.3.2.2 CDM profile 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Brazil was the first country to sign the UNFCCC (on 4 June 
1992) and also played a seminal role in establishing the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol. Brazil's 
institutional infrastructure for climate change is regarded by some as 'well prepared' to deal with 
CDM projects.
58
The Designated National Authority (DNA) in Brazil is the Interministerial Committee for Global 
Climate Change (Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima), which was created with 
the purpose of coordinating government action.
59
 The DNA is chaired by the Minister of Science
54
 C Mooney & D Phillips 'Brazil just ratified the Paris climate agreement. Here's why that's a really big deal' (2016), 
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/09/12/brazil-just-ratified-the-paris-
climate-agreement-heres-why-thats-a-really-big-deal/?utm_term=.cc3a758002e1, accessed on 20 March 2017. 
55







 UNIDO Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) investor guide: Brazil (2003) at 75, available at 
https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/CDM_investor_guide_Brazil.pdf, accessed on 19 
March 2017. 
59
FGV Editora The CDM: a Brazilian implementation guide (2002) at 20, available at 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0013/13748.pdf, accessed on 19 March 2017. This DNA was established by 
Presidential Decree on 7 July 1999. 
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and Technology and the vice-chair is the Minister of the Environment.
60
 The commission has the
authority to authorise individual projects as CDM projects, and thus make CER units available.  
Brazil currently has 342 registered CDM projects (refer to Table 5.1). A number of these projects 
relate to the production of energy from hydro and sugarcane bagasse, which is a remnant from 
sugarcane processing and a renewable source of energy.
61
 Eco-innovation is among the priorities of
Brazil's innovation strategy, with Brazil developing a specialisation in environmental technology, in 
comparison with the other BRICS countries.
62
 Moreover, Brazil has generated the world’s third-
largest amount of CER credits under the CDM, which has been a key driver of technology transfer 
and has also encouraged domestically-driven innovation.
63
5.3.3 Russia 
Russia is the world's largest producer of crude oil, the second-largest producer of dry natural gas 
and also the producer of significant amounts of coal.
64
 The Russian economy is highly dependent on
its hydrocarbons; oil and natural gas revenues account for more than half of the federal budget 
reserves – as illustrated by Figure 5.9.
65
60
 Ibid. The DNA also comprises members of the following ministries: Foreign Relations; Agriculture, Livestock and 
Supply; Transportation; Mines and Energy; Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, and the Chief of Staff (Casa 
Civil) of the Presidency of the Republic. 
61
 L du Toit 'Promoting Clean Development Mechanism Implementation in South Africa: Law and Policy' (2009) 1 SA 
Public Law 33-55 at 49. 
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 US Energy Information Administrator (EIA) Russia, available at 




Figure 5.9 Total primary energy supply in Russia
66
Russia maintains its position as one of the world's most important energy players, continuing its 
essential role in global energ  suppl  and holding a ong the world’s largest resources of gas, oil 
and coal.
67
 Although the IEA recognises the long-standing co-operation between the IEA and
Russia, it also acknowledges that the carbon intensity of the Russian economy, as measured by CO2 
emissions per real GDP, is 60 per cent higher than the average of IEA member countries and that 
'there is much scope to limit CO2 emissions'.
68
 Indeed, Russia is one of the world's largest CO2
emitters.
69
The modernisation of the Russian energy sector depends to a large extent on energy efficiency 
deployment and infrastructure investments, especially in the industrial, residential and transport 
sectors, as well as the district heating and power generation sectors.
70
 Notwithstanding that Russia
is pursuing ambitious energy policy goals of improving energy efficiency, increasing the share of 
renewable energy and modernising its energy sector, efforts to integrate climate and energy policy 
objectives into a coherent energy and climate policy package remain very limited.
71
66
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Share of total primary energy supply in 2014 – Russian Federation (2014), 
available at http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/RUSSIA4.pdf, accessed on 19 March 2017. 
67
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Russian Federation (2017), available at https://www.iea.org/countries/non-
membercountries/russianfederation/, accessed on 22 March 2017. 
68
 Ibid. The co-operation between the IEA and Russia dates back to 1994 and covers energy security, energy efficiency, 
energy statistics, energy policy reviews and technologies. 
69
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Beyond IEA Countries: Russia (2014) at 63, available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Russia_2014.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2016. 
70
 IEA Russian Federation (n67). 
71
 Id at 63. 
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5.3.4 India 
5.3.4.1 Energy profile 
India was the fourth-largest energy consumer in the world after China, the US and Russia in 2011, 
and despite having notable fossil fuel resources, the country has become increasingly dependent on 
energy imports.
72
 India's largest energy source is coal, followed by traditional biomass and waste
and petroleu . The countr ’s need for energ  suppl  continues to cli b as a result of dynamic 
economic growth and modernisation over the past several years.
73
 Figure 5.10 illustrates the total
primary energy supply in India in 2014. 
Figure 5.10 Total primary energy supply in India
74
That said, India is increasingly engaged in reducing carbon emissions and alleviating environmental 
degradation.
75
 The govern ent seeks to balance the countr ’s growing need for electricit  with
environmental concerns due to the use of coal and other energy sources to produce that electricity.
76
Frequent flooding and droughts, deforestation and desertification, as well as possible glacial melting 
72
 US Energy Information Administrator (EIA) India, available at 




 International Energy Agency (IEA) Share of total primary energy supply in 2014 – India (2014), available at 
http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/INDIA4.pdf, accessed on 19 March 2017. 
75
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Understanding energy challenges in India: policies, players and issues (2012) at 
17, available at 
 https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/India_study_FINAL_WEB.pdf, accessed on 14 March 
2016. 
76
 EIA India (n71). 
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in the Himalayas have sharpened the focus on climate change and provide a strong impetus towards 
India’s transition to a low-carbon economy.
77
India's emissions profile offers a stark contrast to that of South Africa (refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
In 2014, India produced 2 019.67 MtCO2. While this is much higher than the CO2 emissions 
generated by South Africa, namely 437.37 MtCO2, the two countries are vastly different in terms of 
per capita emissions. Notwithstanding that both countries are heavily reliant on coal, India's per 
capita emissions are much lower – only 1.56 tCO2/capita, compared to South Africa's 8.10 
tCO2/capita.  
However, India's CO2 emissions should be viewed through two lenses. One the one hand, per capita 
emissions are extremely low (standing at just one-quarter of China's). The reason for this is that 
India has a much larger population than South Africa. In fact, India is expected to overtake China to 
become the world's most populous country in the early 2020s, with its population exceeding 1.6 
billion by the end of the period.
78
 On the other hand, India is the third-largest country in terms of
the volume of CO2 emissions in the world, lagging behind only China and the US.
79
 Rapidly
growing power generation and continued reliance on coal as the fuel of choice for generation make 
India a significant contributor to growing CO2 emissions from the power sector.
80
The IEA and India benefit from a long, ongoing bilateral relationship built on co-operation in a 
broad range of areas, including energy security, statistics, efficiency, market analysis, 
implementation agreements and technology.
81
 A priority area for co-operation is oil and gas
security, and the IEA and the Ministry for Petroleum and Natural Gas signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2011.
82
 In 2016, India and the IEA signed a Statement of Intent to enhance co-
77
 IEA Energy challenges in India (n75) at 17. 
78
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Climate and Change: World Energy Outlook (2016) at 44, available at 
http://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/november/world-energy-outlook-2016.html, accessed on 12 February 2017. 
79
 International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook – Special Report India (2015) at 48, available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/IndiaEnergyOutlook_WEO2015.pdf, accessed on 11 
February 2017.  
80
 Id at 87. In fact, in the period to  040, India’s CO2e from power generation is expected to grow by nearly two-and-a-
half-times, making its power sector the second-largest emitter from power generation in the world. 
81
 IEA India (key partner country), available at https://www.iea.org/countries/non-membercountries/india/, accessed on 
23 March 2016. 
82
 Ibid. This was the first time that the IEA signed a memorandum of understanding with a key partner country in the 
area of emergency preparedness. 
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operation in numerous fields, including forecasting and data.
83
 The IEA and India also collaborate
on renewable energy.
84
5.3.4.2 CDM profile 
India currently has 1 639 registered CDM projects (refer to Table 5.1). The Central Government 
constituted the National Clean Development Mechanism Authority in December 2003. The 
Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Forest was elected as the Chairperson, tasked with 
according Host Country Approval to the CDM projects.
85
 The Indian government has also
mandated large-scale CDM projects to commit two per cent of revenue generated from the sale of 
CERs to support sustainable development activities for the local communities.
86
Most of the CDM projects in India are concentrated in a few sectors, with about 82 per cent of the 
registered CDM projects categorised under energy industries.
87
 Several kinds of renewable energy
projects have been registered under the CDM, with wind energy dominating other forms of 
renewable energy production.
88
 Indeed, the most promising renewable source of energy is wind.
89
China and India could be seen as comparable case studies when it comes to an analysis of 
independent criteria, as, based on the scope of CDM projects, China and India are the top two. The 
two countries’ size, econo   and fossil fuel dependence are also si ilar. In addition, China and 
India are the two most populated countries in the world with similar economic conditions (they 
belong to the lower middle-income and low-income category, respectively). The two countries are 
alike in terms of fossil fuel consumption, with coal dominating the primary energy supply of both 
countries.  
India is undergoing a rapid social and economic transformation, in which strong economic growth, 
a burgeoning middle class and large-scale urbanisation underpin broader development.
90
 The






National CDM Authority, Government of India Constitution (2009), available at 




 K Ranganathan & MK Goyal 'Clean development mechanism–an opportunity to mitigate carbon footprint from the 




 Ibid. The authors point out that, at the end of 2013, India was the fifth-largest wind energy producer in the world. 
90
 IEA India special report (n79) at 53. 
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carbon sources in the energy mix.
91
 The countr ’s vision provides a continued, i portant place for




5.3.5.1 Energy profile 
China 'lies at the centre of the world's energy issues', being the world's largest energy consumer (23 
per cent of global energy consumption), largest energy producer (19 per cent of global energy 
supply) and largest oil importer and CO2 emitter in 2014.
93
 The Chinese government is aiming for a
transition to a low-carbon economy, as it faces the challenges of increasing constraints on resources 
and the environment.
94
 Figure 5.11 shows the total primary energy supply in China in 2014.
Figure 5.11 Total primary energy supply in China
95
Despite a much larger economy and population size, China's emissions profile is not very different 
to that of South Africa (refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2). In 2014, China produced 9 086.96 MtCO2. 






 International Energy Agency (IEA) China's engagement in global energy governance (2016) at 7, available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/PartnerCountrySeries_ChinasEngagementinGlobalEner
gyGovernance_Englishversion.pdf, accessed on 27 June 2016. 
94
 Id at 42. 
95
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Share of total primary energy supply in 2014 – China (2014), available at 
http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/CHINA4.pdf, accessed on 19 March 2017. 
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the two countries are fairly close in terms of per capita emissions. Both countries depend heavily on 
coal, although China's per capita emissions are lower, at 6.66 tCO2/capita, compared to South 
Africa's 8.10 tCO2/capita.  
The develop ent of China’s infrastructure in recent decades relied heavil  on energ -intensive 
industrial sectors, notably steel and cement. However, energy demand from these sectors is now 
past its peak, with the projected decline to  040 lowering China’s industrial coal use in its wake.
96
Al ost all the growth in China’s power generation co es fro  sources other than coal, of which 
the share in the power mix is expected to fall from about two-thirds today to less than 45 per cent in 
2040.
97
At the IEA Ministerial meeting in 2015, China became one of the first countries to activate 
Association status with the Agency.
98
 The IEA has since worked with China to assist the country in
its transition to a more sustainable energy economy and to provide a greater understanding of 
China’s energ  s ste . The IEA has established in-depth bilateral co-operation with China in a 
wide range of areas, including energy security, energy statistics, energy markets (coal, oil, gas, 
renewables, and energy efficiency), the IEA Technology Collaboration Programmes, and energy 
technology in cleaner coal, industry, buildings and transportation.
99
In 2016, China was the world's largest investor in renewable energy and employed more than 40 per 
cent of the sector's worldwide workforce.
100
 As a case in point, China is currently building the
world's largest solar farm in Qinghai province
101
 and the world's largest wind farm in Gansu
province.
102






 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) China, People's Republic of (Association country) (2017), 
available at https://www.iea.org/countries/non-membercountries/chinapeoplesrepublicof/, accessed on 22 March 
2017, this development builds on relations that date back to a Memorandum of Policy Understanding in the Field of 




Cit  Weekend ‘The cli ate pivot: how China beca e the world's new cli ate leader’ (2017), available at 
http://www.cityweekend.com.cn/beijing/article/climate-pivot-how-china-became-world%26rsquo%3Bs-new-climate-
leader, accessed on 20 March 2017. 
101
 T Phillips ‘China builds world's biggest solar far  in journe  to beco e green superpower’ ( 017), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/19/china-builds-worlds-biggest-solar-farm-in-journey-to-
become-green-superpower, accessed on 20 March 2017. The Longyangxia solar farm now has the capacity to produce 
850MW of power and is spearheading a 'global photovoltaic revolution'. 
102
The Jiuquan Wind Power Base is located on the edge of the Gobi Desert and has more than 7 000 turbines. 
According to JC  ernandez ‘It can power a s all nation. But this wind far  in China is  ostl  idle’ (2017), available 
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entails infrastructure and technology investments along the ancient Silk Road trade route through 
Asia, Europe and northern Africa. The other initiative is a South-South Cooperation, which is a UN 
framework encouraging joint projects among countries in the global south.
103
 Notwithstanding that
China remains the world's biggest emitter, it has also become an improbable leader in the battle 
against climate change. While President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the 
Paris Agreement is disheartening, it also presented an opportunity for other countries to step up and 
fill that vacuum - and China aims to do exactly that.
104
5.3.5.2 CDM profile 
Although the international community and investors from the Annex I countries have shown much 
interest in China as a potential CDM market with a favourable investment environment, China 
made a relatively slow start in establishing domestic institutions to host CDM projects, in 
comparison with India and several Latin American countries. After China ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2002, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, together with the 
National Scientific Technolog  Ministr , pro ulgated the ‘Interi  Measures for Operation and 
Management of Clean Development Mechanis  Projects in China’ in  004, which contains rules 
and procedures on CDM project activities in China.
105
 The National Development and Reform
Commission is China's DNA. 
Until the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, the Chinese government showed 'little 
enthusiasm' regarding the CDM.
106
 However, b   01 , the end of the K oto Protocol’s first
commitment period, China had built the most extensive CDM programme in the world, specifically 
at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/asia/china-gansu-wind-farm.html?_r=0, accessed on 20 March 2017, 
a nationwide economic slowdown has reduced demand for electricity to such an extent that 60 per cent of the power 
generated by the turbines is unused. 
103
 City Weekend (n99). 
104
 See L-A Steenkamp, A Smit, J Volschenk & P Naudé 'Trump's withdrawal from Paris Agreement could ultimately 
harm US economy' (2017), available at http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/356/163134.html, accessed on 20 
June 2017. 
105
 Y Xing & W Xi 'Chapter 5: CDM in China' in KL Koh (ed) Crucial issues in climate change and the Kyoto 
Protocol: Asia and the world (2010) at 129. 
106
 S Shin 'The domestic side of the clean development mechanism: the case of China' (2010) 19(2) Environmental 
Politics 237-254. The author ascribes this to several reasons: the Chinese government was not convinced that the 
Kyoto Protocol would come into force; the international rules for the CDM were still uncertain; and China had 
enough foreign direct investment from other sources, compared to other developing countries. 
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encouraging renewable energy and energy efficiency measures.
107
 In 2010, China became the
leading country based on registered CDM projects (751 projects, representing 36.4 per cent of the 
world total), the volume of annual expected CER units (205 MtCO2e, or 59.4 per cent of the total), 
and actual CER certificates issued (48 per cent).
108
Financing is a key issue in addressing climate and environmental challenges. As a signatory of the 
Kyoto Protocol, China is a major beneficiary of the CDM, with more than US$81 million in grants 
committed to support over 200 projects under the China Clean Development Mechanism Fund 
(CDMF).
109
5.3.6 South Africa 
5.3.6.1 Energy profile 
According to the IEA, South Africa accounted for more than one-third of the total energy-related 
CO2 emissions on the African continent.
110
 The same report states that emissions in South Africa
are projected to follow a 'peak, plateau and decline' trajectory, largely due to improved energy 
efficiency and a turn towards renewables and nuclear energy.
111
South Africa’s energ  and electricit  supplies are do inated b  coal. In 2014, almost 70 per cent of 
South Africa’s total pri ar  energ  suppl  was supplied b  coal. South Africa’s total pri ar  
energy supply is illustrated in Figure 5.12. 
107
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Technology Perspectives (2014) at 366, available at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/energy-technology-perspectives-2014.html, accessed on 
20 March 2017. 
108
 Ibid.  
109
 IEA China's engagement (n93) at 41. 
110
International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Climate and Change: World Energy Outlook (2015), available at 




Figure 5.12  Total primary energy supply in South Africa
112
South Africa's state-owned power utility, Eskom, generates approximately 95 per cent of the 
electricity used in South Africa and around 45 per cent of the electricity used in Africa.
113
 The
balance of the country's requirements is supplied by a few independent power producers and 
imports from neighbouring countries.  
Eskom has nominal installed power generation capacity of 44.2 GigaWatt (GW), although much of 
its actual power generation has been constrained in recent years due to the historical lack of 
investment in new plants, an increase in unplanned outages and a failure to maintain its existing 
fleet.
114
5.3.6.2 CDM profile 
Chapter 6 will provide more in-depth analytics regarding South Africa's CDM profile. Here it is 
highlighted that South Africa currently has 56 registered CDM projects (refer to Table 5.1). Figure 
5.13 indicates a peak in registrations during 2012, with no new projects having been registered after 
2014. This zenith can likely be ascribed to the fact that the window of opportunity for CDM project 
112
 International Energy Agency (IEA) Share of total primary energy supply in 2014 – South Africa (2014), available at 
https://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/SOUTHAFRIC4.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2017. 
113
ESKOM Company information overview (2017), available at 
http://www.eskom.co.za/OurCompany/CompanyInformation/Pages/Company_Information.aspx, accessed on 12 
March 2017. 
114
 J Wakeford 'The South African Energy Context' in J Glazewski & S Esterhuyse (eds) Hydraulic Fracturing in the 
Karoo: critical legal and environmental perspectives (2016). 
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implementation was drawing to a close when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
came to an end.
115
Figure 5.13  Total number of CDM projects in South Africa through 2016
116
South Africa's DNA was established with the Department of Energy (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
The CDM includes various project types, such as hydroelectricity, improved public transport and 
industrial energy efficiency. The geographical distribution across provinces in South Africa will be 
examined in Chapter 6.  
Having analysed the international status of the CDM, it is now necessary to extend our focus to the 
future in an attempt to gauge the global appetite for SDM projects. To that end, the last section of 
this chapter offers an overview of the ratification status of the Paris Agreement by the BRICS 
countries.  
5.4  RATIFICATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
5.4.1 Introduction 
It was stated earlier in Chapter 1 that the Paris Agreement
117
 entered into force on 4 November
2016. The Paris Agreement is founded on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) by countries 
115
 It was expected that the Kyoto Protocol would have terminated by 2012 and been replaced by a new protocol. 
116
 Source: Author's own, based on information from South Africa's registered projects documentation. 
117
United Nations (UN) Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification (2017), available at 
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themselves, in keeping with their specific situation. To ensure the success of the Paris Agreement, it 
is imperative that parties translate their NDCs into specific policies and measures.  
The CDM framework is available to parties, also as a domestic instrument, and can be used to 
achieve some of the key elements needed for NDC implementation. It could therefore be argued 
that the status of a country's ratification of the Paris Agreement could be indicative of its 
willingness to implement market-based instruments as part of its mitigation action. This section will 
accordingly examine the status quo of ratification of the Paris Agreement in each of the BRICS 
countries as a means of gauging the possible success of the SDM there. 
5.4.2 Brazil 
During September 2015, Brazil announced its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), 
with an emissions target of 1.3 GtCO2e by 2025 and 1.2 GtCO2e by 2030.
118
 This is equivalent to
37 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively, below 2005 emissions levels, including Land Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF).
119
 Additionally, the document lists sectoral measures to
achieve these targets. Brazil officially ratified the Paris Agreement on 21 September 2016, 
transforming the INDC into a NDC.
120
According to Climate Action Tracker's
121
 analysis, Brazil's emissions reduction targets are 'at the
least ambitious end of a fair contribution to global mitigation'.
122
 Their research shows that Brazil is
set to meet its 2025 target, but would need to enhance its efforts to reach the target emissions levels 
118
 Federative Republic of Brazil Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards achieving the objective of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2016) at 1-2, available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Brazil%20First/BRAZIL%20iNDC%20english%20FINAL.
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121
Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent scientific analysis produced by three research organisations, 
tracking climate action and global efforts towards the globally agreed aim of holding warming below 2°C, since 2009. 
The CAT consortium comprises Climate Analytics (a non-profit climate science and policy institute based in 
Germany), Ecofys (a leading international energy and climate consultancy which forms part of Navigant's global 
energy practice) and the NewClimate Institute (which supports research and implementation of action against climate 
change around the globe). For more information, see http://climateactiontracker.org/about.html, accessed on 20 
March 2017. 
122
Climate Action Tracker Brazil (2016), available at 
http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil/2016.html#Footnotes, accessed on 20 March 2017. 
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for 2030. This discrepancy (between the NDC and Paris Agreement goals) can be attributed to 
increasing energy demand and an implementation lag that affects climate policy in Brazil.
123
On a positive note, Brazil's NDC proposes an 'absolute target'
124
, which actually constrains
emissions.
125
 Moreover, the NDC sets out a clear plan to achieve this target, including the goal of
reaching a 45 per cent share of renewables in its primary energy mix by 2030.
126
5.4.3 Russia 
In March 2015, the Russian Federation submitted its INDC, proposing to reduce emissions by 
25 to 30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030.
127
 The Russian government officially signed the Paris
Agreement on 22 April 2016. However, at the time of writing (September 2017), the ratification of 
the agreement and thus the submission of the definitive NDC are still pending.
128
Russia's targets could be viewed as 'inadequate'.
129
 The significant fall in emissions in the early
1990s means that Russia can, in fact, increase its emissions until 2030 without missing its goal.
130
In addition, as indicated in its INDC, the Russian boreal forests have global significance for 
mitigating climate change, protecting water resources, preventing soil erosion and conserving 
biodiversity on the planet.
131
 The rational use, protection, maintenance and forest reproduction are
123
 Ibid. It is also noted that emissions in most sectors are expected to continue rising until at least 2030. 
124





 Brazil INDC (n118) at 3. The NDC suggests the following: 
 expanding the use of renewable energy sources other than hydropower in the total energy mix to between 28 per
cent and 33 per cent by 2030;
 expanding the use of non-fossil fuel energy sources domestically, increasing the share of renewables (other than
hydropower) in the power supply to at least 23 per cent by 2030, including by raising the share of wind, biomass
and solar; and
 achieving 10 per cent efficiency gains in the electricity sector by 2030.
127
Russian Federation Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (unofficial translation) (2016), available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Russia/1/Russian%20Submission%20INDC_en
g_rev1.doc, accessed on 29 March 2017. 
128
 United Nations Status of Ratification (n117). 
129
 Climate Action Tracker Russia (2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russianfederation.html, 




 Russia INDC (n127). 
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important elements of the Russian policy to reduce GHG emissions.
132
 Consequently, Russia's
calculation of its GHG emissions should be reduced by the factor attributable to Russia's boreal 
forests (thus, excluding LULUCF).
133
As the world's third largest emitter, and one of the most important fossil fuel producers, Russia has 
large mitigation potential and 'should play a major role in international climate policies'.
134
5.4.4 India 
On 2 October 2016 – symbolically coinciding with Mahatma Gandhi's birthday –  India ratified the 
Paris Agreement.
135
 Prior to this, on 1 October 2015, India had submitted its NDC, which aims to
lower the emissions intensity of GDP by 33 to 35 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030.
136
 With
greater emphasis on solar and wind energy sources, the document aspires to increase the share of 
non-fossil based power generation capacity to 40 per cent of installed electric power capacity by 
2030 (equivalent to 26 to 30 per cent of generation in 2030), and to create an additional 
(cumulative) carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 GtCO2e through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.
137
The targets set under India's NDC are challenging, considering that the country has approximately 
300 million people without access to electricity and is home to 30 per cent of the global poor.
138
 As





 Climate Action Tracker Russia (n129). 
134
 Ibid. The analysis reveals that, in 2014, Russia's emissions (excluding LULUCF) were 30 per cent lower than in the 
base year of 1990. Consequently, Russia would not need to implement any new policies to achieve its current target. 
135
 United Nations Status of Ratification (n117). India made the following declaration upon ratification of the Paris 
Agreement: 
'The Government of India declares its understanding that, as per its national laws; keeping in view its 
development agenda, particularly the eradication of poverty and provision of basic needs for all its citizens, 
coupled with its commitment to following the low carbon path to progress, and on the assumption of 
unencumbered availability of cleaner sources of energy and technologies and financial resources from around 
the world; and based on a fair and ambitious assessment of global commitment to combating climate change, it 
is ratifying the Paris Agreement'. 
136
 India Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: working towards climate justice (2016), available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/India%20First/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf, 




 Id at 5. 
139
 Climate Action Tracker India (2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india.html, accessed on 
22 March 2017. 
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This view is due, in part, to a lack of transparency in India's NDC in terms of describing the GHGs 
and the manner in which the country envisages it will achieve the non-fossil power capacity 
target.
140
At the G8+5 Summit
141
 in Germany in 2007, then Indian Prime Minister Singh pledged that India's
per capita emissions would never exceed those of the developed world.
142
 Given India's low per
capita emissions, meeting this pledge does not require any additional emissions reductions 
compared to the current policy projections up to 2030.
143
5.4.5 China 
During June 2015, China announced its INDC which endeavours to reduce the emissions intensity 
of GDP by 60 to 65 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030.
144
 China ratified the Paris Agreement on
3 September 2016, transforming the INDC into a NDC.
145
 The policies which are in place to reach




The Group of Eight + Five (G8+5) was an international group that consisted of the leaders of the heads of 
government from the G8 nations, plus the heads of government of the five leading emerging economies (Brazil, India, 
China, Mexico and South Africa). The Global Legislators Organisation (GLOBE International) held a meeting of the 
G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue in Washington, D.C., where a non-binding agreement was reached to cooperate on 
tackling global warming. See http://globelegislators.org/, accessed on 26 March 2017. 
142
 NP Rastogi 'Winds of change: India's emerging climate strategy' (2011) 46(2) The International Spectator 127-141. 
143
 Climate Action Tracker India (n139). The researchers acknowledge that India's pledges are in line with effort 
sharing approaches that focus on equal cumulative per capita emissions. They point out that approaches which focus 
on historical responsibility and capability would require more stringent emissions reductions. 
144
 China Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (unofficial 
translations) (2015) at 5, available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/China%20First/China%27s%20First%20NDC%20Submissi
on.pdf, accessed on 26 March 2017. 
145
 United Nations Status of Ratification (n117). China made the following declaration upon ratification of the Paris 
Agreement: 
'In accordance with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic 
of China and the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
the Government of the People's Republic of China decides that the Agreement applies to the Hong Kong 
special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China'. 
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of non-fossil energy carriers of the total primary energy supply to around 20 per cent by that time, 
and increasing its forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic metres, compared to 2005 levels.
146
As with Brazil and India's rating, China's estimated emission levels for 2025 and 2030, resulting 
from all aspects of the NDC, except the carbon intensity target, may not be consistent with limiting 
warming to below 2°C.
147
 However, the emissions resulting from the 2030 carbon intensity targets
– if viewed in isolation – are 'significantly higher and would be rated as inadequate'.
148
 This could
be ascribed to the view that the weak NDC carbon intensity targets would only be reached at the 
expense of important national policies and actions, including in relation to reduced air pollution.
149
On the upside, China is implementing noteworthy climate change policies and recent research 
suggests that coal consumption may well have peaked; the analysis seems to indicate that China 
will achieve both its 2020 pledge and its 2030 plans.
150
 China's peak in CO2 emissions will have a
major impact on global CO2 emissions in the period after 2030.
151
 The country's participation in
international climate change negotiations is gradually moving to centre stage.
152
 Whether or not its
commitments to cap its carbon emissions are sufficiently ambitious, other key players are likely to 
follow suit. 
146
 China INDC (n144) at 5. 
147
 Climate Action Tracker China (2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china.html, accessed on 






 Ibid. The researchers draw attention to the fact that China's total GHG emissions are likely to continue increasing 
until 2030, as the country has not yet implemented sufficient policies addressing non-CO2 GHG emissions. It is 





Z Zhang 'Are China's climate commitments in a post-Paris agreement sufficiently ambitious?' (2016) Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1-20 at 14 also opines that China 'has shown great flexibility in making 
several significant concessions' in enabling the Paris Agreement to come to fruition.  
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5.4.6 South Africa 
In September 2015, South Africa submitted its INDC, which included a target of reducing GHG 
emissions to between 398 and 615 MtCO2e (including LULUCF), over the period 2025 to 2030.
153
South Africa ratified the Paris Agreement on 1 November 2016.
154
 The country's NDC is consistent
with its pledge under the Copenhagen Accord, which proposes emissions reductions below 
business-as-usual (BAU) levels by 34 per cent in 2020 and 42 per cent in 2025. 
Interestingly, Bodansky et al mention that in the lead up to Paris, South Africa was among the many 
countries who had called for an obligation that parties should be required to achieve their NDCs.
155
They further remark that this view was 'strenuously opposed' by some other countries (including the 
US, China and India) who did not wish to be subject to legally binding obligations of result.
156
Now, of course, it is apparent that the Paris Agreement deferred to the latter countries in this 
respect.
157
Notwithstanding that the South African NDC assumes the finalisation of an ambitious, fair, 
effective and binding multilateral agreement under the UNFCCC at COP21,
158
 it also highlights the
fact that economic and social development and poverty eradication are South Africa's top 
priorities.
159
 However, as was the case with the other BRICS nations, South Africa's commitment
could be considered as 'inadequate' in reaching the 2°C pathway.
160
Thus, it is cautioned that care should be taken to ensure that the emissions reduction target is 
strengthened to reflect South Africa's responsibility to act based on its historical emissions, as well 
as the country's comparatively high emissions per capita.
161
153
South Africa Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (2015) at 6, available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/South%20Africa/1/South%20Africa.pdf, 
accessed on 29 March 2017. 
154
 United Nations Status of Ratification (n117). 
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Ibid. To ensure that parties act in good faith, Art 13(7)(b) of the Paris Agreement requires each party to provide the 
information necessary to track progress in the implementation and achievement of its NDC. 
158
 South Africa INDC (n153) at 3. 
159
 Id at 7. 
160
 Climate Action Tracker South Africa (2015), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southafrica.html, 




The next chapter will consider the measure of South Africa's success with CDM project 
participation in the years leading up to the Paris Agreement. 
5.5  CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the global contribution of the CDM, with a focus on the BRICS countries. A 
comparative analysis was conducted among geographical regions, which highlighted the CDM's 
project generation ability, contribution to the economy, investment capability and actual emission 
reductions. In all four indicators, Asia ranked first. This is not surprising, as the two largest CDM 
participants (China and India) are included in this regional cluster. For all four parameters, Africa 
fared somewhat better than the Middle East, but it was found that there is considerable scope for 
improvement. 
A more nuanced analysis of the BRICS countries revealed that South Africa's CDM per capita 
ranked lowest. Regrettably, the country also had (by a far margin) the highest CO2 emissions per 
capita. When applying a different metric, namely that of CDM as a percentage of GDP, South 
Africa was on par with Brazil. Encouragingly, South Africa ranked first in terms of the estimated 
CO2e reductions per CDM project.  
The energy context of each of the BRICS countries was also considered, as well as their CDM 
profile. It became apparent that further in-depth study of South Africa's CDM projects was required 
in order to truly evaluate its success – this will be done in the next chapter. 
Finally, this chapter examined the status of each BRICS country's ratification of the Paris 
Agreement and commitments made under their NDCs. This was performed as a means of gauging 
the possible appetite of participating in the SDM. With the notable exception of Russia (which also 
does not participate in the CDM), it was noted that all BRICS countries have ratified the Paris 
Agreement. As regards the commitment to reduce GHG emissions, however, it was found that all 
the countries fell short in their targets to limit warming to below 2°C. 
The next chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of all 56 registered CDM projects in South 
Africa, by assigning sustainable development criteria to the goals stated in each project design 




The status of the CDM in South Africa 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds on the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, wherein the global 
contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was considered. Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol lists the contribution to sustainable development in host countries as the primary objective 
of the CDM. It is awarded the same level of importance as assisting Annex I parties to meet their 
emissions reduction targets. 
This chapter aims to understand and assess the extent to which the CDM has, in fact, contributed to 
sustainable development in South Africa. First, an overview of the criteria currently used by 
Designated National Authorities (DNAs) to assess sustainable development contributions of CDM 
projects is provided. This chapter then presents the analysis undertaken for this study on the 
reporting of sustainable development impacts in registered Project Design Documents (PDDs). The 
resulting trends in reported impacts are subsequently presented by province and project type.  
The chapter concludes by considering a case study from South Africa, where the country's first 
CDM project has received mixed reviews. 
6.2  THE CDM'S CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that South Africa's National Environmental Management Act 
(NEMA) defines sustainable development as 'the integration of social, economic and environmental 
factors into planning, implementation and decision-marking so as to ensure that development serves 
present and future generations'. The UN, in its Brundtland Report, Our Common Future,
1
 describes
sustainable development as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. The report 'sparked an extensive body of 
literature on the concept of sustainable development as well as numerous attempts to measure 
whether specific actions contribute to sustainable development'.
2
1
 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (1987) at 8, available at http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf, accessed on 9 April 2017. 
2
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Benefits of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (2012) at 13, available at https://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/index.html, accessed on 21 March 2017. 
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Operationally, the concept of sustainable development encompasses three dimensions: the social, 
the economic and the environmental.3 Each pillar has a number of indicators, which elaborate on its 
contribution.
4
 There are ten indicators in total, as described in Table 6.1 below.5
3






Owing, partly, to the absence of an accepted international definition for sustainable development, 
the responsibility for determining whether a CDM project contributes to national sustainable 
development, as defined by the host country, currently resides with its DNA.
6
 The DNA therefore
states in its letter of approval of the CDM project that, in its judgement, the proposed CDM project 
will contribute to the country's sustainable development.
7






must ensure confirmation by the DNA of the host country that the project activity does, in fact, 
assist in achieving sustainable development in the host country.
8
On a macro level, some of the global benefits of the CDM can be listed as follows:
9
 Attracts clean energy investment: CDM projects attract foreign and domestic funding for
projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions and generation of clean energy; this can also foster
partnerships to promote low-carbon growth.
 Global environmental benefits: Companies and governments are encouraged to participate in
projects aimed at sequestering or reducing GHG emissions, which further reduce global
warming.
 Enhanced transfer and sale of clean and green technologies: The use of low-carbon
technologies and processes is promoted by the CDM. This, in turn, leads to transfer of
technologies between regions and to enhanced sale and purchase of high-end technologies.
 Reduced dependence on fossil fuels: CDM advances generation of energy from renewable (or
non-fossil) sources, thereby leading to conservation of already scarce fossil fuels. This leads to a
reduction in atmospheric emissions.
 Enhanced role of private sector in addressing the issue of climate change: The private sector is
encouraged to play an active role in mitigating climate change.
 Enhanced awareness and creation of a knowledge base: In addition to the creation of a
knowledge base for evaluating and monitoring GHG mitigation projects, the CDM also
contributes to creating awareness about the impact of GHGs on climate. It also promotes
educational activities and dissemination of information and research on this subject.
 Job creation: CDM results in new employment opportunities, including income generation.
 Economic benefits to local stakeholders: CDM projects lead to new industrial activities and
business opportunities, inflow of funds and technologies, growth of infrastructure, and enhanced
productivity.
The sustainable development indicators (as listed in Table 6.1) are required to measure how a CDM 
project contributes to sustainable development on a national level. Consequently, the next section 




R Spalding-Fecher, AN Achanta, P Erickson, E Haites, M Lazarus, N Pahuja, N Pandey, S Seres & R Tewari 
'Assessing the impact of the clean development mechanism' Report commissioned by the High Level Panel on the 
CDM Policy Dialogue (2012)  at 57, available at http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030_impact.pdf, 
accessed on 2 April 2017. 
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6.3  CONTRIBUTION OF CDM PROJECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.3.1 Distribution by region 
As at 30 September 2017, there are 56 registered CDM projects in South Africa, spread over all 
nine provinces of the country. Following on the preliminary analysis conducted in the previous 
chapter, this chapter has cross-referenced the information contained in the PDDs with the United 
Nations CDM registry.
10
 Only registered projects were included in the analysis (ie excluding
projects in the pipeline, for example, in the validation phase). Figure 6.1 demonstrates an uneven 
distribution across regions, with a small number of provinces hosting the majority of CDM 
projects.
11
Figure 6.1 Geographical distribution of CDM projects in South Africa (author's own) 
10
 All graphs are based on analyses conducted by the UNEP DTU Partnership (formerly UNEP Risø Centre) on 
regularly updated information. The partnership collaborates with the energy branch of the UN Environment's 
Economy Division. It is a leading international research and advisory institution on energy, climate and sustainable 
development. For more information, see http://www.unepdtu.org/, accessed on 30 September 2017. Refer to CDM 
Pipeline spreadsheet 'Regions', available at http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm. 
11
 Where a CDM project is jointly hosted by a number of provinces, this was counted as a project in each of the 
provinces. For example, project no. 7478 deals with energy efficiency households and is co-hosted by Gauteng, Free 
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Gauteng is the dominant region for CDM projects (at 18%), followed by the Western Cape, Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) (all at 14%). These four provinces account for over half of all 
CDM projects in South Africa. The lowest number of CDM projects is found in North West (8%) 
and Limpopo (2%).  
The uneven distribution may be indicative of the uneven spread of economic wealth in the various 
provinces, as Gauteng and the Western Cape are generally considered as the economic hubs of the 
country. Figure 6.2 depicts the average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth per province from 
2004 to 2014.  
Figure 6.2 Average GDP growth per province, 2004 - 2014
12
 
The Western Cape, Gauteng, KZN and the Eastern Cape outperform the other provinces, with the 
Western Cape and Gauteng on par. Compared to the rest of the country, where growth averaged 3.1 
per cent between 2004 and 2014, growth in the Western Cape averaged 3.7 per cent. Over the 
period 2004 to 2014, the Western Cape registered the joint fastest growth, along with Gauteng.
13
The distribution of economic growth correlates with the geographical distribution of CDM projects. 
Accordingly, it could be surmised that the wealth of a province serves as an indicator of their 
12
 Western Cape Government Provincial Treasury Provincial Economic Review and Outlook 2016 (2016) at 44, 
available at  
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/treasury/Documents/Research-and-




willingness to host CDM projects. It could also be indicative of the provincial authority's ability to 
attract foreign investors and create an enabling financial environment within which to operate. 
Furthermore, the provincial spread could be demonstrative of the enthusiasm of local government in 
driving CDM projects – in other words, a province's appetite to host CDM projects and to mitigate 
climate change. The following are examples of provincial initiatives to respond to climate change:
14
(i) KwaZulu-Natal
The Durban Adaptation Charter (DAC) commits local governments to local climate action in their 
jurisdiction that will assist their communities to respond to and cope with climate change risks.
15
 By
signing the DAC they commit, inter alia, to: 
 Providing key information of all local government development planning;
 Ensuring that adaptation strategies are aligned with mitigation strategies;
 Promoting the use of adaptation that recognises the needs of vulnerable communities and
ensuring sustainable local economic development;
 Prioritising the role of functioning ecosystems as core municipal green infrastructure; and
 Seeking innovative funding mechanisms.
To aid in the implementation of the DAC, a Central KwaZulu-Natal Climate Change Compact was 
formed to facilitate information sharing and collaboration on climate change adaptation projects. As 
the metropolitan, district and local municipalities of central KwaZulu-Natal are signatories to the 
DAC, they have committed themselves to take local climate action in their jurisdiction.  
(ii) City of Cape Town
The GreenCape
16
 initiative has undertaken the project management, on behalf of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), the Western Cape Government and the City of Cape Town, in the 
14
 These examples were derived from a monthly report which this author compiled in her capacity as South Africa's 
country manager for the Climate Scorecard citizens' initiative. See L-A Steenkamp 'South Africa: 
Regions/Provinces/States' (February 2017) in L Barber & R Israel (eds) Climate Scorecard Report #7: Sub-national 
Best Practices, available at http://climatescorecard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ClimateScorecardReport7.pdf, 
accessed on 30 July 2017. 
15
 See http://www.durbanadaptationcharter.org/contact, accessed on 10 December 2016. 
16
 GreenCape is a non-profit organisation, which was established in 2010 and aims to unlock the investment potential of 
green business, technologies and manufacturing. See http://www.green-cape.co.za/, accessed on 10 December 2016. 
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application for the designation of a Greentech Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Atlantis.
17
  The
ter  ‘ reentech’ refers to low-carbon and resource-efficient technologies. This SEZ has the 
potential to create 2 500 direct jobs, whilst also contributing to environmental efforts. Significant 
tax breaks are offered to companies operating within an SEZ. 
(iii) Gauteng
The Gauteng Climate Adaptation Forum is a platform for cities in the province to hone their skills 
and cross-pollinate ideas on climate change adaptation for sustainable development and the 
wellbeing of their residents.
18
 The focus is placed especially on the urban poor (such as residents of
informal settlements), who bear the brunt of climate change in developing countries. The forum also 
aims to promote coordination of climate change issues amongst institutions. 
The forum provides a platform for sharing experiences, practical approaches and frameworks 
relating to climate change adaptation. Membership includes representatives from civil society, 
government, parastatals, academia and business. 
6.3.2 Distribution by type 
There are 24 different CDM project types or technologies (refer to Table 6.2 on the next page), of 
which 13 are employed in South Africa.
19 
17
 Atlantis is a town in the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality and is located in the Western Cape. 
18
 See http://www.adaptationnetwork.org.za/2016/02/gauteng-provincial-climate-change-forum/, accessed on 10 
December 2016. 
19
 UNFCCC Benefits (n2) at 78. 
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Table 6.2 Definitions of project types applicable for the projects analysed in this study 
Project type Definition 
Afforestation and reforestation According to land use, land-use change and forestry rules 
Agriculture Irrigation, alternative fertilisers and rice crop methane avoidance 
Methane avoidance Biogas from manure, waste water, industrial solid waste and palm oil solid waste, 
or methane avoidance by composting or aerobic treatment 
Biomass energy New plant using biomass or existing ones changing from fossil fuels to biomass; 
also biofuels 
Cement Projects where lime in the cement is replaced by other materials, or neutralisation 
with lime is avoided 
CO2 capture Recovered CO2 from tail gas substituting fossil fuels for production of CO2 
Coal bed/mine methane CH4 is collected from coal mines or coal beds, including ventilation air methane 
Energy distribution Reduction in losses in transmission/distribution of electricity/district heat; 
country interconnection 
Energy efficiency: households Energy efficiency improvements in domestic houses and appliances 
Energy efficiency: industry End-use energy efficiency improvements in industry 
Energy efficiency: own generation Waste heat or waste gas used for electricity production in industry 
Energy efficiency: service Energy efficiency improvements in buildings and appliances in public and private 
service 
Energy efficiency: supply side More efficient power plants producing electricity and district heat, coal field fire 
extinguishing 
Fossil fuel switch Switch from one fossil fuel to another fossil fuel (including new natural gas 
power plants) 
Fugitive Recovery instead of flaring of CH4 from oil wells, gas pipeline leaks, charcoal 
production and fires in coal piles 
Geothermal Geothermal energy 
HFCs HFC-23 destruction 
Hydro New hydro power plants 
Landfill gas Collection of landfill gas, composting of municipal solid waste, or incinerating of 
the waste instead of land filling 
N2O Reduction of N2O from production of nitric acid, adipic acid and caprolactam 
PFCs and SF6 Reduction of emissions of PFCs and SF6 
Solar Solar photovoltaic, solar water heating and solar cooking 
Tidal Tidal power 
Transport More efficient transport 
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Figure 6.3 illustrates the spread of the various project types in South Africa. 
Figure 6.3 Distribution of CDM projects by type (author's own) 
The most dominant of all technologies – by a clear margin – is wind technology at 18%, followed 
by energy efficiency own generation at 14%. These two project types constitute approximately one-
third of the total CDM projects in South Africa, with the lowest number of CDM projects being in 
energy efficiency services and fugitive (both at 2%).  
Given that there are 13 different project technologies, with only two project types constituting the 
 ajorit  of all projects, it would appear that South Africa’s project t pe distribution is also uneven. 
Surprisingly, despite the abundance of sunshine in South Africa (refer to Figure 6.4), solar energy 
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Figure 6.4 Direct Normal Solar Irradiation (DNI) map of South Africa
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6.3.3 Evaluating South Africa's CDM projects 
One method of assessing the contribution of CDM projects to sustainable development in a region 
is the systematic examination of the supporting PDDs.
21
 The PDDs of all 56 registered CDM
projects in South Africa were therefore scrutinised in order to measure their contribution to 
sustainable development. The sustainable development claims in the PDDs of these projects were 
tabulated using the indicators in Table 6.1. It should be cautioned that the indicators are based on 
information in the PDDs, which reflects the expected contributions at the time the project is being 
validated. The actual contributions may differ.
22
20
 Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies 'New solar resource maps for South Africa' (2014), available at 
http://www.crses.sun.ac.za/research-publications-resources, accessed on 3 April 2017. 
21
 See, for example, S Sirohi 'CDM: Is it a "win-win" strategy for rural poverty alleviation in India?' (2007) 84(1) 
Climatic Change 91-110; C Sutter & JC Parreno 'Does the current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deliver its 
sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects' (2007) 84(1) Climatic Change 75-
90; and S Pillay 'The impact of Clean Development Mechanism projects on sustainable development in South Africa' 
(2015) 14(6) International Business & Economics Research Journal 777-790. 
22
 The comparison of expected versus actual outcomes could be the subject matter of future research, wherein the 
sustainable development claims could be independently verified (also see next footnote). 
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The aim of this review is to provide high-level insight in terms of the sustainable development 
benefits at the project level.
23
 The analysis was conducted in an Excel spreadsheet (contained in
Annexure C of this thesis), with the findings illustrated in Figure 6.5 below. 
Figure 6.5 Percentage of South African PDDs mentioning various indicators (author's own) 
When referring to the economic sustainable development criteria in Figure 6.5, it is evident that 
nearly all (91%) of CDM projects addressed employment generation and poverty alleviation, 34% 
addressed technology transfer and only 4% addressed improvement to infrastructure. The 
technology benefits were primarily as a result of installation or creation of new machines or 
equipment, which would assist in the reduction of GHGs.  
As regards environmental criteria, the majority of projects (79%) focus on the promotion of reliable 
and renewable energy. This was followed by the reduction of pollution (57%), with the preservation 
of natural resources coming in last (21%). 
23
 It is acknowledged that a possible limitation on this type of analysis is that some information might have been 
omitted from the PDD, or that some views in the PDD may be over- or understated. A future research opportunity 
could be to perform a comprehensive review in later stages of the project life cycle to evaluate whether PDD targets 
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Stimulation of the local economy including job 
creation and poverty alleviation 
Development and diffusion of technology 
Improvement to infrastructure 
Reduction of pollution 
Promotion of reliable and renewable energy 
Preservation of natural resources 
Improvement of health and safety 
Engagement of local population 
Promotion of education 
Empowerment of women, care of children and the 
frail 
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Social criteria seem to be lowest on the priority list: the improvement of health and safety claimed 
the top position (at 34%), followed by the engagement of the local population (30%), empowerment 
of women, care of children and the frail (5%), and the promotion of education (4%). 
The chapter concludes with a brief account of the country's first registered CDM project and why it 
is considered both a success and a failure. 
6.4  THE KUYASA PROJECT – AN AMBIVALENT TALE 
South Africa's first registered CDM project is the Kuyasa Low-income Housing Energy Upgrade 
project, located in Khayelitsha (an impoverished township in Cape Town).
24
 Developed by the Non-
governmental Organisation (NGO) SouthSouthNorth (SSN), the project was registered by the CDM 
Executive Board on 27 August 2005,
25
 with the City of Cape Town as the project owner.
26
 Kuyasa
is also the world's first CDM project to be validated against the Gold Standard (GS).
27
The project presented an opportunity to roll out energy efficient technologies as part of the CDM 
carbon credits facility.
28
 The premise was to retrofit over 2 300 low-income houses with solar water
24
 For more information, see http://kuyasacdm.co.za/, accessed on 21 July 2017. 
25
 Project Design Document 0079, available at https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1121165382.34/view, 
accessed on 21 July 2017. 
26
 The CDM project is the result of a partnership between the City of Cape Town, the Department of Environmental 
Affairs (formerly the national Department of Water and Environmental Affairs), the Provincial Department of 
Housing and Local Government, the South African Export Development Fund and the community of Kuyasa. 
27
 See Chapter 2 for a comparison of the GS and other prominent carbon offset standards. 
28
 According to S Rosenberg 'A “pro pt start” for the CDM? Lessons fro  earl  experiences fro  South Africa' ( 007) 
at 10, available at  
http://www.basic-project.net/data/final/Paper11SouthAfrica%20CDM%20Experiences%20and%20Lessons2.pdf, 
accessed on 21 July 2017,  Kuyasa was in many respects a seminal project, as it:  
 Was the first African CDM project to be registered by the UNFCCC CDM Executive Board (EB);
 Established the principle of suppressed demand for energy services;
 Contributed to the debate resulting in Montreal guidance on the Programmatic CDM;
 Was the first African CDM project to be registered by the UNFCCC CDM EB;
 Was the first CDM project to be validated against the GS;
 Established the potential for public sector engagement in the CDM;
 Highlighted the barriers to renewable energy and energy efficiency project implementation; and
 Reviewed national policy, especially as regards the provision of low-income housing.
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geysers, insulated ceilings and compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs.
29
 By 2003, ten demonstration
installations were completed.
30
 However, implementation and funding model problems resulted in
the project coming to a standstill for over two years.
31
 By 2014, the Kuyasa project had installed
solar water heaters, ceilings and CFLs on 2 100 houses and created 85 full time jobs.
32
 The project
saves households money that would have been spent on coal-fired electricity and supplementary 
paraffin, improves indoor air quality and reduces GHG emissions by approximately 2.85 tons per 
low-income house per year.
33
Not only was this South Africa's pilot CDM project, Kuyasa was also unique in obtaining the active 
support of the local community.
34
 However, Kuyasa may be regarded as both an 'extraordinary
success and a dismal failure'.
35
 The carbon value of the project was pre-sold to the UK government
to offset emissions of the G8+5 summit in 2008,
36
 but failed to actually deliver.
As at 28 February 2014, no Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) certificates had been issued. 
This can mostly be ascribed to the transaction costs involved in validating and issuing CDM and GS 
credits as well as the small nature of the project.
37
 Thereafter, Kuyasa decided to switch from the
CDM and GS to the Credible Carbon registry and its voluntary carbon market standard, with the 
switch backdated to 1 December 2010.
38
 Table 6.3 presents a comparative analysis of the cost and
29
 M Goldman 'Kuyasa CDM Project: Renewable Energy Efficient Technology for the Poor' GIM Case Study No. B070 
(2010), at 3 available at http://www.growinginclusivemarkets.org/media/cases/SouthAfrica_Kuyasa_2010.pdf, 






 Credible Carbon 'Kuyasa' (n.d.), available at https://www.crediblecarbon.com/offset-projects/kuyasa/, accessed on 21 
July 2017. 
33
 Goldman (n29) at 2. 
34
 VI Grover Global Warming and Climate Change: Ten Years after Kyoto and Still Counting (2016) at 436. 
35
 SouthSouthNorth (SSN) 'Comment on Draft Regulations: Carbon Offsets' (2016) at 1, available at 
http://www.southsouthnorth.org/wp-content/uploads/SSN-Comments-on-Draft-Policy.pdf, accessed on 21 July 2017. 
36
 The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) states that the carbon credits would be used to 
offset the emissions associated with air travel, local transport, hotel accommodation and meeting venues. See 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070101092801/http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/car
boncost/carbon-offsetting/presidency.htm, accessed on 21 July 2017. 
37
 SSN (n35) at 3. 
38
 Credible Carbon (n32). The first Kuyasa audit revealed that the project had delivered 23 683 tCO2 reduction for the 
period 1 December 2010 to 30 September 2014. The verification report is available at 
https://www.crediblecarbon.com/resources/docs/Kuyasa/Kuyasa_verification_report_2010-12-1_to_2014-09-
30_TGH_2014_12_03.pdf, accessed on 21 July 2017. 
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time involved of the CDM GS versus Credible Carbon registry, using the Kuyasa project as 
illustration.
39
The Kuyasa project addresses environmental, social and economic aspects. It delivers energy 
efficient and cost savings systems to the local community while also providing skills training, 
creating environmental awareness and job opportunities.
40
The lesson to be learnt from the Kuyasa experience is that in order for small scale initiatives to be 
successful, an 'appropriate, affordable and effective' validation and verification mechanism is 
required.
41
 Although the South African government's funding support is commendable, it does not
present a sustainable financial model.
42
 Unless development finance is sourced from elsewhere, the
CDM (and even the GS) will prove too high a hurdle to traverse for local small scale projects.
43
39
 SSN (n35) at 4. 
40
 R Donaldson, D Du Plessis, M Spocter & R Massey 'The South African area-based urban renewal programme: 
experiences from Cape Town' (2013) 28 (4) Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 629-638 at 634. 
41
 Id at 1. 
42
 Grover (n34) at 438. 
43
 In this regard H Winkler & D van Es 'Energy efficiency and the CDM in South Africa: constraints and opportunities' 
(2007) 18(1) Journal of Energy in Southern Africa 29-38 at 36 remark that it is not only for Government to take 
action - it is also in the interest of the private sector. 
Table 6.3 Comparative analysis of the cost and time for validating the Kuyasa CDM project 
CDM GS Credible Carbon 
Time to validate 2 years 1 month 
Cost to validate Approximately R3m Nil 
Time to verify > 6 years and ongoing < 3 months 
Cost to verify Approximately R2m and counting R30 000 (paid by Credible Carbon 
at their own risk and recovered 
from first CER sales) 
Time to first cash return > 6 years since completion and
still waiting
< 1 years 
Money spent on foreign 
based consultants 
€140 000 Nil 
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6.5  CONCLUSION 
The empirical analysis demonstrates that – on paper, at least – CDM projects do have a positive 
impact on the various facets of sustainable development in South Africa. The indicators mentioned 
most frequently were job creation and poverty alleviation, the promotion of reliable and renewable 
energy and the reduction of pollution. Interestingly, these findings corroborate an earlier global 
study undertaken by the UN.
44
 The focus on job creation is not surprising, especially in light of
South Africa's socio-economic challenges. Indeed, South Africa's NDC explains that the country
45
' ... faces significant rigidity in its economy and any policy-driven transition to a low carbon and climate 
resilient society must take into account and emphasise its overriding priority to address poverty and 
inequalit ’. 
 A more cynical view is that employment opportunities are the consequence of investments in 
GHG-reducing technologies and that any health benefits only arise as a by-product of CO2e 
reductions.
46
 One way of achieving a greater contribution to sustainable development in South
Africa would be for the CDM policy to increase its focus on promoting sustainable development 
criteria as a whole, and not exclusively on GHG reductions.
47
Two possible policies could be considered to achieve this end. The first is the implementation of a 
points system, which allocates points based on development aspects of CDM projects. All projects 
could be required to attain a minimum level of points in order for sustainable development benefits 
to be accepted.
48
 The second is a CER value adjustment to be made in the case where CDM projects
favour high CERs, but low sustainable development or distributional benefits.
49
 The first policy
would require the buy-in of all stakeholders, as the weighting of points must be regarded as fair and 
agreeable to them.
50
 The second policy would have to be carefully crafted, so as not to lead to a
market distortion of CERs by artificially altering their value.
51
44
 UNFCCC (n2). 
45
 South Africa Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (2016) at 6, available at 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/South%20Africa%20First/South%20Africa.pdf, accessed on 
20 December 2016. 
46






 Ibid. The author explains that this would compel project designers to focus on a more equivalent distribution of 






The UNFCCC has identified 24 different CDM project types or technologies (refer para 6.3.2), of 
which 13 are employed in South Africa. This chapter illustrated that most CDM projects in South 
Africa are energy related. It could therefore be surmised that existing CDM (and future SDM 
projects) play a vital role in contributing to South Africa's sustainable energy future. The Kuyasa 
project revealed that small scale initiatives required an appropriate, affordable and effective 
verification mechanism, together with a sustainable financial model.  
In light of the status of the CDM globally (as outlined in Chapter 5) and in South Africa (this 
chapter), the next chapter will seek to identify barriers preventing the expansion of the CDM. In 
particular, Chapter 7 will examine the problems encountered with the concepts of additionality, 
technology transfer, double counting and the plummeting of the carbon market in 2008/2009. 
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Chapter 7 
Barriers preventing the expansion of the CDM – and suggestions 
to overcome them 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters considered the development of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
the policy considerations underpinning its use, as well as the success of the CDM in the global 
arena and its contribution to sustainable development in South Africa. Notwithstanding that the 
CDM has achieved some level of success, it became apparent that certain impediments hinder a 
more extensive roll-out of CDM projects. This chapter seeks to identify the barriers which prevent 
the expansion of the CDM in order to apply these lessons to the Sustainable Development 
Mechanism (SDM). 
Due to the low demand for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and the resulting generally low 
carbon price (see paragraph 7.2.1 below), many CDM projects have ceased to issue CERs.
1
 The
decline in CDM activity has continued to affect the CDM's third-party validators and verifiers, 
namely the Designated Operational Entities (DOEs).
2
 Furthermore, the CDM faces uncertainty
regarding whether and how it could be used beyond 2020. 
According to a recent annual report of the CDM Executive Board (EB), in 2016 the CDM continued 
to face low demand for CERs, compared to that in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (which ended in 2012).
3
 This is reflected in continuing low levels of project registration




 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Annual report of the Executive Board of the 
clean development mechanism to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (2016) at 5, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cmp12/eng/04.pdf, accessed on 24 April 2017. 
The report states that approximately 42 per cent of the projects that had CERs issued up to 31 December 2012 have 
not had any further CERs issued. 
2







It is not all bad news, though. To date, the CDM has catalysed the registration of more than 8 000 
projects and Programme of Activities in 111 countries and has issued more than 1.7 billion CERs.
5
The CDM has therefore demonstrated its potential as a tool for mobilising finance for climate action 
and sustainable development, albeit to a limited extent for developing countries. Until such time as 
the CDM is formally terminated, it continues to be used both by countries to meet their 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and by non-party stakeholders for other purposes.
6
Furthermore, the World Bank has continued to use the CDM for its results-based finance 
programmes.
7
This chapter is devoted to an analysis of barriers preventing the expansion of the CDM, as well as 
proposals for overcoming them. The next section examines these inhibiting factors, which include a 
fluctuating carbon market, problems with additionality and accounting, issues associated with 
technology transfer, policy and legislative hurdles in host countries, as well as high transaction 
costs.  
The focus then shifts to the South African experience, highlighting problems experienced by local 
CDM project developers. Thereafter, the chapter explores three proposals which are aimed at 
boosting the CDM uptake during the transition period and beyond 2020. Finally, the chapter 
considers a case study from Panama, which serves as a cautionary tale where insurmountable 
barriers (in the form of socio-economic factors) caused the demise of a CDM project. 
7.2 INHIBITING FACTORS 
7.2.1 Carbon market 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the Kyoto Protocol provides for three flexible mechanisms, ie 
the Joint Implementation (JI), CDM and International Emissions Trading (IET), which enable 
developed countries to acquire Greenhouse Gas (GHG)-reducing credits. It will also be recalled that 
one CER is equal to one metric ton of CO2e. For trading purposes, CERs can be sold privately or in 
the international market at the prevailing carbon market price. Climate exchanges – similar to 
traditional stock exchanges – have been established to provide a platform through which CERs can 
5




 Ibid. The report mentions the Carbon Initiative for Development and the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and 




 The price volatility of CERs is an inevitable concomitant of such an exchange, and is
understandably off-putting for risk-averse investors and CDM project developers. The following 
viewpoint summarises the inherent risk associated with a derivative instrument
9
 (such as the
CER):
10
'Ultimately, unlike soft and hard tangible commodities such as corn or gold, the carbon credits exist purely on 
the basis of ‘authorisation’ on the part of national govern ents. If ‘deauthorised’, the entire credit  arket – 
and the justification of hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of carbon trades – becomes pure fiction.' 
Figure 7.1 below illustrates the fluctuating price of CERs, ranging fro  € 0/tCO2 at its peak in 
 007/ 008, before plu  eting to €10/tCO2 in 2008/2009 and subsequently bottoming out to less 
than €5/tCO2 in mid-2013.
11
  The sharp and persistent price decline has sparked intense debates,
both in academia and among policymakers, about the decisive CER price drivers.
12
 Two extreme
events, namely the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2011 European debt crisis, have caused 
structural breakpoints in the carbon price.
13
8
 According to GM Zatzman Sustainable Energy Pricing: Nature, Sustainable Engineering, and the Science of Energy 
Pricing (2012) at 360, examples include the Chicago Climate Exchange, European Climate Exchange and the 
NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe. 
9
 A derivative is a financial instrument with a price that is dependent upon (or derived from) one or more underlying 
assets. According to Investopedia, available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp, accessed on 12 
June 2017, the derivative itself is a contract between two or more parties, with its value determined by fluctuations in 
the underlying asset. The most common underlying assets include commodities, shares, bonds and market indexes. 
Derivatives can be used for hedging against a particular risk (for example exchange rate fluctuations) or for 
speculation in betting on the future price of an asset. 
10
 P Bond, K Sharife, F Allen, B Amisi, K Brunner, R Castel-Branco, D Dorsey, G Gambirazzio, T Hathaway & A Nel 
The CDM cannot deliver the money to Africa (2012) at 13, available at http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/121221_EJOLT_2_Low.pdf, accessed 12 May 2017. 
11
 N Koch, S Fuss, G Grosjean & O Edenhofer 'Causes of the EU ETS price drop: Recession, CDM, renewable policies 




 B Zhu, J Chevallier, S Ma & Y Wei 'Examining the structural changes of European carbon futures price 2005–2012' 
(2015) 22(5) Applied Economics Letters 335-342 at 336. O Rumble, A Gilder & M Parker 'Chapter 20: Carbon 
Pricing in South Africa' in T Humby, L Kotzé, O Rumble & A Gilder (eds) Climate Change Law & Governance in 
South Africa (Original Service 2016) at 20-18 describe yet another possible factor, namely the dwindling of political 
will among developed countries to comply with their emissions reduction obligations. This, coupled with the 
burgeoning success of the CDM, inverted the supply and demand of carbon credits, thus causing the collapse in 
prices. 
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Figure 7.1 Price volatility of CERs from 2008 - 2017
14
 
The economic value of CDM projects is dependent upon a stream of future benefits which are, in 
turn, subject to a variety of risks.
15
 As a consequence, CDM investors are motivated by
opportunities to meet emission reduction goals at a lower cost.
16
 Similarly, host countries often
promote policies that attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as these investments will inject 
capital and promote the transfer of knowledge and technology transfer.
17
The latest report by the World Bank Group on the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing states that 
international demand for CERs is 'almost exhausted'.
18
 This may be attributable to the EU (which
has historically been the biggest source of demand) having likely already fulfilled its demand for 
international credits.
19
 Furthermore, there is no other significant source of demand for CERs at
present.
20
To this end, the CDM Executive Board (EB) is investigating ways to broaden demand for CERs and 
participation in the CDM.
21
 In addition, the first COP21 Decision encourages parties to promote the
14
 See https://www.quandl.com/data/CHRIS/ICE_CER1-ECX-CER-Emission-Futures-Continuous-Contract-1-CER1-
Front-Month?utm_medium=graph&utm_source=quandl, accessed on 10 May 2017. 
15
 A Dinar, DF Larson & SM Rahman The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): An Early History of Unanticipated 












 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Concept note - Options for using the clean 
development mechanism as a tool for other uses (2016), available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/2/M/1/2M1EZ9RTQCY58NX6AIO73SWBKFUVPJ/eb88_propan01.pdf?t=RzF8b3
Bic2thfDAhMNXoIX8khHpkDRikQlcz, accessed on 2 May 2017. 
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voluntary cancellation of Kyoto credits.
22
 An online platform for voluntary CER cancellations
23
 was
subsequently launched in September 2015 in an effort to increase demand for credits.
24
 The
platform allows direct sales from project owners of smaller quantities of certificates.
25
The World Bank Group report mentions a number of initiatives
26
 to help stimulate the demand for
emission units, but cautions that 'it is unlikely that these initiatives will trigger significant demand 
pre- 0 0’.
27
 Added to this are the credits yet to be issued, which will add to this surplus.
28
 The
outlook beyond 2020 is uncertain, as the role of the CDM alongside the SDM has not yet been 
defined.
29
Similar to the sluggish world economy, the international carbon market is constrained by various 
factors, including barriers related to capacity and investment finance in many developing countries. 
In addition, the limited market-based cooperation to date can be ascribed to several other hurdles:
30
 Market uncertainty: this barrier is intensified if there is uncertainty on the alignment of domestic
22
 COP Decision 1/CP.21 'Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties', available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2, accessed on 2 May 2017.  Para 106 states -  
   'Encourages Parties to promote the voluntary cancellation by Party and non-Party stakeholders, without double 
counting, of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including certified emission reductions that are valid for the 
second commitment period'. 
23
 Per the online platform, 'voluntary cancellation' is the process by which CERs are taken out of circulation, preventing 
any further use. It is similar to destroying them or marking them so they can no longer be used. The website is 
available at https://offset.climateneutralnow.org/, accessed on 2 May 2017. 
24
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Annual report of the Executive Board of the 
clean development mechanism to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (2015) at para 25, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cmp11/eng/05.pdf, accessed on 29 April 
2017. The platform will be promoted by the secretariat in the context of its Carbon Neutral Now initiative, whereby 
companies, organisations, events and individuals are encouraged to measure their emissions, reduce what they can 
and offset the rest using CERs.  
25
 World Bank Group (n18) at 36 notes that, as at 31 August 2016, the platform has resulted in voluntary cancellations 
of over 40 000 CERs, which represents less than one per cent of the total 13.5 million CERs cancelled since voluntary 
cancellation of CERs was made possible. 
26
 Id at 36-37. An example includes the International Civil Aviation Organisations' net Carbon Offsetting and Reduction 
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). Airlines might be allowed to buy emission units before the start of the 
CORSIA and bank them for later compliance. 
27






 World Bank Group (n18) at 88-96. 
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Measurement and Evaluation (MRV) arrangements with international standards. It will also be 
compounded if there is uncertainty at the international level over the standards or norms 
governing international carbon market access. 
 Loss of environmental integrity: the environmental integrity of a coordinated system can be
compromised by weak integrity in one jurisdiction, stemming from poor standards in MRV and
oversight. Related to this are the issues of additionality and double counting, which are
examined in subsequent paragraphs.
 Potential loss of co-benefits: Co-benefits include health benefits (due to reduced local air
pollutants), low-carbon innovation and energy security. An international market drives cost
savings because the emission reductions take place where abatement is cheaper. However, this
can also lead to the loss of domestic co-benefits.
 Loss of regulatory control: In addition to the potential loss of control over domestic market
design and regulation, policymakers are often concerned about the reduced ability to affect the
domestic carbon price, given the wider economic implications.
 Undesirable distributional implications: the workings of the international market will cause the
carbon price to rise in jurisdictions with a lower price.
The current low prices for CERs impact CDM project activities via various mechanisms. On the one 
hand, projects already implemented may no longer be able to cover their operational costs.
31
Furthermore, project owners may find themselves unable to pay transaction costs for registration, 
verification and issuance, as well for the financing of CDM-specific monitoring activities.
32
 In the
absence of any prospect for a price increase in the short term, chances are good that many projects 
may go unimplemented, be shut down, or modified in such a way that they no longer comply with 
CDM standards.
33
At any rate, the transition to a low-carbon future requires 'predictable, sufficiently high, and 
politically credible carbon prices', failing which private entities will defer low-carbon investments.
34
31
 C Warnecke, T Day & N Klein Analyzing the status quo of CDM projects: Status and Prospects. report prepared by 
Ecofys/NewClimate Institute by order of German Federal Ministry for the Environment (2015) at 2, available at 







 FG Tiche, SE Weishaar & O Couwenberg 'Carbon Market Stabilisation Measures: Implications for Linking' (2016) at 
4 MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research CEEPR WP 2016-011. The authors explain that 
without these prerequisites, a lock-in of emissions-intensive investments could occur, thereby exacerbating the costs 
of transitioning to a low-carbon future. 
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Some analysts estimate that, in order to reach the Paris Agree ent’s goal of keeping global 
war ing well below  °C, the carbon price should be above €40/tCO2.
35
 There are also calls on
governments at a global level to make businesses pay a higher price for the pollution they generate, 
in an attempt to force companies to reduce their carbon emissions.
36
7.2.2 Additionality and accounting 
Currently, the Kyoto Protocol determines that emission reductions from CDM projects shall be 
'additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified projects’ activities'.
37
 The
Marrakesh Accords elaborates on this requirement by explaining that
38
 -
'A CDM project activity is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced 
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity'. 
In order to estimate additionality, a baseline must be established which represents business-as-usual 
(BAU) emissions trends. In other words, the counter-factual situation has to be projected, ie as if the 
project did not occur.
39
 The additional emissions reduction is calculated by comparing the CDM
project emissions with that of a constructed baseline scenario. Phrased differently, the baseline 
becomes the point of reference from which to judge whether an activity is additional.  
The additionality requirement is subject to different interpretations and is one of the 'most difficult 
and subjective issues' facing the CDM.
40
 The demonstration of additionality has been debated in
international climate negotiations and in the literature since the establishment of the CDM.
41
 This is
due to the fundamental problem that the question of whether a project would also have been 
implemented without the CDM is hypothetical, ie it can never be proved with absolute certainty.
42
35
 A Moone  'BlackRock calls for higher carbon price to tackle cli ate change’ ( 016), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/bde6859a-9ac2-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae, accessed on 2 May 2017. 
36
 Ibid. The author mentions that BlackRock (the world's largest fund house) is struggling to understand the climate 
change risks it faces when making investment decisions as the prices that companies have to pay for emitting carbon 
are inconsistent. 
37
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 12(5)(c). 
38
 Para 43 of the Marrakesh Accords, available at http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf, accessed on 10 
August 2016. 
39
 Paras 44 to 48 of the Marrakesh Accords expand on this requirement.  
40
 RM Shrestha & GR Timilsina 'The additionality criterion for identifying clean development mechanism projects 
under the Kyoto Protocol' (2002) 30(1) Energy Policy 73-79 at 73. 
41
 L Schneider 'Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned' (2009) 9(3) 




From a purely economic perspective, GHG mitigation projects may be classified into two 
categories. The first is referred to as 'economically no-regret' projects, as they are economically 
feasible, without even considering climate change benefits.
43
 The second category is referred to as
'economically regret' projects, as these would only be feasible if the total benefit of the project, 
inclusive of climate change benefits, exceeds the total project cost.
44
Failure to follow the additionality requirement could result in a project with GHG mitigation 
potential that would have been implemented regardless, being allowed to register as an eligible 
CDM project. This, in turn, would result in 'free-riding and leakage'.
45
 If CERs are created that
represent emission reductions that would have happened regardless, the emission targets will be 
under ined b  ‘fake’ reductions.
46
Economically no-regret projects run the risk of encouraging 'moral hazards', as there is an incentive 
for both host and investing parties to include such projects under the CDM. This is due to the fact 
that both parties would obtain extra benefits under the CDM in comparison with what they could 
get from the project activities in the absence of the CDM.
47
 On the other hand, the exclusion of
economically no-regret projects could raise a question as to the validity of the additionality criterion 
in countries where economic attractiveness of a project alone would not ensure a project's 
implementation.
48
One of the opposing arguments put forward by developing countries is that introducing an 
additionality check would further lower the competitiveness of the CDM with regard to JI and 
43
 Id at 74. Examples include energy sector demand-side efficiency improvement projects that are cost-effective, even 
without considering the GHG mitigation benefits. 
44
 Ibid. Examples include most clean coal and renewable energy technologies. 
45
 Ibid. The authors explain that free-riding can occur in several ways: A host country party which was considering 
implementing projects with GHG mitigation potential for purposes other than GHG mitigation would now have an 
incentive to strategically delay their implementation in order to get their projects included into the CDM. Private 
investors might have a tendency to include already profitable GHG mitigation projects into the CDM for CER 
benefits. 
46
 S Greiner & A Michaelowa 'Defining investment additionality for CDM projects—practical approaches' (2003) 
31(10) Energy Policy 1007-1015 at 1007. The authors illustrate this by way of the following example (at 1008): 
Increased energy efficiency is achieved by foreign direct investment in a heavy industry company in a developing 
country that reduces emissions and enhances profits. The investor would have done so anyway. If the investor obtains 
CERs due to the approval of the project as a CDM project, the CERs are 'fake'. This will lead to an inflation of the 









 This could consequently divert possible transfers from the developing world. However, it
could also be argued that the additionality requirement is justifiable, as the CDM in itself does not 
reduce global emissions – it is an offset mechanism allowing industrialised countries with a GHG 
reduction obligation to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries.
50
Of course, the additionality requirement could have the unintended and undesirable result that host 
countries do not to implement ambitious policies for the deployment of renewable energy.
51
To address this dilemma, the CDM EB stipulated that the CDM would not take national policies 
into account in the baseline calculation that was implemented after November 2001.
52
 This was
done so as not to punish governments of CDM host countries that have passed progressive 
renewable energy policies.
53
Several approaches for assessing additionality have been employed in new methodologies 
submitted to the CDM EB over the years. These are depicted in Figure 7.2. 
49
 Greiner & Michaelowa (n46) at 1008. This would also raise transaction costs and could exclude potentially beneficial 
projects. 
50
 Q Wang & Y Chen 'Barriers and opportunities of using the clean development mechanism to advance renewable 
energy development in China' (2010) 14(7) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1989-1998 at 1994 explain 
that, if a company decides not to reduce its own emissions, but instead purchases credits from a CDM project to offset 
them, and if this project is not additional, then global emissions increase. 
51
 Ibid. The authors describe the situation whereby a host country already has progressive policies for renewable energy 
development. In this case, it would be hard to testify that the project would not have occurred without the CDM. This 






Figure 7.2 Approaches for assessing additionality (author's own)
54
The CDM EB has combined the barrier, investment and common practice analyses into two tools 
which are used in most approved methodologies for large-scale CDM projects.
55
 These are known
as the Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality
56
 and the Combined tool to
identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality.
57
 The barrier and investment analyses
either offer alternative approaches to demonstrating additionality or they can be combined, while 
the common practice analysis complements these as a credibility check.
58
 The CDM EB has
approved a simple barrier test for small-scale CDM projects.
59
54
 Based on text from the United Nations (UN) CDM Methodology Booklet (2016) at 41-45, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/documentation/index.html, accessed on 20 April 2017. 
55
 Schneider (n41) at 244. 
56
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Tool 01 Methodological Tool: tool for the 
demonstration and assessment of additionality (2012), available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-01-v7.0.0.pdf, accessed on 22 April 2017. 
57
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Tool 02 Methodological tool: combined tool 
to identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality (2015), available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-02-v6.0.pdf, accessed on 22 April 2017. 
58
 Schneider (n41) at 244. 
59
 Ibid. 
•An entire project category is assumed to be additional.
Positive lists 
•Demonstrate that barriers exist that would prevent the proposed project from being
carried out if the project acitvity is not registered as a CDM activity.
Barrier analysis 
•Demonstrate that the proposed project activity is economically or financially less
attractive than at least one other credible alternative.
Investment analysis 
•Assess the extent to which the proposed project type (eg technology or practice) has
already been deployed in the relevant sector and region.
Common practice analysis 
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The calculation of a baseline requires complex accounting rules. Moreover, there are many different 






 baselines, as well
as top-down baselines, which can be used on aggregated country-specific data.
63
 In addition, a
baseline could be static or dynamic.
64
 A number of principles can be used to guide the construction
of baselines for GHG mitigation projects:
65
i) Accuracy
A baseline should provide an accurate description of the path of net emissions in the absence of
a purposeful intervention. Accuracy will be less of a problem for small projects where it is
possible to define a control group. Likewise, accuracy will be more challenging for projects
where the technological progress and socio-economic development are likely to determine the
length of time for which a project provides savings.
ii) Comprehensiveness
An ideal baseline should be comprehensive in the sense that it captures all important
consequences of alternative 'without project' activities. It should therefore also consider
secondary effects outside of the immediate project, by taking into account spatial and temporal
boundaries.
iii) Conservativeness
It should be demonstrated with sufficient confidence that the credits for emission reductions do
not exceed the improvements for the global system. In other words, the choice of baseline
should tend to result in conservative GHG credits. Conservative accounting should make
involved parties responsible for demonstrating that they chose baseline results in claimed credits
that are less than or equal to the mitigation benefits that actually occur.
60
 L Gustavsson, T Karjalainen, G Marland, I Savolainen, B Schlamadinger & M Apps 'Project-based greenhouse-gas 
accounting: guiding principles with a focus on baselines and additionality' (2000) 28(13) Energy policy 935-946 at 
936 describe this baseline, as determined on a case-by-case basis with project-specific measurements or assumptions 
for all key parameters. 
61
 Ibid. The authors explain that a multi-project baseline is equivalent to an 'activity standard' or policy target that is 
aggregated at a certain level. 
62
 Ibid. The authors clarify that hybrid baselines are determined in a hybrid fashion, with some key parameters being 




 Ibid. In contrast to a dynamic baseline, a static one is at a constant level throughout the credit time of the project. 
65
 As articulated by Gustavsson et al (n60) at 936-942. 
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iv) Practicality
From the UNFCCC perspective, the rules for the definition of baselines should favour projects
that yield real, measurable and verifiable long-term reduction in net emissions, but discourage
projects that do not. Project baselines should be verifiable so that they can be accepted, not only
by the project host and project investor, but also by an impartial third party or overseeing body.
Yet, these rules need to be broadly practical and simple enough to be applicable in a variety of
places and circumstances, while not being so simple that the principles of accuracy,
comprehensiveness and conservativeness are violated.
Carbon accounting methods have a strong impact on project viability and on the scale at which 
projects are benefiting from the CDM.
66
 Emissions quantification is a fundamental element of the
Paris Agreement, as it is necessary for the purpose of measurement and reporting.
67
 The Paris
Agreement aims to ensure robust accounting through the text included in para 6.2: 
‘... internationall  transferred  itigation outco es towards nationall  deter ined contributions ... shall apply 
robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting,’ 
as well as in para 6.5: 
‘E ission reductions resulting fro  the  echanis  referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used 
to demonstrate achievement of the host Party's nationally determined contribution if used by another Party to 
de onstrate achieve ent of its nationall  deter ined contribution’. 
These provisions imply that comprehensive national accounting for offset crediting must take place 
for both the recipient and the source of the units.
68
 There will be no change for the recipient in their
procedures,
69
 but the source country will be required to make an equivalent reduction from their
stated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).
70
 This 'corresponding adjustment' was a feature
of the JI, but was not a required practice of the CDM.
71
66
 B Locatelli & L Pedroni 'Accounting methods for carbon credits: impacts on the minimum area of forestry projects 
under the Clean Development Mechanism' (2004) 4(2) Climate Policy 193-204 at 194 explain that the number and 
price of credits that can be awarded to the projects are dependent on the accounting method used. 
67
D  one ‘Revisiting global e issions accounting’ (2016), available at 




 Hone (n67) explains that the introduction and counting of 'outside' units is already built in to the inventory processes 






The example in Box 7.1 below illustrates the hypothetical case for a nature-based transfer from 
Kenya to Canada, utilising the SDM as a means to acquire the necessary funding.
72
It is expected that, over time, Art 6(4) will introduce much-needed accounting rigour. This may well 
change the supply/demand balance, leading to a more robust and enduring carbon market.
73
72
 Derived from Hone (n67). 
73
 Ibid. 
Box 7.1:  Example - Accounting for international transfers under the Paris Agreement 
Hypothetical facts 
Canadian NDC: Canada intends to achieve an economy-wide target to reduce its GHG 
emissions by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. This equates to an effective cumulative 
emissions cap of 5 650 MtCO2e over the period 2020 to 2030 for all GHGs. 
Kenyian NDC:  Kenya seeks to abate its GHG emissions by 30 per cent by 2030 relative to 
the BAU scenario of 143 MtCO2. This equates to a notional emissions cap of 1 000 MtCO2 
over the period 2020 to 2030 for all GHGs. 
In terms of its commitments as set out in its NDC, Kenya plans to expand tree cover to ten 
per cent of its land area. If it does so through Canadian-sourced funding, in exchange for a 
nature-based transfer using the SDM's Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome 
(ITMO) of 50 MtCO2 over the ten-year period, the following occurs: 
Results 
 The Canada cap rises to 5 700 MtCO2e;
 The Kenya NDC shifts to 37 per cent by 2030 to account for the 50 MtCO2 transfer; and
 An ITMO to the effect of 50 MtCO2 shifts from Kenya to Canada.
Discussion 
The impact on the Kenyian NDC implies a shift from a stated reduction of 30 per cent from 
BAU in 2030, to 37 per cent below BAU. This ensures there is no double counting of the 
transferred amount, thereby maintaining the integrity of the overall NDC approach. This, in 
turn, should ensure that the implied global cumulative emissions goal of the NDCs is 
maintained. However, Kenya will have to unearth further reductions in its economy as a 
result. 
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7.2.3 Technology transfer 
7.2.3.1  Background 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, in addition to reduce GHG emissions, a complementary objective 
of the CDM is to assist developing countries in achieving their sustainable development goals. One 
benefit of investing in climate change mitigation projects that are channelled through the CDM 
towards developing countries, is the transfer of technology and know-how that are not already 
available in the host country.
74
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines technology transfer as 'a broad set 
of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and 
adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector 
entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and research/education 
institutions'.
75
 The ter  ‘transfer’ is broad and inclusive and enco passes the diffusion of
technologies and technology cooperation across and within countries.
76
 Technology transfer
therefore covers 'every relevant flow of hardware, software, information and knowledge between 
and within countries'.
77
 It can be on purely commercial terms or on a preferential basis.
78
Technology development and transfer are included as priorities in both the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol. Article 4.1 of the Convention requires all parties to promote and cooperate in the 
development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of GHG mitigation technologies.
79
 In
addition, the Kyoto Protocol requires all parties to cooperate in the development, application, 
diffusion and transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are in the public domain.
80
Although the CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate, it does have a more 
general objective of contributing to the sustainable development of developing countries. The 
74
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) The contribution of the Clean Development 
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to technology transfer (2010) at 10, available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Reports/TTreport/TTrep10.pdf, accessed on 19 March 2017. 
75
 B Metz, OR Davidson, J-W Martens, SNM van Rooijen & L Van Wie McGrory (eds) Methodological and 
technological issues in technology transfer: a special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(2000) at 3. 
76
 Ibid. The authors explain that 'transfer' comprises the process of learning to understand, utilise and replicate the 
technology, including the capacity to choose it, adapt it to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous 
technologies. 
77




 UNFCCC (1992) Art 4.1(c). 
80
 Kyoto Protocol, Art 10(c). 
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contribution that the CDM makes to technology transfer – by financing emission reduction projects 
that use technologies currently not available in the host countries – may be viewed in this light.
81
CDM project participants are not specifically required to report technology transfer, but are required 
to provide details on the technology used for their projects in the Project Design Documents 
(PDDs), from which information on technology transfer can be derived.
82
 The statements in the
PDDs therefore reflect the implicit definitions of technology transfer made by the project 
participants.
83
There are certain key factors which influence technology transfer. The first refers to the host 
country itself, as each CDM project must be approved by the host country government. As part of 
the approval process, the host country government may choose to impose technology transfer 
requirements.  
The next paragraph briefly describes some aspects of the policies put in place by the Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa (BRICS) countries (excluding Russia, as it does not participate in CDM 
projects). 
7.2.3.2  Technology transfer in BRICS countries 
(i) Brazil
The Brazilian Manual for Submitting CDM Project Activities requires the project developer to 
include in the description of the project its contribution to sustainable development, including its 
contribution to 'training and technological development'.
84
 Technology transfer is not mentioned
directly; instead the project's contribution to technology development is assessed as part of its 
contribution to sustainable development.
85
 In an earlier global study undertaken by the UN, it was
found that technology transfer for Brazilian projects is below the average for all CDM projects 
globally, measured in terms of the share of projects (25 per cent versus the global average of 40 per 
cent). 
81




 Id at 13. 
84
 Government of Brazil Manual for Submitting CDM Project Activities to the Interministerial Commission on Global 
Climate Change, aimed at obtaining a Letter of Approval from the Brazilian Government (2008) at 18, available at 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0025/25269.pdf, accessed on 22 April 2017. The project's contributions to 
sustainable development must be described in a separate document, commonly referred to as 'Annex III'. 
85
 UNFCCC Contribution (n74) at 24. 
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(ii) India
The Indian Government has a list of eligibility criteria for CDM project approval. One of the 
sustainable develop ent indicators refers to ‘technological wellbeing’:
86
‘The CDM project activity should lead to transfer of environmentally safe and sound technologies that are 
comparable to best practices in order to assist in upgradation of the technological base. The transfer of 
technology can be within the country as well from other developing countries also.’
India has adopted a broad concept of technology transfer, which is similar to that of the IPCC 
Special Report (ie it includes technology transfer within the country).
87
 Despite this, India has the




According to the Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism 
Projects in China, the Government of China expects that 'CDM project activities should promote 
the transfer of environmentally sound technology to China'.
89
 This is a general provision for the
country's use of the CDM, rather than a mandatory requirement for each project.
90
 The rate of
technology transfer for projects in China is about half the average for all global CDM projects (19 
per cent versus 40 per cent).
91
(iv) South Africa
The Department of Environmental Affairs has a guide containing the Sustainable development 
criteria for approval of Clean Development Mechanism projects by the Designated National 
Authority of the CDM.
92
 The country's Designated National Authority (DNA) will evaluate CDM
projects submitted to it by considering economic, social and environmental criteria. In assessing 
each PDD, the DNA is informed by also considering the project indicators, one of which alludes to 
86
 See Government of India Approvals Process (n.d.), available at http://www.cdmindia.gov.in/approval_process.php, 
accessed on 22 April 2017. 
87
 See Metz et al (n75) at 3. 
88
 UNFCCC Contribution (n74) at 24. 
89
 Government of China Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China 
(2005) at Article 10, available at http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/chn152593.pdf, accessed on 22 April 2017. 
90




 Department of Environmental Affairs Sustainable development criteria for approval of Clean Development 
Mechanism projects by the Designated National Authority of the CDM (2004), available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/kyoto/Web%20info/Annex%203%20SA%20Sustainable%20Development%




 This comprises positive or negative implications for the transfer
of technology to South Africa arising from the project; impacts of the project on local skills 
development; and demonstration and replication potential of the project.
94
South Africa performs comparatively well with regard to the rate of technology transfer, coming in 
at 34 per cent (versus the global rate of 40 per cent). Figure 7.3 below illustrates the distribution of 
technology transfer over the various projects types deployed in South African CDM projects. The 
graph shows that the share of projects involving technology transfer ranges from nil to 37 per cent. 
The dominant project types are 'Energy efficiency own generation'
95
 and N2O reduction.
96
Figure 7.3 Technology transfer by project type as a percentage of projects (author's own) 
It is evident that the host country is a key factor in determining the extent to which technology 
transfer is involved in its CDM projects. The host country influences this explicitly through the 
criteria it establishes for approval of CDM projects.
97
In general, technology providers have limited interest in the transmission of their technology into 
the local economy as they hope to avoid imitation.
98
 On the other hand, the recipient's primary
93




 As per Table 6.2 in the previous chapter, this project type refers to waste heat or waste gas used for electricity 
production in industry. Most of these projects are based in the North-West and Mpumalanga provinces. 
96
 As per Table 6.2, this refers to the reduction of N2O from the production of nitric acid, adipic acid and caprolactam, 
with most of the projects situated in the Free State. 
97
 UNFCCC Contribution (n74) at 24. 
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motivation to adopt new technology is driven by considerations about their competitive position in 
the local market.
99
 In other words, recipients do not necessarily search for the most efficient
technology in the global market, but rather search for technology best suited to the company's local 
needs and their capacity to absorb new technology.
100
The remainder of this section will explore other barriers to technology transfer which impede the 
growth of the CDM. 
7.2.3.3  Barriers to technology transfer 
(a) Lack of commercial viability
Technology imported from industrialised countries is generally more efficient, but also more 
expensive than technology manufactured locally.
101
 The result is therefore higher initial investment
costs.
102
(b) Lack of information
Even assuming that a technology transfer deal is considered commercially viable, it might not be 
executed due to a lack of information about the investment opportunity.
103
 Concomitant concerns
include a lack of confidence in the information, as well as high transaction costs for obtaining 
reliable information and negotiating the deal.
104
 Moreover, technology available on the world
market is often not appropriate, due to insufficient knowledge about recipients' local needs and 
technological capabilities.
105
(c) Lack of access to capital
Firms might be unable to attract an investor due to high interest rates or the insufficient 
infrastructure of financial markets in many developing countries.
106
 Investors also sometimes
98
 M Schneider, A Holzer & VH Hoffmann 'Understanding the CDM's contribution to technology transfer' (2008) 






















The perceived and effective protection of intellectual property rights can affect whether technology 
transfer via CDM projects is achieved.
108
 Indeed, the issue of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has
'provoked particularly thorny debate between developed and developing countries'.
109
 IPRs are legal
rights over ideas, creative processes and products, with patents likely to be the most important type 
of IRP with the context of low carbon technology transfer.
110
Two viewpoints inform this debate. One argument goes that low carbon technologies are public 
goods, due to their contribution to the avoidance of future carbon emissions.
111
 Therefore, these
technologies should be made freely available to developing countries.
112
 Proponents underscore
how IPRs can prohibit access to new technologies by, for example, enabling firms that own 
patented technologies to keep prices prohibitively high.
113
On the other hand, opponents argue that low carbon technology transfer will be better facilitated if 
developing countries ensured that their legal frameworks (for IPR protection) are ratcheted up and 
properly enforced.
114
 After all, multinational companies are unlikely to deploy cutting-edge
technologies - which they have spent significant time and money on developing – in countries 
where they cannot ensure adequate patent protection.
115
 In this regard, Ncube cautions that IPR




K Murphy, GA Kirkman, S Seres & E Haites 'Technology transfer in the CDM: an updated analysis' (2015) 
15(1) Climate Policy 127-145 at 133. 
109
 DG Ockwell, R Haum, A Mallett & J Watson 'Intellectual property rights and low carbon technology transfer: 
Conflicting discourses of diffusion and development' (2010) 20(4) Global Environmental Change 729-738 at 729. 
110
 Id at 730. The authors explain that IPRs also include copyrights and trademarks. 
111
 Id at 731. 
112
 Ibid. The authors provide an analogy: this is similar to agreements made over certain anti-retroviral drugs for treating 
HIV/AIDS. 
113
 Ibid. They also observe how IPRs can reduce the scope for imitation which, in countries such as South Korea and 
Japan, has been a key source of learning and technological change. 
114






 The challenge is to 'appropriately calibrate' IPR regimes for local benefit,
whilst not losing sight of attracting foreign direct investment.
117
Implicit in these disparate views is the so-called patent dilemma in global climate change, which 
can be stated as follows:
118
1) Responding ethically to global climate change requires technological innovation that is
accessible to everyone.
2) Strong patent protection is necessary for technological innovation.
3) At the same time, strong patent protection makes it unlikely that patent-protected technologies
will be accessible to everyone, particularly those in developing countries.
4) Thus, it appears that responding ethically to global climate change is unlikely.
Biddle posits
119





 However, Article 10 of the Paris Agreement merely calls for
establishing a Technology Framework
122
 to provide advice and guidance to the already existing
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).
123
116
 CB Ncube Intellectual property policy, law and administration in Africa: Exploring continental and sub-regional 




JB Biddle 'Intellectual Property Rights and Global Climate Change: Toward Resolving an Apparent Dilemma' 
(2016) 19(3) Ethics, Policy & Environment 301-319 at 302. 
119
To that end, Biddle (n118) at 312-316 has formulated a multi-pronged, multi-tiered strategy to satisfy these 
conditions. 
120
 Id at 303 explains that it should be politically and economically realistic to at least begin to implement a strategy in 
the near term, because the problem of global climate change is time sensitive. 
121
 Ibid. Biddle states that non-paternalistic strategies should not involve coercion. In addition, they should 'not treat 
people as if they were passive objects rather than agents capable of formulating their own plans'. 
122
 Art 10(4) of the Paris Agreement states: 
'A technology framework is hereby established to provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology 
Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to 
support the implementation of this Agreement, in pursuit of the long-term vision referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this Article.' 
123
 Created in 2010, the TEC is the policy arm of the Technology Mechanism. It focuses on identifying policies that can 
accelerate the development and transfer of low-emission and climate resilient technologies. The TEC and the CTCN 
together form the Technology Mechanism. With the Technology Mechanism serving the Paris Agreement, the TEC 
will play a key role in supporting countries to identify climate technology policies that support them to achieve the 
Agree ent’s objectives. See http://unfccc.int/ttclear/tec, accessed on 30 July 2017. 
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It is important to point out that these bodies are not mandated to discuss IPRs.
124
 It would therefore
seem that the Paris Agreement does not add much to the obligations on technology transfer that 
already exist in the UNFCCC.
125
 Consequently, it remains to be seen if and how the Technology
Mechanism established in the Paris Agreement will address the two discourses of development and 
diffusion as described above. It is clear to see how these competing discourses can imply very 
different policy options. 
(d) Repellent institutional framework
Other factors, such as tariffs or barriers to imports of relevant technologies, perceived and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights, and restrictions on foreign investments can also affect the 
extent of technology transfer.
126
 For example, access to capital is more restricted if investors are
worried about political risks and regard enforcement of the regulatory framework as weak.
127
Furthermore, high levels of corruption complicate the retrieval of correct information and thus raise 
transaction costs. In short, the stability of the political system, sound economic policy and 
regulatory frameworks, legal security, trade openness and a low level of corruption are important 
elements of an enabling environment.
128
(e) Stakeholder perceptions
A range of other – more subjective – factors influence the success of technology transfer. First, 
there is a lack of awareness of the range of potentially useful technologies.
129
 Secondly, an innate
assumption exists that technologies which had not been used in a particular developing country's 
context before were more expensive and thus presented more risk.
130
 Thirdly, historical experience
could hamper the acceptance of a particular technology: if a new technology was badly 
124
 M Wewerinke-Singh & C Doebbler 'The Paris agreement: Some critical reflections on process and substance' (2016) 




 UNFCCC Contribution (n74) at 24. 
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 W van der Gaast, K Begg & A Flamos 'Promoting sustainable energy technology transfers to developing countries 
through the CDM' (2009) 86(2) Applied Energy 230-236 at 234. The authors describe two main aspects to this issue: 
first, stakeholders may never have heard of some technologies and were therefore locked in to established 





implemented (for whatever reason), then this could create an automatic bias against it.
131
 Finally,
cultural aspects must also be taken into account so that technology is compatible with the residents' 
lifestyles.
132
Although technology transfer is not an explicit objective of the CDM, the CDM has contributed to 
the transfer of mitigation technologies to developing countries.
133
 Some CDM projects have used
technologies not currently available in the host country, and have thus induced technology 
transfer.
134
 Some scholars are of the opinion that the CDM is 'currently the strongest mechanism for
technology transfer under the UNFCCC'.
135
A developing country government wishing to develop technological capacity related to a specific 
technology should consider whether there is potential for successful domestic application from a 
commercial perspective.
136
 It should then develop a strategy for building this capacity, which might
include transfer via one or more channels, including CDM projects, and complementary policies, 
together with financial incentives for deployment of the technology.
137
7.2.4 Policy and legislative barriers in host countries 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there are 
three different types of host country barriers that can impede the development of CDM projects.
138
The following paragraphs will examine each in turn. 
(i) National barriers
Many CDM project activities are being developed unilaterally, without the involvement of foreign 
investment.
139
 The policy and legislative framework within a country may therefore enable
131
 Ibid. The authors add that people also have to overcome a resistance to change in their decision-making process and 
go beyond technologies with which they are familiar. 
132
 Id at 235. The authors provide a curious example of a solar cooking pilot programme in Kenya which failed, because 
the local people did not like to cook outside (due to dust and dogs, etc) and also did not want the prying eyes of 
neighbours.  
133




 Schneider et al (n98) at 2936. 
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 J Ellis & S Kamel 'Overcoming barriers to clean development mechanism projects' (2007) 7(1) OECD Papers at 17. 
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domestic and foreign investments to varying extents. Actions which reduce bureaucratic processes 
and simplify the overall complexity of the CDM process include the following:
140
 Ensuring that laws are stable and enforced: investors require reasonable certainty that key
legislative provisions will remain stable, unambiguous and enforced throughout the lifetime of
the CDM project. This can only be achieved through good governance and responsible
leadership.
 Providing an appropriate tax/incentive framework for investments: high or discriminatory taxes
can be a barrier to investments, as they reduce the effective rate of return. Tax breaks, subsidies
and import duties also impact investment decisions.
 Reducing participation/ownership restrictions of foreigners: some countries prevent non-
citizens from owning land; others may restrict the level of foreign investment in particular
sectors; some stipulate local procurement requirements for some project types. Restrictions may
also be placed on the level of foreign ownership in potential CDM projects.
 Developing a clear policy on CDM-relevant issues: investors need clarity on the impact of
national legislation on the eligibility of proposed CDM projects and the ownership of CERs.
In short, CDM investors require a stable political regime and enabling macro-economic climate. 
(ii) Institutional barriers
The CDM-specific framework within host countries is an important factor that can assist or obstruct 
the development of projects under the CDM.
141
 Some of these barriers are sector- or project-related,
while others are more national barriers.
142
 For example, if a host country has no DNA, it will not be
able to participate in the CDM, even it has an enabling general policy framework and a first-rate 
investment climate.
143
 There are three institutional barriers which come into play:
144
 An enabling CDM-specific policy framework: good communication between the different role
players and the various levels of government is necessary to ensure a consistent policy. Some
139
 Ibid. The authors note that even CDM project activities that are developed on a bilateral basis may often involve 
Annex I parties purchasing credits generated by the project, rather than funding the underlying project. 
140
 Id at 18-25. 
141






 Id at 25-30. 
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countries devote significant resources to promoting CDM activities in their countries. A clear 
policy on the legal status and ownership of CERs is also desirable. 
 CDM institutional capacity and framework: institutions relevant to the CDM should possess
adequate information on CDM modalities and procedures. In addition, these institutions should
have the mandate and ability to take actions that would facilitate the completion of CDM
transactions in a timely and transparent manner.
145
 Awareness of CDM issues: the key stakeholder groups must possess adequate and correct
knowledge. These include the policymakers responsible for enacting laws and decisions;
individuals working in technical fields and economic activities; and bankers, loan officers and
individuals working in local financial intermediaries.
(iii) Project-related barriers
As the development of a CDM project requires resources upfront, it is important to have CDM 
'champions' to assist with CDM project development.
146
 Table 7.1 summarises common pitfalls in




Id at 28-30. The authors describe a 'successful' DNA as having the following operational characteristics: 
responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, efficiency and transparency. 
146
 Id at 29. 
147
 Id at 30, citing UNEP Risoe-DNV (2005) CDM PDD Guidebook: Navigating the Pitfalls. 
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Lack of financing is among the most common barriers inhibiting CDM project development.
148
 The
fact that many sub-Saharan African countries (including South Africa) suffer from poor credit 
ratings and high sovereignty risk, further limits the possibility for securing financing.
149
 CDM
projects often face a long project lead time and are viewed as high risk compared to conventional 
technologies with low capital cost requirements.
150
 Other project-related barriers include exchange





 As regards finance in the run up to the climate talks, the African Development Bank said it would triple climate 
financing to reach $5 billion a year by 2020. See African Development Bank Group 'African Development Bank to 
triple Annual Climate Financing to nearly $5 billion by 2020' (2015), available at http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/article/african-development-bank-to-triple-annual-climate-financing-to-nearly-5-billion-by-2020-14798/, 
accessed on 30 July 2017. 
Another programme aimed at mobilising additional support for adaptation and for addressing loss and damage is  the 
Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI). The AAI was formally launched at the COP21 in December of 2015. See 
http://www.africaadaptationinitiative.org/, accessed on 30 July 2017. 
150
 Ellis & S Kamel (n138) at 30. 
151
 Ibid. 
Table 7.1 Examples of common pitfalls in CDM project development 
1. Lack of logic and consistency in the PDD. 9. Insufficient explanation of baseline scenarios.
2. Deviations from selected calculation
methodology not justified sufficiently or
incorrect formulas applied.
10. Insufficient explanation of project 
additionality.
3. Compliance with local legal requirements not
covered sufficiently.
11. Baseline information not sufficiently
supported by evidence and/or not referenced
sufficiently.
4. Insufficient information on the stakeholder
consultation process.
12. Major risks to the baseline not 
identified/described.
5. Evidence of Environmental Impact
Assessment and/or required construction or
operating permits or approvals not provided.
13. Project boundaries not defined clearly.
6. Letter of Approval insufficient or delayed. 14. Project and/or crediting start date unclear.
7. Project participants not identified clearly. 15. Deviations from monitoring methodology not
justified sufficiently.
8. Insufficient description of the technology.
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 alf of this will be used to reduce Africa’s     e issions via the i ple entation of renewable 
energy, particularly solar; while the rest will be used to help African economies adapt to climate 
change through climate-resilient crops, for example, and improving access to water. Both national 
and international actions can help countries to tap into a larger proportion of their CDM potential.
152
This work can be effected by national governments and the international UNFCCC negotiating 
process, as well as by organisations such as development agencies, financial institutions and carbon 
funds.
153
7.2.5 High transaction costs 
The size of a CDM project will depend, among other factors, on the transaction costs related to the 
implementation of the project. The transaction costs154 incurred by investors and hosts comprise a 








 Per the Oxford Online Dictionary (2017), available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/, accessed on 29 April 2017, 
'degressive' means to reduce by gradual amounts. This should not be confused with the term 'regressive'. The latter is 
used in the context of taxation, and refers to taking a proportionally greater amount from those on lower incomes. 
155
 Based on A Michaelowa & F Jotzo 'Transaction costs, institutional rigidities and the size of the clean development 
mechanism' (2005) 33(4) Energy policy 511-523 at 513. The authors point out that transaction costs will be higher in 
countries with an inefficient regulatory framework and will thus lead to a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other 
countries. 
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No official definition for CDM transaction costs exists, although many scholars have attempted to 
formulate a definition. One such definition
156
 is that transaction costs are components in the price of
a CER that cannot be attributed to either -  
 the physical process of removing GHGs from the atmosphere; or
 The level (or changes in the level) of demand for CERs.
A simple test was consequently suggested for determining whether an item should be considered as 
a CDM transaction cost – see Box 7.2.
157
156
See BP Chadwick 'Transaction costs and the clean development mechanism' (2006) 30(4) Natural Resources 
Forum 256-271 at 260. 
157
 Ibid. 
Table 7.2 Definition of transaction cost components 
Transaction cost 
components 
Description of component Relation to 
project size 
Search costs Including costs incurred in the preparation of the PDD that also 
document assignment and scheduling of benefits over the project 
time period. It also includes public consultation with key 
stakeholders 
Fixed 
Negotiation costs Degressive 
Project documentation 
costs 
Development of a baseline and monitoring plan Fixed 
Approval costs Costs of authorisation from host country Proportional 
Validation costs Review and revision of PDD by operational entity Fixed 
Registration costs Registration by CDM EB Slightly degressive 
Monitoring costs Costs to collect data Fixed 
Verification costs Costs to hire an operational entity and to report to the CDM EB Degressive 
Certification costs Issuances of CERs by UNFCCC EB Degressive 
Enforcement costs Including costs of administrative and legal measures incurred in 
the event of departure from the agreed transaction 
Proportional 
Transfer costs Brokerage costs Proportional 
Registry costs Costs to hold an account in national registry Proportional 
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CDM transaction costs will never be eliminated entirely, as the key commodity, namely CERs, is 
'unusual and requires careful monitoring, verification, and evaluation before anyone would pay for 
it'.
158
 Each step in the CDM project process adds costs that do not remove additional GHGs, but that
are essential to ensure that CERs on the market are scientifically credible to host countries.
159
Figure 7.4 on the next page depicts the decision flowchart for determining whether a CDM project 
is viable, taking into account the various levels of transaction costs. 
158
 Id at 263. The author further explains that not only does a CER represent the absence of GHGs, but most of these 
gases are invisible, even when they are present. It therefore creates additional challenges to proving that they have 
been reduced. 
159
 Id at 265. The author mentions that the expectation is for this process to become more standardised and streamlined 
over time, thereby lowering the costs of each individual step and, ultimately, the total transaction costs. 
Box 7.2 Test for determining CDM transaction cost 
If the project were undertaken as is, but without this expense, would it release additional GHG? 
YES: The expense is an operation cost contributing to the reduction of GHGs. 
NO:  The expense is a transaction cost required to obtain title to CERs. 
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Figure 7.4 Decision flowchart for pursuing a CDM project
160
Having considered the obstacles impeding the growth of the CDM (as well as suggestions to 
overcome these), the next section regards the South African experience. 
160
 Id at 264. 
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7.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
In a local study conducted in 2007, interviews with 30 experts involved in the South African CDM 
identified a number of factors perceived to be facilitative and inhibitive of the use of the CDM.
161
Although the study was conducted a decade ago, it is among the most comprehensive of its kind in 
South Africa and the findings provide a useful starting point. The list of factors and associated 
issues is presented in Table 7.3, together with this author’s co  ents as to the relevance of these 
issues in the current political and economic climate.
162
Table 7.3 Clustered factors and associated issues 
Clustered factor Stakeholder issue Classification 






 Expensive to keep up to date with CDM developments
 Complexity of CDM process
 Methodologies applicable to SA
 Bureaucratic process
 Transaction costs
 USA & Australia outside Kyoto
164
Inhibiting 
2 Carbon markets  Volatility of CER price
 Growth of CER market / money
 Price of CERs
165
 Time to return CERs
Facilitating 
3 South African 
infrastructure 
 SA economic growth
166 Facilitating 
161
 GS Little, T Maxwell & M Sutherland 'Accelerating the implementation of the clean development mechanism in 
South Africa' (2007) 10(4) SAJEMS 395-411. The five groupings of stakeholders comprise industry, government, 
policy makers, project developers and supporting catalysts. Through their analysis, the authors have identified 56 
issues and grouped these into 11 clusters. 
162
 Id at 402-403. 
163
 This has now likely shifted to post-2020 uncertainty regarding the probable replacement of the CDM with the SDM. 
164
 The anxiety surrounding President Trump's views on climate change could also be cause for concern for CDM 
stakeholders. 
165
 As discussed in para 7.2.1. above, the volatility of the carbon market and plummeting of the carbon price are likely 
to now be regarded as an inhibiting factor. 
166





 Development of SA infrastructure
 Africa not a significant international investment
destination
 SA best investment destination in Africa
168
 No SA experience in Activities Implemented Jointly
(AIJ) or emissions trading
 Role of civil society / NGOs
 Attractiveness of FDI
 Energy crisis
4 SA Government 
infrastructure 
 No direct legislation covering CDM
 No formal incentives to industry to implement CDM
 Environmental Impact Assessments




5 SA Energy infrastructure  Cheap coal power
 Eskom policies
Inhibiting 
6 SA CDM capacity  CDM capacity in South Africa
 Silos in capacity
 SA banks lack understanding of CDM finance
Facilitating 
7 Government CDM 
processes 
 SA ratified Kyoto Protocol
170
 DNA in DEA
 SA slow to form a DNA
 DNA effectiveness in promoting CDM
 Government guidance
 Government capacity




Likewise, corruption and discord within the ruling party have seriously hampered the political stability of the 
country. 
168
 This is a debatable point, as some economists no longer rank South Africa as the top destination in Africa. See, for 
example, Quantum Global 'Botswana Most Attractive Investment Destination in Africa' (2017), available at 
https://quantumglobalgroup.com/article/botswana-most-attractive-investment-destination-in-africa/, accessed on 24 
April 2017, where neighbouring country Botswana was awarded top status. 
169
 This is no longer an issue, since receipts from the sale of CERs are exempt from Income Tax (refer to Chapter 4). 
170
 As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, South Africa has also ratified the Paris Agreement. This factor 
therefore remains facilitating. 
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8 SA Industry 
infrastructure 
 Corporate governance
 Conservative industry / inertia
 Potential for renewable energy / energy efficiency
 Old technology ready for replacement
 Large emitters
 Industry economic focus
Facilitating 
9 SA Industry CDM 
response 
 Industry leadership
 Industry understanding of CDM process
 Technology transfer
 Identification of correct projects
 Business priorities elsewhere (not CDM)
 Lack of success stories / CDM critical mass
Inhibiting 
10 Industry / government 
interface 
 Government and industry cooperation Inhibiting 
11 Public & media 
perceptions 
 Climate change is a real issue
 Increased media coverage of global warming issues
 Lack of awareness of CDM process
 Mixed messages on CDM and climate change




Of particular interest are the interventions identified by the study to accelerate the implementation 
of CDM in the South African industry:
172
 A clear understanding of the Kyoto Protocol (and now Paris Agreement) mechanisms and of the
opportunities for South Africa must be developed by all stakeholder groups.
 The national processes supporting CDM have to be streamlined by government to facilitate
project implementation.
 The South African energy market needs to be opened to reduce the dominance of Eskom and
fossil-based power. To that end, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer
Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) (as discussed in Chapter 4), as well as the privatisation of
the state-owned entity Eskom, will go far in addressing this issue.
171
 This point is likely no longer an inhibiting factor, as the government (under the auspices of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs has devoted much time and effort towards formulating and implementing climate change 
mitigation policies – see Chapter 4. 
172
 Little et al (n161) at 409-410. 
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 Business should take the lead and drive CDM in South Africa.
 Formal structures are required to facilitate communication between stakeholders to prevent a
'silo' mindset.
 The CDM should be promoted to change perceptions in the media and public.
 South Africa can learn from successful non-Annex I countries.
When viewed in the context of the African continent, it is evident that the compliance-driven 
demand for credits from African CDM projects 'has come to an almost complete halt'.
173
 However,
there is a range of bilateral or multilateral procurement initiatives that focus on African countries 




 S Hoch, S Greiner, A Michaelowa, F Le Saché, A Korthuis & E-HM Diagne Progress and potential of CDM reform 
and post-Paris market mechanisms for Africa: policy briefing (n.d.) at 5, available at 




As is the case elsewhere in the developing world, South Africa faces numerous challenges in 
attracting foreign CDM investors. At the same time, the country has the potential to traverse these 
hurdles if it is able to create an enabling policy framework to address the issues highlighted in this 
section.  
From a global perspective, interesting proposals have been advanced to navigate the CDM obstacle 
course. The next section addresses the first proposal, which is to link the CDM to the Green Climate 
Fund. Thereafter, the development of the Sustainable Development tool is discussed. Lastly, a 
proposal for a sector-based mechanism is considered. 





Ministry of Finance can procure up to 60 million CERs generated until 2020, 





Manages nine multilateral funds and facilities and approximately 140 
projects, of which 37% are located in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Carbon Initiative 
for Development of 
the World Bank 
A budget of US$100million for technical assistance and procurement of 
CDM credits from energy access projects in low-income countries. 
The Pilot Auction 
Facility 
A competitive auctioning mechanism piloted by the World Bank that targets 
stranded CDM projects in the methane sector. 
BMUB/KfW 
foundation future of 
the Carbon Market 
Supports credit-based programmatic mitigation projects via start-up finance. 
Go Climate Neutral 
Now 
Recently launched initiative of the UNFCCC Secretariat allows users to 
calculate their carbon footprint, advises on reduction strategies and offers to 
offset remaining emission via the purchase of CERs. 
UN Office for Project 
Services 
Seeks to procure 350 000 carbon credits from CDM projects to offset 
emissions of the UN system. 
European Parliament The existing carbon offsetting scheme is being expanded with an additional 
€250 000 budget for Gold Standard and UNFCCC credits, targeting African 
countries. 
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7.4 A PROPOSAL TO LINK THE CDM TO THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty of the continuance of the CDM alongside the SDM, until such time 
as the CDM is replaced (if at all), an opportunity exists to link the CDM to the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF). The GCF was discussed as part of the historical development of the CDM in Chapter 3.  
At the Climate Change Conference held in Paris in December 2015, the idea to link the CDM to the 
GCF was formally placed on the agenda. The GCF is primed to become the key vehicle for large-
scale international climate finance under the UNFCCC.
175
 However, it is still at an early stage of its
institutional development and an opportunity exists for collaboration between the CDM and GCF. 
On the one hand, the GCF can make use of the CDM's MRV framework to enhance its results-
oriented approach to financing mitigation action.
176
 Moreover, the CDM can support the GCF in
leveraging private capital from investors seeking investment opportunities in green asset classes.
177
On the other hand, the CDM stands to gain an important source of demand for CERs.
178
The UNFCCC Secretariat has identified four new areas where the CDM can contribute to global 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions:
179
(i) Support the implementation of NDCs, whereby the CDM can provide a means for realising
domestic targets or support the achievement of higher conditional targets proposed by
parties.
(ii) Encourage voluntary offsetting by corporations, governments or sectors that are likely to
face compliance targets in a post-2020 environment.
(iii) Increase the number of market-based carbon pricing policies intended to utilise CERs by
linking to emerging ETS worldwide.
(iv) Serve as an effective MRV tool to enable credible and transparent results-based payments,
using both public and private climate finance.
175
 S Mikolajczyk, D Brescia, H Galt, F Le Saché, T Hunzai, S Greiner & S Hoch Linking the Clean Development 
Mechanism with the Green Climate Fund (2016) at 9, available at 
http://www.perspectives.cc/fileadmin/user_upload/Linking_the_Clean_Development_Mechanism_with_the_Green_C




 Ibid. This is due to the use of the internationally recognised standard quantifying and tracking GHG mitigation 
results. 
178
 Ibid. This is because the CDM offers a large pipeline of high-quality, investment-ready mitigation activities that can 
be mobilised rapidly. 
179
 United  Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Annex I - Concept Note: Options for using 
the clean development mechanism as a tool for other uses (2016), available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Meetings/MeetingInfo/DB/FIMUC4QJ0NXEAHW/view, accessed on 23 April 2017. 
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Similarities between the objectives of both institutions serve as the starting point for collaborative 
engagement. As regards the mission of each, the following broad similarities emerge:
180
 Both the GCF and the CDM are governed by the UNFCCC;
 Both institutions share the objective of stimulating GHG mitigation action in developing
countries, while contributing to sustainable development; and
 The GCF is a funding vehicle through which international climate finance pledges are disbursed
and accounted for, whereas the CDM represents a baseline and crediting scheme.
With reference to the scope and modalities of the GCF and the CDM, Table 7.5 offers a 
comparative view.
181
By incentivising entities accredited to the GCF and project implementers to use the CDM's 
established framework – or by having the GCF directly support high-quality CDM activities – the 
180
 Mikolajczyk et al (n175) at 20. 
181
 Id at 19. 
Table 7.5 Comparison between the operating modalities of the GCF and the CDM 
GCF CDM 
Mission To expand collective human 
action to respond to climate 
change by mobilising funding at 
scale to support a paradigm shift 
towards low-emission and 
climate-resilient development. 
To allow those countries that have an 
emission reduction commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol to meet these 
commitments by supporting cost-
effective mitigation activities in non-




Governed by a Board, 
administrated through a 
Secretariat, supported through 
Committees and implemented 
through Accredited Entities and 
Executing Entities. 
Governed by an Executive Board, 
administrated through a Secretariat, 
supported through panels and working 
groups, with independent auditing 
conducted by DOEs, implemented by 
Project Participants. 
Approval cycle Proposal submission through 
Accredited Entities, endorsed by 
National Designated Authorities. 
First review by the Secretariat, 
final funding decision by the 
Board. 
PDD validation through DOEs, 
endorsement by DNAs. First review by 
the Secretariat, registration by the 
Board. Successful monitoring by Project 
Participant, and verification by DOEs is 
prerequisite for issuance of CERs by the 
Board. 
Funding instruments Direct through grants, 
concessional loans, equity and 
price guarantees. 
CERs serve as assets that can receive 
financing by carbon market or non-
market climate finance sources. 
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linkage can achieve a number of synergistic effects.
182
 However, there are opposing views to such a
connection.  
First, due to the previously mentioned problem of additionality, there is a risk that purchasing 
'stranded' offset credits (that is, credits that do not represent real emission reductions) would result 
in wasteful expenditure of scarce climate finance.
183
 Another reason is the lack of safeguards or an
established grievance mechanism under the CDM.
184
 The GCF accreditation process has adopted
safeguards which foresee extensive stakeholder participation, as well as a grievance mechanism.
185
The disparate view is therefore that, in its current design, the CDM does not comply with the 
safeguard policies of the GCF and should therefore not be accredited as an eligible entity to access 
funds.
186
A positive development is that the CDM EB is considering defining additional guidelines for 
stakeholder consultations, as well as incorporating a grievance mechanism to allow for post-
registration stakeholder feedback.
187
 Such a grievance mechanism should exist both at the national
level, but more importantly, at the international level, especially considering the international nature 
182
 Id at 10-11. 
183
U Trunk ‘Wh  CDM projects do not qualif  for  CF finance’ (2014), available at 




 Per Green Climate Fund Further development of the initial investment framework: sub-criteria and methodology, 
GCF/B.09/07 (2015), available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24949/GCF_B.09_07_-
_Further_Development_of_the_Initial_Investment_Framework__Sub-Criteria_and_Methodology.pdf/18db33f8-
a55b-488f-8a6b-5df68f39a137, accessed on 23 April 2017, there are six key investment criteria which the GCF 
considers: 
 Impact potential: potential of the activity to contribute to the shift to low-emission, sustainable development
pathways or increased climate resilience;
 Paradigm shift: degree to which the activity can catalyse a wider impact and contribute to global low-carbon
sustainable development in line with a temperature increase of less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels;
 Sustainable development: degree of environmental, social, economic, and gender-related benefits resulting from
the activity;
 Needs of recipient: technical, institutional and financing needs of the beneficiary country or project implementer;
 Country ownership: of the activity, as well as alignment with national development or climate policies;
 Efficiency and effectiveness: economic and financial soundness of the activity, including the cost of the tCO2e
reduced.
186
 Trunk (n183). 
187




 The mechanism should give individuals, communities or indigenous peoples
the opportunity to submit complaints and relevant information.
189
 The assessment of such
grievances should be carried out by independent experts who should recommend measures for 
preventing or minimising harmful effects.
190
In addition to alignment with the GCF, the CDM would do well to also consider best practices from 
programmes of comparable status, such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+)
191
 and the Adaptation Fund (AF), which are making steady progress in
mainstreaming human rights into their operations.
192
 In some of the programmes and initiatives,
non-judicial grievance mechanisms are emerging and being used effectively to address disputes 
between individuals, companies, or groups in societies, and to strengthen stakeholders' 
participation. For example, at the Cancun COP, the normative basis for implementing REDD+ was 
established in the form of safeguards.
193
 Subsequent decisions of the COP further require that
188
J Voigt Human rights implications of climate mitigation actions – second edition (2016) at 25, available at 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NC-HUMAN-RIGHTS-IMPLICATIONS-OF-
CLIMATE-CHANGE-MITIGATION-ACTIONS-VERSION-02-MAY-2016-OK-WEB-spread-page-.pdf, accessed 
on 23 April 2017. 
189
 Id at 26. 
190
 Ibid. The author advocates the following principles to guide the design of a grievance mechanism: 
 Effectiveness, in providing timely and meaningful recourse;
 Legitimacy, which requires independence from political influence;
 Accessibility, particularly for complainants;
 Predictability, by way of clear and known procedures and monitoring of implementation;
 Equitability, by ensuring aggrieved parties can engage in a process on fair and equitable terms;
 Transparency of process and outcome;
 Rights compatibility to ensure consistency with internationally recognised human rights standards; and
 Participation, at all relevant stages of the decision-making process.
191
 NA Munuo Towards the design of a reflexive regulatory framework to "Reduce and control emissions from land 
deforestation and degradation and enhancing carbon stocks"(REDD+): a perspective from select developing 
countries (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2016) argues that REDD+ has emerged as a governance 
approach which calls for developing countries to participate in a second commitment period for a post-2020 climate 
change regime under the auspices of the UNFCCC, yet outside of the UNFCCC. The goal of REDD+ is that host 
countries will receive, inter alia, financial compensation if they choose to conserve their forests, rather than convert 
them to non-forest land use.  
192
 E Filzmoser, J Voigt, U Trunk, KH Olsen & AO Jegede The need for a Rights-based approach to the Clean 
Development Mechanism (2015) Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (Public Participation and 
Climate Governance Working Paper Series) at 14. 
193
 COP Decision 1/CP.16 'The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention', available at 
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parties indicate their level of compliance with these safeguards through national communications 
and other channels.
194
 In particular, countries are required to develop a Safeguards Information
System (SIS).
195
 The SIS is dependent on a scale, risk-based approach to provide information on
how safeguards are addressed and respected.
196
Developed countries are more likely to provide financial assistance for transition towards low-
carbon economies in developing countries where economic interests converge.
197
 This could be
achieved through the implementation and linking of market-based instruments.
198
 Thus, linking the
CDM with the GCF presents an opportunity to capitalise on collaborative efforts and improve the 
working of both institutions.
199
 Ultimately, it is hoped that this linkage will enhance climate change
mitigation action as a whole. 
7.5 THE CDM SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
The second proposal refers to a tool that has emerged as part of the CDM experience, and which 
could be carried forward to the SDM. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, criticism of the CDM has 
been raised over the years that the DNA’s assess ent of sustainable develop ent was weak due to 
the lack of clear and transparent criteria. This was exacerbated by the lack of requirements and 
procedures to monitor, report and verify that the intended sustainable development benefits were 
actually being received. This led to the 2011 COP/MOP mandating the CDM EB to develop 
voluntary measures to highlight the co-benefits of CDM projects.
200
 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2, accessed on 23 April 2017. Para 2 of Appendix I 
describes these safeguards. 
194
 COP Decision 12/CP.19 'The timing and the frequency of presentations of the summary of information on how all 
the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected', available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#page=33, accessed on 23 April 2017. 
195




 E de Lemos Pinto Aydos 'Paris: the dilemmas of international climate change negotiations and the role of linked 
Emissions Trading Schemes in the post-2020 regime' in NP Stoianoff, L Kreiser, B Butcher, JE Milne & H Ashiabor 




 Mikolajczyk et al (n175) at 63. 
200
 K  Olsen, C Arens & F Mers an ‘Learning fro  CDM SD tool experience for Article 6.4 of the Paris Agree ent’ 
(2017) Climate Policy 1-13 at 3. 
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Following a call for input by stakeholders, the UNFCCC Secretariat cooperated with the UNEP 
DTU Partnership in 2012 to develop a draft CDM Sustainable Development tool (SD tool).
201
 The
tool consists of three elements: a sustainable development taxonomy of indicators to identify and 
describe the co-benefits of CDM projects, safeguards to mitigate the risks of negative impacts, and 
enhanced requirements for stakeholder consultation.
202
 The final SD tool was approved by the CDM
EB in Doha in 2012.
203
 However, it was reduced to only one element, namely voluntary declaration
of sustainable development co-benefits, as members of the Board argued that there was only a 
COP/MOP mandate to highlight the co-benefits, and not any negative impacts.
204
The SD tool can be used at any time in the lifetime of a CDM project or Project of Activities and 
may include an update in the event of a change in the co-benefits.
205
 There are no requirements to
monitor or verify declared co-benefits, but voluntary options exist.
206
 The declaration of co-benefits
uses the three basic dimensions of sustainable development (as seen in the previous chapter) and 
comprises environmental, social and economic dimensions. Based on the above, the sustainable 
development tool uses a taxonomy of 12 sustainable development criteria and 70 indicators.
207
From the data input to the tool, a Sustainable Development Co-benefit (SBC) report is generated 
and made public on the CDM website.
208
 Primary users of the tool are project participants and







 KH Olsen Sustainable Development Impacts of NAMAs: An integrated approach to assessment of co-benefits based 
on experience with the CDM (2013) at 14, available at 
 http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/88057192/Low_Carbon_Development.pdf, accessed on 13 May 2017. 
204






 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) EB 68 - Annex 22 Draft voluntary tool for 
highlighting sustainable development co-benefits of CDM project activities and Programmes of Activities (2012) at 
para 13, available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/v/w/AZNU6L350HMOJIVGS1FWCBEXRQ27TP.pdf/eb68_propan22.pdf?t=TTB8
b3B3MThzfDBcYPDiV656fkXnULuXmLif, accessed on 13 May 2017. 
208
 See http://cdmcobenefits.unfccc.int/Pages/SD-Tool.aspx, accessed on 13 May 2017. As of May 2017, there are 50 
reports on the UNFCCC website. 
209
 Per C Arens, F Mersmann, C Beuermann, F Rudolph, KH Olsen & JV Fenhann Mapping the Indicators. An Analysis 
of Sustainable Development Requirements of Selected Market Mechanisms and Multilateral Institution (2015) at 16, 
available at http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/115264357/Mapping_the_Indicators.pdf, accessed on 13 May 2017, they may 
request access to the tool fro  the CDM’s tool webpage or download a Word version as an alternative fro  the sa e 
page. 
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Despite its usefulness in highlighting the co-benefits of CDM projects, there are a number of 
observed shortcomings and demands for sustainable development assessment in practice. These 
include:
210
 Quantification: The tool does not provide a method for quantifying the co-benefits. The extra
data collection is considered as adding considerable effort for both project participants and
DNAs. Quantification is required in order to determine the scope and significance of sustainable
development impacts and the necessity of monetising the value of co-benefits, so as to leverage
additional climate and development finance.
 Assessment of negative impacts: The tool does not contain safeguards against negative
impacts.
211
 Fro  a bu er’s perspective, the avoidance of negative i pacts is a ke  priorit  in
mitigating financial and reputational risks.
 Monitoring and reporting: The tool does not require the monitoring of co-benefits.
Consequently, the SDC report may be submitted at any time without any requirements for the
monitoring of sustainable development claims.
212
 Independent third-party validation and verification: In its current form, the sustainable
development tool does not contain any requirements for verification. Validation and verification
are seen as prerequisites for pricing co-benefits in the carbon market and as a means to attract
results-based climate or development finance.
 Certification: At the moment, certification is not envisaged by the sustainable development tool.
It could be considered of interest if the tool is informed by international guidance regarding best
practice.
 Guidelines for stakeholder consultation: The tool does not mention local stakeholder
consultations, although provisions exist elsewhere in the CDM modalities and procedures.
213
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 Olsen et al (n200) at 4-5. 
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In its draft form, the tool did contain safeguard provisions, but the CDM EB omitted it from the final tool. Olsen et al 
(n200) at 11 explains that the Secretariat was requested to simplify the tool by leaving out two of the three elements 
in an integrated approach to SD assessment, namely safeguards to avoid negative impacts and enhanced procedures 




  eeting in Februar   015, the CDM EB discussed a concept note on the ‘Voluntar   onitoring of 
Sustainable Development co-benefits’. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Concept note - Voluntary monitoring of sustainable development co-benefits (2015), available at 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/7/S/F7SC8OIAU2RMXJ6E5PNVWGTQ90LDZB/eb82_propan14.pdf?t=VEV8b
3VrbXRofDDUJqMqUfx0zvbopSotBkUj, accessed on 2 May 2017. However, no decision was made to formally 
adopt this. 
213
 In addition, enhanced requirements for local stakeholder consultations were included in the draft SD tool. 
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Guidance for local stakeholder consultations is a core element to ensure that a project activity is 
beneficial to sustainable development priorities and does not result in negative impacts. 
Table 7.6 presents possible ways to improve and enhance the tool, and to improve the consideration 
of sustainable development in the CDM in general.
214 
The CDM SD tool offers an international and flexible definition of sustainable development criteria 
and indicators.
215
 It can help guide national authorities, such as DNAs, to develop their own
214
 Derived from C Arens, F Mersmann, C Beuermann, F Rudolph, KH Olsen, F Bakhtiari, ML Hinostroza & JV 
Fenhann Reforming the CDM SD Tool - Recommendations for Improvement (2015) at 18, available at 
http://orbit.dtu.dk/files/115264238/Reforming_the_CDM_SD_Tool.pdf, accessed on 13 May 2017. 
Table 7.6 Recommendations to improve the SD Tool 
Improving the tool 
Introduce no-harm safeguards 
 Establish no-harm safeguards as mandatory benchmarks;
 These could comprise human rights, good labour practice, anti-corruption
issues, etc.
Develop monitoring and reporting guidelines 
 Global guidelines can be made available and tailored for voluntary use
with the SD tool;
 Keep this monitoring separate from GHG reduction monitoring, to ensure
the SD tool remains voluntary and flexible to use.
Introduce 3
rd
 party validation and verification of sustainable development 
claims 
 Independent validation and verification of sustainable development co-
benefits;
 Keep this separate from validation and verification of GHG reductions.
Link enhanced stakeholder requirements to the CDM SD tool 
 SDC reports could be used as the basis for stakeholder consultations;
 Introduce a grievance mechanism.
Enhancing the tool 
Introduce UNFCCC certification of sustainable development co-benefits 
 A UNFCCC sustainable development certification framework could be
made available to countries that do not have the capacity to develop their
own standards.
Create a global standard for quantification of sustainable development co-
benefits 
 Willingness to pay for extra benefits can be identified and additional
sources of finance for mitigation can be leveraged.
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sustainable development assessments or to adopt a global sustainable development goal tool in 
entirety or in part.
216
 Furthermore, the harmonisation of sustainable development assessment
methods across cooperative approaches is advisable.
217
 An enhanced sustainable development tool
in the SDM that builds on the existing CDM SD tool could lay down common international best 
practice, upon which guidance for cooperative approaches can be built.
218
7.6 A SECTORAL APPROACH 
The third proposal has its point of departure in the CDM, but may be viewed as a stepping stone to 
the SDM. The sectoral approach was proposed as a means to broaden the global scope of GHG 
mitigation to developing countries.
219
 This approach entails a combined industry and government
initiative, which may apply to one sector or to several sectors at once. They may also apply to one 
or to several countries and, in the latter case, may differ from one country to another.
220
A sectoral CDM (S-CDM) approach would maintain some basic elements of the current CDM, but 
would also allow for the development of CDM projects without pre-established limitations in terms 
of territorial coverage or enabling instruments.
221
 Different entities have defined the sectoral
concept in different ways, including the following:  
 a government-driven mechanism that would enable non-Annex I parties to develop local
policy initiatives to discernibly lower GHG emissions in a particular sector;
222
 a policy-based mechanism driven by private role players to combine similar projects within
a country or local region along the lines of a sector;
223
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 R Baron, B Buchner & J Ellis Sectoral approaches and the carbon market (2009) at 6, available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/environment/sectoral-approaches-and-the-carbon-market_5k4559g5snzq-en, accessed 
on 14 May 2017. 
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Resource Economics 1-20 at 2. 
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A Cosbey, JE Parry, J Browne, YD Babu, P Bhandari, J Drexhage & D Murphy ‘Realizing the development 
dividend: Making the CDM work for developing countries’ (2005) at 55-57, available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/climate_realizing_dividend.pdf, accessed on 14 May 2017. 
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 a sectoral baseline where any emission mitigation below the baseline would be credited.
225
As for defining the sector (or the CDM project boundary), developing countries would be 
encouraged to develop sectoral (eg electricity, transport, forestry), territorial (eg cities or regions) or 
a combination of these (eg transport and lighting in a particular city) projects.
226
 In contrast to the
project-based approach of the CDM, a sectoral approach evaluates aggregate emission reductions 
relative to a single sector-wide baseline.
227
The S-CDM approach brings with it a number of design and methodological issues. The first relates 
to the distribution of costs and benefits, as the S-CDM has the potential to turn an instrument that 
was originally aimed at private investment into a tool for governments to finance climate-friendly 
policy measures.
228
 The question then arises as to how much a government could charge for the
preparation of an S-CDM project.
229
The second issue pertains to the determination of a baseline and additionality. Sectoral projects 
have two levels, namely the level of the overall project and the level of the individual actions which 
the project induces.
230
 Consequently, a project would have to utilise a two-level approach, setting a
baseline and demonstrating additionality for both the whole project and for each of the activities.
231
This evidently results in greater complexity. 
The third issue, which stems from the concerns surrounding additionality, refers to double counting. 
If the local project receives CERs for the climate benefit it has achieved and the sectoral project 
224
 D Bodansky, E Diringer, J Pershing & X Wang Strawman elements: Possible approaches to advancing international 
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also receives CERs for the contribution made by the local project, the same climate benefit is, in 
effect, counted twice.
232
 Moreover, since most economic segments are interlinked, the double
counting problem might also arise if there were more than one sectoral project in a particular 
country.
233
The last point of concern has to do with the project approval process. Under the CDM rules, it is the 
prerogative of the host country to check whether a project supports its sustainable development 
claims.
234
 In the case of the S-CDM project, the government would actually be asked to approve its
own plans.
235
Despite the abovementioned problematic points, a sectoral approach to the CDM has several 
benefits. First, it would allow for greater flexibility in modes of investment, as activities 
complementary to direct mitigation could be supported.
236
 It would also expand the range of
mitigation options, which would increase the scale of possible emissions reductions.
237
 Next, the S-
CDM would be better suited to achieving sector-wide transformations.
238
 In addition, sectoral
agreements could result in broadening participation in the case where some major emitting 
countries are not prepared to take on economy-wide targets (as sectoral agreements would offer an 
alternative path to climate commitments).
239
The S-CDM also has the potential to simplify negotiations in sectors with relatively few important 
actors.
240
 The sectoral approach allows states to proceed in an incremental fashion, targeting their
initial efforts to sectors where action is most urgent.
241
 Finally, the S-CDM could address some of
the competitiveness concerns raised by a comprehensive approach.
242
 This is because an
232












 Sterk & Wittneben (n228) at 285 explain that, in particular, the renewable energy, energy efficiency and transport 
projects would be given a boost, as these are problematic to fit into a single-site approach. 
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D Bodansky International sectoral agreements in a post-2012 climate framework (2007) at 5, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028187, accessed on 15 May 2017. 
240
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international sectoral approach could ensure that all global competitors in a given sector undertake 
mitigation efforts – whether fully comparable or differentiated – to reflect equity considerations.
243
With the prospect of the SDM in the Paris Agreement, many developing counties have begun 
refining their climate policies.
244
 Sustainable benefits in the CDM and the proposed SDM have the
potential to  atch developing countries’ needs for sustainable develop ent and cli ate  itigation 
measures.
245
 To that end, Figure 7.5 presents an overall approach as to how such a sectoral
methodology could be attained. 









 Based on text from Chan et al (n227). 
Scope 
•Host countries for SDM activity should be limited to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
•Begin implementation of SDM with a relatively small number of host countries to allow for gradual adoption
of governance norms.
Governance 
•Participation rules for the EB should be reformed to strengthen conflict of interest protection.
•The new SDM EB should establish an oversight committee to maintain transparency within the Board.
•Established DNAs in host countries should be maintained under the SDM. DNAs should seek to engage
domestic central banks to facilitate governance while maintaining national sovereignty.
Sectoral baselines 
•The new SDM EB should adopt standardised methodologies for setting sectoral baselines.
•Sectoral baselines should be defined in terms of absolute emissions.
•Baseline and crediting methods should avoid exemptions to provide the highest level of environmental
integrity.
Emissions accounting 
•Establish multiple baselines that avoid the double counting of the host country's mitigation activities under
their NDC as activity under the SDM.
Re-evaluation 
•The SDM should initially be established with clearly defined goals over short (approximately five-year)
timelines.
•The SDM EB should establish regular evaluation timelines to allow for reflection and adjustment.
•Country-level sector baselines should be re-evaluated regularly on the basis of emissions reductions and
sustainable development.
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To conclude: a sectoral approach to the CDM has several features which could enhance this 
 echanis ’s sustainable develop ent  andate.  owever, an S-CDM cannot be regarded as a cure-
all for the CDM’s shortco ings. The concerns raised about host countries’ sustainable develop ent 
criteria, together with the lack of opportunities for local stakeholders to engage meaningfully in the 
approval process, are independent of the type of projects proposed.
247
 The latter issue was brought
strikingly to the forefront in a failed CDM project in Panama. Apart from all the financial and 
economic aspects, the next section demonstrates that socio-economic factors – in particular human 
rights considerations – are as vital to the success or failure of a CDM project. 
7.7 THE FAILED PANAMA PROJECT - A CAUTIONARY TALE 
In early November 2016, Panama withdrew the Barro Blanco hydroelectric power plant project 
from the CDM registry.
248
 This marked the first time that a host country had withdrawn a CDM
registration, effectively preventing Barro Blanco from issuing offset credits.
249
 Specifically, the
registration was withdrawn due to human rights concerns.
250
 In addition to claims that livelihoods
were destroyed by the flooding of the dam's reservoir, the indigenous Ngäbe people were forcibly 
relocated.
251
 This, coupled with the fact that the residents had not consented to the project, were
viewed as human rights infringements and resulted in the intervention by the international 
environmental NGO, the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL).
252
The Barro Blanco project entailed the construction of a large-scale hydroelectric dam in Western 
Panama. It was registered as a CDM project by the CDM Executive Board under the Kyoto 
Protocol. In June 2011, Barro Blanco was approved as a CDM project at the CDM EB Meeting 
61.
253
 The project was run by Panamanian company GENISA and financed largely by German and 
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 Sterk & Wittneben (n228) at 285. 
248
Carbon Market Watch ‘Barro Blanco carbon credits withdrawn’ ( 016), available at 
http://www.thepanamanews.com/2016/11/carbon-market-watch-barro-blanco-carbon-credits-withdrawn/, accessed on 




 A Chatziantoniou & K Alford-Jones 'Panama withdraws problematic Barro Blanco dam project from CDM registry' 
Centre for International Environmental Law (2016), available at http://www.ciel.org/panama-withdraws-problematic-






For an historical account of the Barro Blanco project, see BF Pérez, JA Hofbauer, M Mayrhofer & PV Calzadilla 




 Although envisioned as a way to contribute to sustainable
development, the dam's reservoir went on to flood indigenous land, homes and cultural artefacts.
255
Ten years after the communities began their defence, the project was formally withdrawn from the 
CDM registry. Criticisms levelled at CDM projects include that these projects usually affect the 
most vulnerable people, the poorest and those who have little political power.
256
 Besides affecting
the quality of life of local communities and indigenous peoples, CDM projects – such as Barro 
Blanco - have also been the direct or indirect cause of displacement, social conflicts and 
repressions.
257
 This, in turn, has resulted in human rights violations affecting, among others, the
right to life, health, safety and physical and psychological integrity.
258
The dual purpose of the CDM should always be borne in mind: to reduce emissions and to promote 
sustainable development in developing countries. Several CDM projects, however, have 'lacked 
environmental integrity, failed to contribute to sustainable development, and others have had 
serious social, environmental and human rights consequences'.
259
 The Barro Blanco case is





Notwithstanding the fact that large-scale renewable energy projects are a means of attaining a 
country's carbon emission reduction goals under the Paris Agreement, they come with their own 
'environmental and social harms'.
262
 In fact, a coalition of more than 300 civil society organisations
from 53 countries released a global manifesto to pressure governments and financiers at the Paris 
climate talks to exclude hydropower projects from the list of sustainable initiatives.
263
 If excluded,
rights' (2016) 12(1) Law, Environment and Development Journal 12-16. The DOE for the validation report was the 
Spanish Association for Standardisation and Certification.  
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 For a discussion of a human rights based approach to climate change, including the benefits and drawbacks of such 
an approach, see D Bodansky, J Brunnée & L Rajamani International Climate Change Law (2017) at 296-313. 
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 Ibid. The authors report that artificial reservoirs created by large-scale dams may emit large amounts of methane gas, 
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263
International Rivers A Civil Society Manifesto for the Support of Real Climate Solutions (2015), available at 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/node/9204, accessed on 17 April 2017. 
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such projects would not be eligible to receive financial incentives under programmes like the CDM 
or GCF.
264
Overall, the Barro Blanco project embodies a number of problematic issues which are 'common' to 
the implementation of CDM projects.
265
 The first is the failure of the CDM institutions to define
clear criteria for sustainable development.
266
 It will be recalled from the previous chapter that there
is no definition of 'sustainable development' under the CDM. Each host country therefore has the 
prerogative of determining whether a CDM project contributes to its sustainable development or 
not. The South African DNA applies a list of sustainable development indicators to assess the 
potential contribution of a CDM project (refer to Table 6.1 in the previous chapter). The previous 
chapter also demonstrated (in Figure 6.5) that social criteria scored the least in South African CDM 
projects. This is not to say that there are impending human rights violations, but merely to highlight 
the fact that social indicators are often not prioritised. 
The second issue relates to stakeholder consultation that is compatible with international human 
rights standards and the lack of authority to review such compliance.
267
 The third concerns the role
of the banks involved, as they failed to exercise due diligence at the initial stages of the 
development of the project.
268
Barro Blanco serves as a cautionary tale for governments, companies and financiers that renewable 
energy projects must meet the same social and environmental standards as any other project. This 
includes environmental impact assessments and proper consultation with affected communities. 
264
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The UNFCCC mandates that lessons learned from existing Kyoto Protocol mechanisms must be 
applied in developing modalities and procedures for the SDM.
269
 Although many concepts that
appear in Art 6(4) of the Paris Agreement (ie the SDM) are generally accepted, there will also be 
many that require negotiations. The challenge will be to do so without going into a renegotiation of 
the Paris Agreement. This chapter aimed to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the drivers 
and barriers of the CDM, so as to derive policy recommendations on how to increase the future 
uptake of the SDM.  
Although the CDM is beset by numerous hurdles (including a volatile carbon price, setting a 
baseline and determining additionality, problematic technology transfer, policy and legislative 
uncertainty and high transaction costs), these are not insurmountable. Recommendations were made 
to accelerate the implementation of the CDM - and by analogy future SDM projects - in the South 
African industry. These included: developing a clear understanding of the workings of the CDM 
and SDM for all stakeholders involved; streamlining of government processes; breaking the Eskom 
monopoly and strengthening the REIPPPP; and enhancing communications between stakeholders, 
the media and the public. In addition to highlighting specific measures targeting the above 
shortcomings, this chapter also examined three proposals which could assist as stepping stones for 
transitioning from the CDM to the SDM.  
The first pertains to linking the CDM with the GCF in order to enhance climate mitigation as a 
whole. It was demonstrated that many similarities exist between the scope and modalities of both 
institutions. This leads to an opportunity for the GCF to make use of the CDM's MRV framework to 
enhance its results-oriented approach for financing mitigation action. 
The second refers to extending the range of the SD tool to beyond the CDM, so as to harmonise 
sustainable development assessment and reporting requirements in other mitigation mechanisms 
(most notably the SDM).
270
 In addition to recommending improvements to the existing SD tool, the
thesis also advocated that the SDM build on the existing SD tool to ordain common international 
best practice, upon which guidance for cooperative approaches could be built. 
269
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Finally, a sectoral approach was considered to hold promising opportunities for enhancing the 
CDM's sustainable development mandate. Although the S-CDM is not a panacea for all the 
shortcomings of the CDM, the thesis presented an overall approach for transitioning to a sectoral-
based SDM by addressing the scope, governance, sectoral baselines, emissions accounting and re-
evaluation matters. 
The failed Panama project demonstrated that in order for the CDM (and the SDM) to achieve long-
term success, the business-centric approach followed by CDM project investors would have to shift 
increasingly to the attainment of the social, economic and environmental benefits for local 
communities. In so doing, sustainable development will be within reach. This will necessitate 
greater public participation of local stakeholders to ensure that people affected by a CDM project 
can provide a timely and meaningful input to a proposed project.  
It is evident that many lessons have been learned from the CDM, and that this knowledge will prove 
indispensable with the design and implementation of the SDM. The next, and final, chapter will 
draw on these lessons and make further recommendations for policymakers, investors and 
financiers to help ensure the success of the SDM. The thesis will conclude with a proposal of 




8.1  OVERVIEW 
The research underlying this thesis was undertaken during the period from 2015 to 2017, and was 
inspired by the 'spirit of Paris' in upholding a culture of multilateralism, the rule of law and trust 
between nations. This thesis came about during a critical juncture in the climate change timeline, 
when policymakers, academics and other stakeholders were contemplating the end of the Kyoto era 
and the beginning of the Paris age.  
In an endeavour to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding this transition, this study was 
primarily concerned with learning from past experience with the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), in order to consider the future of the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) 
provided for in Art 6(4) of the Paris Agreement. In so doing, a critical assessment of the SDM was 
undertaken by examining the prospects and challenges of its predecessor, the CDM. 
To achieve this overall objective, Chapter 2 contextualised the CDM/SDM study against the 
backdrop of a theoretical framework relating to the concepts and principles pertaining to market-
based instruments (MBIs), with a particular focus on environmental taxes and carbon offsets.  
Having laid the theoretical foundation in the previous chapter, Chapter 3 subsequently examined the 
Kyoto Protocol, particularly Art 12, which contains the CDM. It was indicated that the CDM only 
applies to developing countries (or non-Annex I parties), such as South Africa. Thereafter, the 
chapter investigated the theoretical and policy considerations underlying the legal aspects of the 
CDM with the aim of assessing how they will be expanded upon by the SDM. The architectural 
components of the Paris Agreement were explored in order to contextualise the origin and proposed 
implementation of the SDM. Lastly, the chapter reflected on transitional arrangements for existing 
CDM projects. It was found that the Paris Agreement had moved purposefully beyond the distinct 
categories between developed and developing countries, as exemplified by the distinction between 
Annex I and non-Annex I parties. The chapter also revealed the manifold interpretational issues 
which remain to be resolved in the coming years.  
Against this background, Chapter 4 described the law and policy framework governing the CDM – 
and, by extension, the SDM – in South Africa. The point of departure is the concept of 'sustainable 
development', which is an environmental right entrenched in the Constitution and elaborated on by 
the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA). The chapter outlined the use of tax 
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incentives to enhance the uptake of renewable energy. Thereafter, the role of local government in 
implementing green reform was explored. It was found that the country's many domestic policies 
(including the National Climate Change Response Strategy) have the potential to create an enabling 
environment for the SDM. However, a co-ordinated and integrated regulatory approach, together 
with a concerted effort by the various government spheres, will be needed to move successfully to a 
sustainable energy future. 
Having considered the policies and politics which inform the workings of the CDM, Chapter 5 
observed the status of the CDM from an international perspective, elaborating on the CDM network 
of the BRICS member countries. High-level analytics revealed that South Africa's CDM per capita 
ranked lowest of the BRICS grouping. Regrettably, the country also had (by a far margin) the 
highest CO2 emissions per capita. When applying a different metric, namely that of CDM as a 
percentage of GDP, South Africa was on par with Brazil. Encouragingly, South Africa ranked first 
in terms of the estimated CO2e reductions per CDM project. With the notable exception of Russia 
(which does not participate in the CDM), it was noted that all BRICS countries had ratified the Paris 
Agreement. However, as regards the commitment to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, it 
was found that all the countries fell short in their targets to limit warming to below 2°C. 
It became apparent that a further in-depth study of South Africa's CDM projects was required in 
order to evaluate its success with greater accuracy. Consequently, Chapter 6 provided a quantitative 
analysis of all 56 registered CDM projects in South Africa, by assigning sustainable development 
criteria to the goals stated in each project design document. The empirical analysis demonstrated 
that CDM projects did have a positive impact on the various facets of sustainable development in 
South Africa. The indicators mentioned most frequently were job creation and poverty alleviation, 
the promotion of reliable and renewable energy and the reduction of pollution. The UNFCCC has 
identified 24 different CDM project types or technologies (refer to para 6.3.2), of which 13 are 
employed in South Africa. Chapter 6 indicated that most CDM projects in South Africa were 
energy-related. It could therefore be surmised that existing CDM (and future SDM projects) play a 
vital role in contributing to South Africa's sustainable energy future. 
Notwithstanding that the CDM has achieved some level of success, it became evident that certain 
impediments hindered a more extensive roll-out of CDM projects. Chapter 7 sought to identify the 
barriers which prevented the expansion of the CDM. These hurdles include a volatile carbon price, 
setting a baseline and determining additionality, problematic technology transfer, policy and 
legislative uncertainty and high transaction costs.  
Two case studies were analysed in this thesis. The local Kuyasa CDM project demonstrated that 
small-scale initiatives require an appropriate, affordable and effective verification mechanism, 
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together with a sustainable financial model, in order to be successful. The Panama project 
demonstrated that, in order for the CDM (and the SDM) to achieve long-term success, the business-
centric approach followed by CDM project investors will have to shift increasingly to the 
attainment of social, economic and environmental benefits for local communities.  
In addition to highlighting specific measures aimed at overcoming the barriers which beset the 
CDM, this study also examined three proposals which could assist as stepping stones for 
transitioning from the CDM to the SDM. These, as well as other recommendations, are set out 
below. 
8.2  KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the eventual architecture of the SDM is in the process of development and, as such, is not 
yet clear, this thesis has demonstrated that many lessons can and should be learned from the CDM, 
as outlined in the subsequent paragraphs. This knowledge is sure to prove indispensable with the 
design and implementation of the SDM.  
An initial suggestion is that the SDM is a successor to the CDM and should replace the CDM from 
2020 onwards. However, this remains a contentious point. Ultimately, two key differences between 
the existing CDM and the proposed SDM were identified. First, carbon markets will no longer be 
limited to developed country parties. Instead, all parties will be able to participate in this 
mechanism. This is in line with the abandonment of the distinct differentiation between Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries alluded to above. Secondly, under the CDM, every tonne of CO2 reduced in 
a non-Annex I country allowed for an additional tonne to be emitted in an Annex I country. This 
was, at best, a zero-sum game. In contrast, the SDM aims to ensure an overall reduction in global 
emissions. 
Moreover, this thesis posits that the South African government remains constitutionally bound to 
apply domestic law in a manner that is consistent with its international law obligations. As a result 
(refer to para 4.2.2), the commitments made by South Africa under the Paris Agreement will 
become binding at a domestic level once enacted into national law. 
Whether the CDM will continue to exist alongside the SDM, or will be replaced by it instead, is as 
yet uncertain. At any rate, some sort of transition will be required. Below are key recommendations 
to facilitate this transition, while the full discussions on which these are based are contained in 
previous chapters. 
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8.2.1 Carbon offsetting for the imminent carbon tax in South Africa 
The CDM is a fully-fledged, internationally regulated carbon offset standard which has also been 
domestically approved as a carbon offset methodology. As discussed in Chapter 2, the use of the 
current existing standards to issue Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) will enhance the 
credibility and confidence in the market with regards to the carbon offset mechanisms. This will 
also ensure that a degree of local familiarity and existing competence in these standards can be 
capitalised on to implement and expedite the process of issuing CERs in South Africa. It is 
suggested that the CDM will move increasingly into the spotlight in South Africa, as it will serve as 
a useful mechanism for reducing (or offsetting) the impending carbon tax liability. 
8.2.2 Transitional arrangements for existing CDM projects 
On the basis that there is no sunset clause for the Kyoto Protocol or its CDM mechanism, existing 
CDM projects can formally continue to exist beyond 2020. Whether the CDM can generate new 
credits after 2020 is a contentious issue.
1
 However, even if there was a clear consensus that the
CDM could continue to issue credits post-2020, it is uncertain whether parties would be likely to 
agree politically on the continuation of these mechanisms.
2
 Between the two extremes of the
discontinuation of existing projects and quasi-automatic continuation under the SDM, are a range of 
non-mutually exclusive options which would allow some projects to continue generating credits 
under the SDM. Section 4.5 identified these options as the -  
 Continuation of certain project types;
 Continuation only in certain countries;
 Continuation after an adjustment to the baseline, which takes the host country's Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC) into account; or
 Continuation after a re-registration of the project under the rules, modalities and procedures of
the SDM.
1
 M Cames, S Healy, D Tänzler, L Li, J Melnikova, C Warnecke, M Kurdziel International market mechanisms after 
Paris – Discussion Paper (2016) at 17-18, available at https://newclimate.org/2016/11/17/international-market-
mechanisms-after-paris/, accessed on 2 January 2017. The authors remark (at 23) that the administration of 
mechanisms is likely to continue for approximately three years beyond 2020 to ensure that all requirements for the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol can be appropriately processed. 
2
 Ibid. The authors contend that it seems 'very unlikely' that the CDM will continue to issue credits, as when the SDM 
comes into force, there is little sense in maintaining other crediting mechanisms which aim to reduce the same 
emissions and are largely based on the same concepts, but which do not take into account the new context under the 
Paris Agreement. 
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It was recommended that an important criterion for judging which option (or combination of 
options) is most appropriate is their potential contribution to reducing global GHG emissions. 
8.2.3 Local governance 
Two necessary components for ensuring the success of a CDM project were posited in section 4.4. 
These are the necessity of a 'champion' for the project at a municipal level, where this individual is 
supported by an advisory team with the necessary technical, legal and financial skills.
3
 Moreover, it
was recommended that the municipality where the CDM/SDM project is physically located ensures 
that all procedural and regulatory approvals are identified and properly addressed.  
This study also suggested that local governments should improve their institutional planning 
processes, increase transparency around local development decision-making processes, and 
emphasise meaningful public participatory processes. It was further advised that municipalities 
align their social economic plans (as developed by renewable energy projects) with local 
government development planning processes.  
Finally, it was recommended that the South African national government should increase its 
capacity and perceived efficiency, while also promoting inter-departmental cooperation, so as to 
attract private investments. 
8.2.4 Contribution of past CDM and future SDM projects to sustainable development 
It was recommended (in section 6.5) that one way of achieving a greater contribution to sustainable 
development in South Africa would be for the CDM policy to expand its focus to the promotion of 
sustainable development criteria as a whole, and not focus exclusively on GHG reductions. To this 
end, two policies were suggested. 
The first is the implementation of a points system, which allocates points based on development 
aspects of CDM projects. All projects could be required to attain a minimum level of points in order 
for sustainable development benefits to be accepted. The second is a CER value adjustment to be 
3
Whether the municipality would have the necessary resources and skills to facilitate this is, of course, highly 
questionable. Most South African municipalities are chronically underfunded, underskilled and lack the necessary 
leadership accountability to curb irregular expenditure. See, for example, the latest Auditor-General report wherein 
only 49 out of 263 municipalities obtained clean audit reports. S Ndlendle 'Auditor-General Report: Municipalities 
lack accountability' (2017), available at https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/auditor-general-report-municipalities-
lack-accountability-9904121, accessed on 12 August 2017. 
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made in cases where CDM projects favour high CERs, but low sustainable development or 
distributional benefits. 
The failed Panama project (see section 7.7) demonstrated that governments, companies and 
financiers of renewable energy projects are required to meet the same social and environmental 
standards as any other project. This includes environmental impact assessments and proper 
consultation with affected communities. Moreover, it was recommended that greater public 
participation by local stakeholders is necessary to ensure that people affected by a CDM project are 
able to provide a timely and meaningful input to a proposed project. 
8.2.5 Recommendations to promote the South African CDM industry 
Section 7.3 suggested the following interventions to accelerate the implementation of the CDM in 
the South African industry and, by extension, to future SDM projects: 
 A clear understanding of the Kyoto Protocol (and now Paris Agreement) mechanisms and the
opportunities for South Africa must be developed by all stakeholder groups.
 The national processes supporting CDM must be streamlined by government to facilitate project
implementation.
 The South African energy market must be opened up to reduce the dominance of Eskom and
fossil-based power. To this end, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer
Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) (as discussed in Chapter 4), as well as the privatisation of
the state-owned entity Eskom, can have a considerable impact.
 Business should take the lead and drive the CDM in South Africa.
 Formal structures are required to facilitate communication between stakeholders to prevent a
'silo' mindset.
 The CDM should be promoted in order to change perceptions in the media and public.
 South Africa can learn from successful non-Annex I countries.
8.2.6 Linking the CDM to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
As discussed in section 7.4, the GCF is positioned to become the key vehicle for large-scale 
international climate finance under the UNFCCC. As the GCF is still at an early stage of its 
institutional development, an opportunity exists for collaboration between the CDM (and future 
SDM projects) and the GCF. It was demonstrated that many similarities exist between the scope and 
modalities of both institutions. This leads to an opportunity for the GCF to make use of the CDM's 
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Measurement and Evaluation (MRV) framework to enhance its results-oriented approach for 
financing mitigation action. In addition, the CDM can support the GCF in leveraging private capital 
from investors seeking investment opportunities in green asset classes. On the other hand, the CDM 
can gain an important source of demand for CERs. It was found that the CDM does not currently 
comply with the safeguard policies of the GCF, and should therefore adopt a similar grievance 
mechanism. 
8.2.7 The CDM Sustainable Development Tool 
Another recommendation (refer to the outline in section 7.5) pertains to a tool that has emerged as 
part of the CDM experience and which could be carried forward to the SDM. The Sustainable 
Development (SD) tool offers an international and flexible definition of sustainable development 
criteria and indicators. It can assist in guiding national authorities, such as Designated National 
Authorities (DNAs), to develop their own sustainable development assessments or to adopt a global 
sustainable development goal tool. This thesis identified a number of shortcomings of the SD tool, 
as well as making recommendations for improvements. It was found that an enhanced sustainable 
development tool in the SDM, which builds on the existing CDM SD tool, could lay down common 
international best practice, upon which guidance for cooperative approaches could be built. 
8.2.8 A sectoral CDM approach 
A sectoral CDM (S-CDM) approach was recommended (in section 7.6) to serve as a stepping stone 
from the CDM to the SDM. This entails a combined industry and government initiative, which may 
apply to one sector or to several sectors at once. The S-CDM approach would maintain some basic 
elements of the current CDM, but would also allow for the development of CDM projects without 
pre-established limitations in terms of territorial coverage or enabling instruments. This thesis 
presented an overall approach for transitioning to a sectoral-based SDM by addressing the scope, 
governance, sectoral baselines, emissions accounting and re-evaluation matters. 
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8.2.9 Recommendations for policymakers, investors and financiers 
The following lessons learned from the CDM experience should provide insight to future SDM 
participants regarding the transition from the CDM. In particular, recommendations for 
policymakers include:
4
 Create an overall enabling environment for businesses to operate in by ensuring the
enforceability of contracts, improving the reliability of regulation and reducing administrative
burdens.
 Use public finance mechanisms to allocate risk effectively between the public and private
sector;
 Establish a well-functioning DNA, which can take decisions quickly and transparently, build
capacity and share experiences with other DNAs in the region and broader continent; and
 DNAs must be embedded within a broader national economic development framework.
For investors and finance providers, the following recommendations are suggested:
5
 Investors should engage with public institutions more systematically on the issue of risk
sharing;
 The inability to mobilise local finance could be bridged by the development of a public finance
mechanism, for example, by providing guarantees to local financial institutions;
 Investors should increase their collaboration with local financial institutions and project
developers in awareness-raising and capacity-building efforts; and
 Investors and lenders must ensure the integration of multiple revenue streams, which increases
the viability and resilience of the business model. At the same time, projects should be aligned
with local development needs to ensure early buy-in and support from relevant stakeholders.
8.2.10 Implementation of the SDM 
In addition to the transitional arrangements proposed in para 8.2.2 above, the following practical 
steps are recommended during this transition period:
6
4
 UNEP ‘And  et it  oves. Success stories and drivers of CDM project develop ent in sub-Saharan Africa’ ( 011) at 
45, available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/and_yet_it_moves_01.pdf, accessed on 11 May 2017. 
5
 Id at 45-46. 
6
 Carbon Market Watch ‘ ood-bye Kyoto: transitioning awa  fro  offsetting after  010’ ( 017) at 6-7, available at 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Good-bye-Kyoto_Transitioning-away-from-offsetting-
after-2020_WEB_1final.pdf, accessed 11 May 2017. 
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1. Design the SDM as a tool for results-based climate finance: the CDM’s  ethodologies to
reduce emissions and criteria to evaluate additionality should be retained, but adapted for the
SDM.
2. Transition period registration from the CDM to the SDM: consensus seems to exist that there
will be no new co  it ent period after the K oto Protocol’s second co  it ent period
expires in 2020. The demand for carbon offsets to fulfil pre-2020 pledges is very limited and, as
such, CDM project registrations should be stopped in 2018.
7
 From 2018, new projects should
seek registration under the Paris Agreement rulebook.
3. Set a cut-off date for the use of CDM credits: the use of CDM credits should be restricted to the
Kyoto time horizon, with a decision to stop credit issuance and usage by the end of the true-up
period in 2023.
8
4. Inform a new, reformed SDM supervisory body: the CDM Executive Board (EB) should be
dissolved and a new body designated to oversee the SDM. The CDM EB has accumulated
revenues generated by the CDM which could be used to establish the new SDM supervisory
body. Equally importantly, the wealth of knowledge and experience of the CDM EB should
inform the formation of the new body.
5. Adapt CDM infrastructure: the CDM has built valuable capacity in developing countries and its
various structures and procedures could be adapted and reformed for use under the SDM.
9
 Civil
society should play an integral role on panels and in working groups.
6. Establish a COP/MOP process to guide the transition process: Notwithstanding that the reform
process for the CDM was originally scheduled for finalisation by December 2013, it has yet to
be concluded. The considerations and discussions in the CDM reform process should feed into
the design of the new SDM.
8.3  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The CDM – one of the flexible mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol – has evolved 
significantly over time, broadening its applicability to a large number of sectors, while introducing 
programmatic and standardised approaches. Despite the crash in carbon prices, the CDM 
7
 COP24 will take place in Poland in 2018. 
8
 This is when parties have to report on how they have met their emission reduction commitments up to 2020. 
9
 Such structures could include the Designated National Authorities (DNAs), Designated Operational Entities (DoEs), 
panels and working groups. 
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successfully attracted private sector investment in projects hosted in developing countries and 
created an internationally recognised framework for realising mitigation action.  
The different legal frameworks of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement give rise to a 
number of challenges in implementing the SDM. The Kyoto Protocol's commitment periods will 
end in 2020. It is therefore incumbent upon the parties to decide actively how to transition the 
Kyoto Protocol's mechanisms, including the CDM, into the Paris Agreement. This transition should 
take advantage of the valuable CDM lessons enumerated above in order to shape the SDM. Indeed, 
Christiana Figueres (former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC), stated that we are 'in a very 
privileged situation of being able to live up to the expectations of the Paris Agreement, because we 
have more than a decade of experience with the CDM'.
10
Although the Paris Agreement established the new SDM, this mechanism has not yet been 
implemented. Until such time as the SDM comes into effect, 'value remains in using the CDM for 
prompt climate action with international recognition'.
11
 This thesis found (particularly in para
4.3.3.) that many of the principles listed for the SDM mirror those of the CDM.  Notwithstanding 
that many concepts which appear in the SDM are generally accepted, there will also be many that 
will require negotiations. The challenge will be to do so without straying into a renegotiation of the 
Paris Agreement. A lot has been learned from the Kyoto mechanisms, and that knowledge is sure to 
prove valuable. 
New instruments (such as the SDM) under the Paris Agreement may come, over time, and 
eventually replace the CDM. However, it is fair to say that the CDM is a working tool for use by 
parties at present and that the experience gained with the CDM will also prove useful for the future. 
While this thesis calls for a bridge between the CDM and the SDM, it remains a vital issue for 
consideration by the parties concerned.
12
10
 United Nations (UN) 'Lessons from Clean Development Mechanism Critical to Implementation of Paris Agreement' 
(2016), available at http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/lessons-clean-development-mechanism-
implementation-paris-agreement/, accessed on 20 July 2017. 
11
 V Silva, L Brusa & N Muller 'Contribution the details: The link between the Clean Development Mechanism and 
Nationally Determined Contributions to climate action' (2017) at 20, available at 
http://www.carbon-
mechanisms.de/fileadmin/media/dokumente/Publikationen/CMR/CMR_2016_02_Towards_Implementation_eng_bf.
pdf, accessed on 8 March 2017. 
12
 Indeed, as D Bodansky, J Brunnée & L Rajamani International Climate Change Law (2017) at 248 succinctly 
remark, 'the post-Paris negotiations have crucial gap-filling work to do'. 
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ANNEXURE A - Extracts from the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement 
Kyoto Protocol, Art 12 – The CDM 
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Paris Agreement, Art 6(4) – The SDM 
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ANNEXURE B - Funding available for CDM projects 
This annexure provides an overview of the development finance institutions, and local financiers 
and investors in both the public and private sectors that provide opportunities for start-up CDM 
projects. Table B-11 below is not exhaustive, but intends to be indicative of the more green-focused 
funds and incentives available.
2
Table B-1 Funding available for CDM projects 







Loan, Equity www.ifc.org 
European 
Investment Bank 

















 Grant: projects with total capital investments in the range of
US$ 30-200 million
 Equity: For IPPs with an ideal size of 5-50MW and a








Grant Up to US$ 50 000 
https://sgp.undp.org/ 
1
 Adapted from Greencape Utility-scale renewable energy sectors 2016 – Market Intelligence Report (2016) at 28-31, 
available at http://greencape.co.za/assets/GreenCape-Renewable-Energy-MIR-2016.pdf, accessed on 12 January 
2017. 
2
In addition to these, the full range of government investment incentives can be found at 
http://www.investmentincentives.co.za/, accessed on 1 February 2017. Also, all website references in this table were 
















































of South Africa: 
Green Fund 
Grant, Loan Green cities and towns; low carbon economy; environmental and 





Grant 10%-30% of the total qualifying infrastructural development costs, 










Loan Up to R50 million at a fixed rate of 4% p.a. 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/financial_assistance/MCEP.jsp 
Note: Despite being temporarily suspended in October 2015, the 
MCEP has since been re-opened for applications 









Note: Despite being temporarily suspended in October 2015, the 





Grant  New or expansion projects < R5 million: investment grant of
30% of the cost of qualifying assets
 New or expansion projects > R5 million: investment grant of
15% to 30% of the cost of qualifying assets
















Initiative of South 
Africa  









Private Sector Funding 




Loan, Rebate Rebate of up to 7% of the loan amount, for clients who qualify for a 







FNB Loan Eco-energy business loans with flexible terms 
https://www.fnb.co.za/business-banking/business-
loan/ecoEnergyLoan.html 














Equity, Loan R0.5 – R30 million 
http://www.businesspartners.co.za/general-finance-solutions/green-
fund/ 














POLYCO Loan, Grant Financial assistance may take the form of a capital interest-free 








ANNEXURE C - Summary of statistical analysis on Project Design Documents 
for South African CDM projects 
Chapter 6 assessed the contribution of CDM projects to sustainable development in South Africa. 
The project design documents (PDDs) of all 56 registered CDM projects in South Africa were 
scrutinised in order to measure their contribution to sustainable development. The sustainable 
development claims in the PDDs of these projects were tabulated using the indicators in Table 7.1. 
The spreadsheet on the next page reflects the working paper of the author, with the digit '1' 
indicating whether a particular indicator was found in the respective PDD. 
303 
Nr Registered Ref Province Project type
Year Province Project type Ind1 Ind2 Ind3 Ind4 Ind5 Ind6 Ind7 Ind8 Ind9 Ind10
1 20/12/2014 10005 NW Fossil  fuel switch 1 1 1
2 22/05/2014 8369 EC Biomass 1 1 1 1 1
3 15/07/2013 8956 NW EE own generation 1 1 1 1
4 24/06/2013 6669 NW EE own generation 1 1 1
5 31/12/2012 8951 EC Wind 1 1 1 1
6 31/12/2012 7576 EC Wind 1 1
7 31/12/2012 8928 KZN EE own generation 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 29/12/2012 9412 Gau EE Service 1 1 1 1
9 28/12/2012 9238 Gau EE industry 1 1 1 1
10 28/12/2012 9187 KZN EE industry 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 27/12/2012 8372 EC Biomass 1 1 1 1 1
12 27/12/2012 8967 NW EE own generation 1 1 1
13 24/12/2012 8954 EC Wind
14 24/12/2012 8289 EC Wind 1 1 1
15 20/12/2012 7476 Mpu Biomass 1 1 1 1 1
16 18/12/2012 5884 WC EE own generation 1 1 1 1
17 13/12/2012 8346 WC Wind 1 1 1 1
18 13/12/2012 8404 WC Wind 1 1
19 13/12/2012 7531 NC Solar 1 1 1
20 12/12/2012 8566 Mpu EE own generation 1 1 1 1
21 12/12/2012 8525 Mpu EE own generation 1 1 1 1
22 11/12/2012 7356 EC, KZN, NW EE household 1 1 1 1 1
23 05/12/2012 7492 NC Solar 1 1 1
24 23/11/2012 8107 WC Wind 1 1 1 1
25 15/11/2012 8047 KZN Methane Avoidance 1 1 1 1
26 14/11/2012 8087 NC, WC Wind 1 1 1
27 14/11/2012 7816 WC Wind 1 1 1
28 14/11/2012 8148 NC, WC Solar 1 1 1
29 12/11/2012 6797 Gau Landfil l 1 1 1 1 1
30 05/11/2012 7536 NC Hydro 1 1 1
31 26/10/2012 7841 NC Solar 1 1 1
32 22/10/2012 7607 NC Solar 1 1 1
33 10/10/2012 7478
Gau, Free State, 
Lim, Mpu, NC EE household 1 1 1 1 1 1
34 10/10/2012 7638 EC Wind 1 1 1
35 24/05/2012 5692 EC Landfil l 1 1 1 1
36 30/04/2012 6083 Free State N2O 1 1 1 1
37 10/06/2011 4728 Free State Fugitive 1 1 1 1 1
38 25/12/2010 3398 Gau Fossil  fuel switch 1 1 1
39 26/10/2010 3677 Gau Landfil l 1 1 1 1
40 08/10/2009 2692 Free State Hydro 1 1
41 24/08/2009 2549 KZN Landfil l 1 1 1 1
42 26/03/2009 1921 KZN Landfil l 1 1 1
43 18/07/2008 1665 Mpu EE own generation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
44 08/02/2008 1364 Gau N2O 1 1 1 1
45 05/11/2007 1171 Gau N2O 1 1 1 1
46 19/10/2007 1027 Gau EE industry 1 1 1
47 25/05/2007 961 Free State, Mpu N2O 1
48 20/05/2007 966 KZN Biomass 1 1 1 1
49 03/05/2007 752 Free State N2O 1 1
50 27/04/2007 925 Gau Landfil l 1 1 1
51 12/02/2007 795 KZN Biomass 1 1
52 15/12/2006 545 KZN Landfil l 1 1 1 1
53 29/09/2006 358 Gau Fossil  fuel switch 1 1 1
54 29/09/2006 446 WC Methane avoidance 1 1 1
55 06/03/2006 177 Gau Fossil  fuel switch 1 1 1
56 27/08/2005 79 WC EE household 1 1 1
Dimension
Economic Environmental Social
